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xGlossary
Acculturation
A process in which members of one cultural group adopt the belief and behaviours of
another group.
Asset
Any item of economic value owned by an individual or corporation.
Banking Consolidation
The transfer of ownership in a payment and settlement context through mergers and
acquisitions and other developments within the financial industry.
Banking Crisis
A systemic crisis episode in which significant segments of the banking sector become
insolvent or illiquid, and cannot continue to operate without special assistance from
the monetary or supervisory authorities.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
The Bank for International Settlements is an international organisation which fosters
international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a bank for central
banks.
Business Environment
Encompasses all those factors that affect a company’s operations, and includes
customers, competitors, stakeholders, suppliers, industry trends, regulations, other
government activities, social and economic factors and technological developments.
Bankruptcy
Legally declared impairment of ability of an individual or organisation to pay its
creditors.
Capital Adequacy
A measure of the financial strength of a bank or securities firm, usually expressed as
a ratio of its capital to its assets.
Capital Base
The issued capital of a company, plus reserves and retained profits.
Capital Flight
Short term private capital outflows.
Credit
Is the trust which allows one party to provide resources to another party where that
second party does not reimburse the first party immediately, but instead arranges
xi
either to repay or return those resources at a later date.
Credit Bureaus
Organisations providing information on individuals borrowing and bill paying habits.
This helps lenders assess credit worthiness, the ability to pay back a loan, and can
affect the interest rate and other terms of a loan.
Cultural Fit
The compatibility between individual and organisational values, beliefs, attitudes and
behaviours.
Currency Crisis
A speculative attack on the exchange value of a national currency resulting in the
devaluation of the currency.
Deposit
The liability owed by the bank to its depositor.
Deposit insurance
A measure implemented to protect bank depositors, in full or in part, from losses
caused by a bank’s inability to pay its debts when due.
Deregulation
The removal or simplification of government rules and regulations that constrain the
operation of market forces.
Financial Deregulation
Exposing existing banks to greater competition through new entry, freeing interest
and deposit rates, and allowing banks to move into geographical areas and products
from which they had been barred.
Group of 10 (G-10)
The Group of Ten is made up of eleven industrial countries which consult and co-
operate on economic, monetary and financial matters.
Human Capital
The set of skills which an employee acquires on the job, through training and
experience, and which increase that employee’s value in the marketplace.
Intermediation
Matching of lenders with savings to borrowers who need money by an agent or third
party, such as a bank.
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The International Monetary Fund is the principal international banking regulator. It
xii
issues advisory reports, which member countries often act on, about credit-
worthiness, banking quality and public spending.
Keynesian model
Allows monetary policy to have long-run effects on unemployment, real wages, and
income distribution, but growth is not affected.
Liberalisation
The relaxation of previous government restrictions, usually in areas of social or
economic policy.
Management Incentives
Programs particularly used in business management to motivate employees
Non-Performing Loan
Lending money without sound credit analysis, which results to defaults in repayment.
Optimal Resource Allocation
The most efficient allocation of resources.
Organisational Culture
Describes the psychology, attitudes, experiences, beliefs and values of an
organisation.
Organisational Values
The acceptable standards which govern the behaviour of individuals within an
organisation.
Policy Instruments
Is the term used to describe some methods used by government to achieve a
desired effect. The two basic types of policy instruments are regulatory and
economic instruments.
Public offering
A public offering occurs when a company raises capital by issuing common stock or
shares to the public.
Recapitalisation
A change in a company’s capital structure, such as an exchange of bonds for stock.
Recapitalisation is often undertaken with the aim of making the company’s capital
structure more stable, and sometimes to boost the company’s stock price.
Recession
A recession occurs when a business cycle contracts, this generally leads to a
slowdown in economic activity over a period of time (i.e. more than two consecutive
xiii
quarters).
Risk Diversification
Strategy designed to reduce exposure to risk by combining a variety of investments.
Rural Bank
A rural bank has the power to provide credit facilities to farmers and merchants or to
cooperatives of such farmers and merchants and, in general, to the people of the
rural communities in which the rural bank operates.
Strategic Fit
The degree to which an organisation is matching its resources and capabilities with
the opportunities in the external environment.
Universal Banking
In universal banking, large banks operate extensive networks of branches, provide
many different services, hold several claims on firms (including equity and debt), and
participate directly in the corporate governance of firms that rely on the banks for
funding or as insurance underwriters (Calomiris 1995).
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Abstract
In an attempt to correct economic shortfalls, authorities in Nigeria deployed
consolidation as the main policy instrument in the 2004-2006 reform of the
banking industry. The Central Bank of Nigeria drew lessons from similar
challenges faced by Malaysian and Indonesian authorities. Nigerian banks
were given an 18 month window, to achieve an increased minimum capital
base of N25 billion. To survive, banks could either raise the new
requirements on their own or engage in mergers or acquisitions. The process
of consolidation resulted in the reduction of banks from 89 to 24 and the
emergence of three categories of banks namely: Stand alone, Common
ownership, and Common interest banks.
Primarily, this study examines change management practices of senior bank
managers directly involved in implementing consolidation in Nigeria, and the
impact of consolidation on credit availability to the private sector. Aggregate
secondary data on the Nigerian banking industry from 2001-2009 were
analysed and used to inform in-depth semi-structured interviews with
thirteen senior bank managers and a respected independent financial
analyst. Mixed methods were used to conduct further analysis. A conceptual
framework was developed through an extension of Pettigrew’s 1988 model,
while a modified Berger et al. 1998 model was deployed to test credit
availability. Findings indicate that most aspects of organisational change
were successful, but a lot more needs to be done to improve cultural
integration and employee motivation. The successes achieved by Nigerian
banks, resulted in higher levels of credit being made available to the private
sector. There is, however, scope for further improvement to be made. For
example, senior bank managers should deploy a more holistic approach to
planned change, and there should be an improved collaborative approach
between the government and private sector which could help enhance
alternative credit delivery channels such as micro finance firms, venture
capitalists and business angels.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of Research
1.0 Introduction
This chapter sets out the context, scope and boundaries of this study. It also
establishes the rationale for focusing on banking consolidation as a technique
for preventing systemic banking crises in emerging economies. The chapter
consists of five sections. Section 1.1 presents the research background.
Section 1.2 highlights the research questions. Section 1.3 identifies the
research aim and objectives. Section 1.4 reviews the research approach and
methodology. Section 1.5 outlines the structure of the chapters that follow.
1.1 Research Background
In the last four years (2008-2011), the global financial industry experienced
significant problems reflected in excessive bank risk taking. There have also
been significant episodes of systemic banking crisis in developed and
developing countries in the last two decades. The financial industry in
developing countries has often been characterised by poor corporate
governance, high numbers of non-performing loans and weak banks.
Therefore authorities in these countries continue to be faced with dilemma,
to maintain financial stability through offering protection to failing banks and
jeopardising future stability by increasing moral hazards if actions make
future assistance appear more likely (Hoggarth et al. 2004). Following this is
the challenge for policy makers to strengthen financial regulation and create
supervisory systems that reveal conditions conducive to bank failures, thus
forming the basis for early warning systems. These episodes have renewed
the debate in academic and policy circles as to how best to manage the
systemic risks posed by weak financial institutions.
The Economist (2006) notes that, most cases of bank failures are due to bad
managerial practices resulting in the deterioration of capital structures and
portfolios. Although it is difficult to directly measure management quality
because it can take several forms; Wheelock and Wilson (2000) suggest that
2inefficiencies in banking are generally as a result of poor corporate
governance, excessive risk taking or simply bad luck. In principle, bank
failures could threaten national economies with its knock on effect on the
supply of credit to the private sector. However, Hoggarth et al. (2004) state
that such systemic threat will vary with the size of bank intermediation in the
economy, as banks could become too big to fail, and whether borrowers have
other sources of credit.
The cost of financial distress on stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, managers,
depositors and creditors) depends on the extent of clarity and transparency
provided by authorities involved in the crisis resolution. Hoggarth et al.
(2004) argue that a clear legal framework can have an important bearing on
both the range and effectiveness of the policy options deployed in resolving
crises. George (1994), Lindgren et al. (1999), Mishkin (2001), Pangestu and
Habir (2002), Batunanggar (2003), Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), and
Hoggarth et al. (2004), outline Unassisted Resolutions, Assisted Resolutions
and Liquidation as three main policy options and techniques used by
authorities (e.g. Central Banks) to resolve banking crisis. The Unassisted
Resolution approach necessitates troubled banks to internally make required
changes or merge with another financially healthy bank. The Assisted
Resolution approach requires Central Banks (lenders of last resort) to provide
liquidity assistance to troubled individual banks that potentially pose
systemic threats for a limited period of time, or induce such banks to merge
or be acquired. In a Liquidation, the restructuring authority liquidates all
assets, the bank is declared insolvent and depositors paid off. These
techniques are deployed by authorities individually or in combination, in
response to the context of financial distress.
Gelos and Roldos (2002) note that consolidation, primarily through mergers
or acquisitions, has served to eliminate excess capacity more efficiently than
bankruptcy or other means of exit in mature markets. While in emerging
markets, consolidation has often been a way of dealing with problems
3stemming from financial crises. In retrospect, the Asian crises of the 1990s
were due primarily to a combination of unsustainable current account
deficits, excessive short-term foreign debts and weak domestic banking
systems (Feldstein 2002). The financial challenges faced by the Malaysian
and Indonesian authorities in the 1990s were similar in Nigeria, as
authorities under the recommendation of the World Bank and IMF began to
liberalise the financial sector. Lewis and Stein (1997) note that rapid
deregulation in Nigeria was not supported by effective institutional reform or
by macroeconomic stability, giving rise to adverse trends and distortions in
the financial sector. The prevention of such episodes as seen in Malaysia and
Indonesia, and the lessons for other emerging economies particularly Nigeria
form the basis for this study.
Aminu (2007) states that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) gained practical
experience from the banking consolidation carried out in Malaysia. Casey and
Dostal (2008) argue that in policy learning and transfers, authorities must
ensure when seeking a model, that there are perceived similarities in terms
of economic, social development, infrastructure, and fundamentally whether
such a model (system) is appropriate for the needs of the country in
question. To highlight these issues in the context of the Nigerian banking
consolidation, chapter 2 examines the Malaysia and Indonesian banking
reforms and the perceived parallels between these countries and Nigeria
(section 2.4).
In an attempt to correct economic short falls, authorities in Nigeria used
consolidation as the main policy instrument in the 2004-2006 reforms of the
banking industry. Soludo (2004 p. 1) claimed that consolidation will create “a
diversified, strong and reliable banking sector which will ensure the safety of
depositors money, play active developmental roles in the Nigerian economy,
and be competent and competitive players in the African regional and global
financial system”. It is against this backdrop that this study aims to critically
4appraise the performance of banking consolidation as a technique for
resolving financial crises.
It is generally agreed that the global shift towards market-oriented policies
and advances in technology have increased the attractiveness of investing
and lending in emerging market countries (Economist 2006). According to
The Economist (2006), these economies provide opportunities to diversify
portfolios with higher returns. Avoiding the mistakes of the past and
preventing a return to financial crisis create major policy concerns. This
study is primarily driven by the need to minimise the risk of recurrent
financial crises, and to examine how future crises can be better managed to
reduce direct adverse consequences in emerging economies.
1.2 Research Questions
Policymakers, academics and investors believe that there are various reasons
for the unequal performance of banks in a crisis situation. Although the
purpose of this study is to test the use of banking consolidation as a
technique for resolving future financial crises in emerging economies, the
ability of senior bank mangers to coordinate changes necessitated by this
phenomenon would influence outcomes. In carrying out reforms, Hayes
(2007) states that attention needs to be given to each step in the change
process and to the way the overall process is to be managed. In the case of
the Nigerian financial reforms, this entails analysing the requirements for
deploying unassisted resolutions, and examining management practices of
managers from consolidating banks. The 13 liquidated banks are not part of
the investigation in this study.
The research agenda developed from the change management literature
contributes to this debate by addressing two main questions: (i) To critically
examine what gaps exist in the change management literature as it relates to
organisational change in banking, (ii) To highlight how change was managed
in Nigerian banks and benchmark these practices with aspects of the change
5management literature. This investigation provides a unique insight to
explaining the fundamentals of theory and practice in implementing change
in the banking industry.
The testing of bank performance also allows this study to question the effects
of banking consolidation on the Nigerian economy. The CBN (2005 p. 9)
notes that one of the goals of consolidating the Nigerian banking industry
includes: “driving down cost structures of banks, improving banks’ efficiency
and encouraging competition with the goals of lowering interest rates and
providing cheap credit to the economy”. On the basis of the CBN’s assertions,
(iii) the extent to which banking consolidation improved the availability of
credit to the private sector is an important hypothesis for this study.
Therefore, the focus here is on factors influencing the supply of credit from
banks and not on the demand for credit.
These three questions are interrelated; as the change management practices
of managers directly impact on the performance of their banks and its ability
to achieve the expected gains of consolidation.
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives
This study aims to further advance knowledge in imperative change
management by highlighting challenges faced by managers implementing
financial sector reforms in developing economies. Thus, this study will seek
to make an original contribution to knowledge and practice through the
lessons learnt from the consolidation of the Nigerian banking industry in
2004-2006.
In order to achieve this, the following objectives have been identified.
 To empirically explore the use of banking consolidation in Malaysia and
Indonesia and highlight lessons for Nigeria.
6 To identify internal and external change drivers, by undertaking an
exploratory critical evaluation of events leading up to the consolidation
of the Nigerian banking industry in 2004-2006.
 To critically explore the change management literature in order to
identify conceptual models and frameworks, to help understand the
nature of change in the Nigerian banking industry.
 To understand the nature of strategic change in the Nigerian financial
industry, by examining change management practices of senior bank
managers involved in the reduction of the number of banks from 89 to
24.
 To critically appraise the effectiveness of key policy instruments and
support mechanisms on performance, competition and availability of
credit to the private sector in Nigeria.
 To develop a conceptual framework for incorporating institutional
variables (e.g. shared values, structures, systems etc) into financial
sector reforms in developing economies, based on the review of
change management literature and evidence from this study.
 To contribute to professional practice through a review of public policy
and managerial recommendations in order to address identified
barriers and opportunities for industry participants.
1.4 Research Methodology
Positivism, Interpretivisim and Realism are some of the most common
philosophical stances in social science. Marsh and Stocker (2002) argue that
positivists are concerned with establishing causal relationships between social
phenomena to detect the regularities in nature, thus propose generalisation.
Their claims are based on two assumptions: (i) reality is external and
objective, and (ii) knowledge is only significant if it is based on observation
of external reality (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991). In contrast, interpretivism
arose from the criticism of the positivist approach to research. Ritchie and
Lewis (2003) suggest that interpretists believe the methods of the natural
sciences are not appropriate because the social world is not governed by law-
7like regularities but is mediated through meaning and human agency.
Delanty (2005) argues that the real strength of the social sciences is not in
predictive or explanatory theory but in reflexive understanding, which is the
weakness of the natural sciences.
However the argument presented by realists tends to bridge the gap between
positivism and interpretivisim. Sayer (2000) notes that the defining feature
of realism is the belief that there is a world existing independently of our
knowledge, while the independence of objects from knowledge immediately
undermines any complacent assumptions about the relationship between
them and renders it problematic. Thus realists acknowledge two points: (i)
while social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation of them (ii)
our interpretation/understanding of them affects outcomes. Bhaskar (1975)
claims that reality exists in three overlapping domains: (i) the “Empirical” are
experiences or observed events, (ii) the “Actual” are events whether
observed or not, and (iii) the “Real” are those underlying tendencies or
mechanisms which may in a given situation give rise to events or lie
dormant, being cancelled by other forces. For example Marsh and Stocker
(2002 p. 31) state that “realists might use quantitative methods to identify
which financial markets are ‘globalised’. However, they would also want to
analyse qualitatively how globalisation is perceived, or discursively
constructed, by governments, because the realist argument would be that
both the ‘reality’ and the discursive construction affect what government
does in response to global pressures”. The approach deployed by Marsh and
Stocker (2002), seems to be the most appropriate for studying a complex
phenomenon such as banking consolidation, where the application of a multi-
level analysis is required to understand the interplay of forces within the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Nigerian banking industry, the different
categories of banks, and individual banks in Nigeria.
The first set of research questions examines change management practices
of managers from consolidating banks. This necessitates the collection of
8data from senior bank mangers directly involved in the consolidation process.
Though this option of collecting data has its advantages, it does have some
practical problems. These include: commercial confidentiality issues, gaining
access to key managers and the ability of these managers to recall details
that occurred 4 years earlier. Some of the difficulties of obtaining accurate
and objective data can be eliminated by using the qualitative research
method. Ritchie and Lewis (2003 p. 3) state that qualitative research is a
“naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with understanding the
meaning which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs,
values etc.) within their social worlds”. This method is, therefore, deployed in
this study.
The second set of research questions relates to the effects of banking
consolidation on the availability of credit to the private sector in Nigeria. To
achieve this, information appearing on the balance sheets and income
statements of banks from 2001-2009 is analysed using a quantitative
approach (see for example Saunders et al. 2003). Based on these results,
the relative contribution of banks to credit availability in the private sector
before and after consolidation is established.
The use of qualitative and quantitative data as described above, are
acknowledged by realists (Marsh and Stocker 2002) and a mixture of both
methods are deployed to test five hypotheses proposed by this study.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This section provides an overview of all the chapters in this study. The
structural changes required by individual banks as a result of the CBN’s
imperative for change, presented contextual issues around economic
stability, bank productivity and performance. The policy instruments chosen
by the CBN which represents their content of change, was strongly influenced
by the experiences in Malaysia and Indonesia (Aminu 2007). The content of
change and strategic choices for senior bank managers were, however,
9influenced by their existing reserve base at the start of the consolidation.
Aggregate data on bank credit to the private sector, were used to analyse
concentration ratios, level of competition, and the spread between deposit
and lending rates. These tools are identified by Gambacorta (2008) as
effective for examining bank efficiency and overall performance. The study
consists of eight chapters, and the flow of these chapters is shown in figure
1.1 below:
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Figure 1.1: Flow Diagram of Thesis
Source: Author Generated
Chapter 1 presents the research background, and highlights the rationale for
focusing on banking consolidation as a technique used in resolving banking
crises in emerging economies. The chapter also identifies the research
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questions and the aim and objectives of this study. The research approach
and methodology are discussed, and on the basis of this the use of mixed
methods for examining the banking consolidation in Nigeria is justified.
Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on the use of banking consolidation in
Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria and by so doing highlights events leading to
financial reform in these countries. The essence here is to establish the
context under which these countries deployed consolidation as a corrective
measure to address systemic issues in the banking industry. The chapter also
focuses on drivers of consolidation, objectives of consolidating authorities,
policy instruments used by authorities, nature of consolidation and lessons
for Nigeria from the prior Malaysian and Indonesian experience.
Chapter 3 examines the change management literature and highlights
relevant areas in the literature for analysing the actions or inactions of
managers in the Nigerian banking industry. The consolidation led some banks
to engage in mergers and acquisitions, thus the overlap of strategy and
organisational culture encompasses a host of pressures which ultimately
influence the performance of these banks. The second part of this chapter
identifies gaps in the literature and develops a conceptual framework built to
address these gaps. The framework addresses some of the research
questions and objectives by incorporating relevant factors and institutional
variables that influence change management practices of managers in the
Nigerian banking industry.
Chapter 4 reviews the research approach, methodology and design used in
this study. Thus it presents a methodological position which justifies the
research design and methods adopted for data collection and analysis. Data
collected are analysed through mixed methods. A series of null hypotheses
and codes are used to address the research questions. Null hypotheses 1-5
looks at the effects of banking consolidation on credit availability to the
private sector in Nigeria, with quantitative and qualitative methods of data
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collection and analysis. Secondly, coding is deployed to examine managerial
practices of senior bank managers in the Nigerian banking industry using
qualitative methods for data collection and analysis.
Chapter 5 presents a multiple case/cross category analysis of events relating
to the banking consolidation in Nigeria, by reviewing the results of qualitative
data collected from senior managers directly involved in implementing
consolidation. The chapter analyses practices of senior bank managers by
benchmarking their actions or inactions with relevant sections of the change
management literature. Specifically, the chapter is organised to analyse why
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) consolidated the Nigerian banking
industry, what aspects of banking practices were transformed, how this was
achieved and highlight lessons learnt.
Chapter 6 analyses the subsequent effects of banking consolidation in
Nigeria. It tests hypotheses 1-5 by examining the performance of banks
before and after the consolidation. The chapter uses qualitative methods to
present and analyse empirical evidence of managers involved in the
consolidation. The evidence are then compared with results from relevant
quantitative data on the static effect, the restructuring effect, the direct
effect and the external effect of consolidation on credit availability to the
private sector.
Arising from the critical analysis in chapters 5 and 6 of change management
practices across categories of consolidating banks and the effects of
consolidation on credit availability to the private sector, chapter 7 presents a
conceptual framework developed for incorporating institutional variables into
financial sector reforms in developing economies. It also attempts to
compare the CBN’s expected benefits in consolidating the banking industry
with actual outcomes.
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Chapter 8 summarises the findings of this study and draws conclusions
relating to the original research questions. The chapter also identifies the
study’s contribution to the body of knowledge and professional practice. The
practical and theoretical implications are acknowledged, while the study’s
limitations and opportunities for further research are also identified.
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Chapter 2: Review of Banking Consolidation
2.0 Introduction
This chapter contains a critical examination of events leading to the financial
reforms in Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria. The essence here is to establish
the context under which these countries deployed consolidation as a
corrective measure to address systemic issues in the banking industry. The
financial reform in Malaysia presents practical experience for consolidating
authorities in Nigeria (Aminu 2007). Therefore, a detailed understanding of
these events is achieved by focusing on drivers of consolidation, objectives of
consolidating authorities, policy instruments used by authorities, nature of
consolidation and lessons for Nigeria from the Malaysian and Indonesian
experience.
Secondly, this chapter provides a detailed examination of the challenges
faced by these countries and highlights critical issues for managers
implementing consolidation. Thus, the understanding of key issues related to
banking consolidation, through the experiences of these countries informs
the primary research questions of this study.
2.1 Banking Consolidation
The last two decades have seen a clear trend towards the abolition of
geographic restrictions on banks and the consolidation of financial
intermediaries around the globe. This is fuelling an active public policy
debate on the impact of banking consolidation on financial stability. The
Group of 10 (G-10) (2001 p. 309) defines banking consolidation as “the
transfer of ownership in a payment and settlement context through mergers
and acquisitions and other developments within the financial industry, such
as alliances, joint ventures and the outsourcing of payment processing, that
result in a higher degree of concentration of payment and securities
settlement activities”. The G-10 (2001) report identifies mergers and
acquisitions as the primary method of consolidation employed by banks, in
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which formerly independent banks become commonly controlled. Lindgren et
al (1999 p. 17) state that “In a merger (or sale) of an institution, all the
assets and liabilities of the firm are transferred to another institution”.
Many academic commentators (for example: Boyd and Graham 1991;
Broaddus 1998; Kwan 2004) have attempted to identify the generic drivers
and economic forces influencing banking consolidation. Kwan (2004 p. 1-2)
suggests that “economies of scale”, “economies of scope”, “potential for risk
diversification” and “bank managements’ personal incentives” may be four
economic forces driving banks to merge. The “economies of scale” is the
relationship between the average production cost per unit of output and
production volume. The “economies of scope” is a situation where the joint
costs of producing and distributing two complementary outputs are less than
the combined costs of producing the two outputs separately. The “potential
for risk diversification” suggests that product or geographic expansion would
provide diversification benefits to a banking organisation not only by reducing
its portfolio risk on the asset side, but also by lowering its funding risk on the
liability side, as it spreads funding activities over a larger geographic area.
The “bank managements’ personal incentives” may include the desire to run
a larger bank and desire to maximize their own personal welfare. For
example: Grinyer et al. (1991) note that managers were likely to obtain
satisfaction from their status, reputations and spheres of influence, and
would other things being equal prefer larger streams of reported earnings to
smaller streams.
However, the argument presented by Broaddus (1998) identifies the extra-
ordinary advances in communications and data processing technology over
the last two decades as the single most important underlying force enabling
bank mergers. Broaddus (1998) argues that a prime example is the
database-management software for mainframe computers that automated
the recordkeeping that is the core of banking business. Thus, the ability to
share customer and product information via computer networks has greatly
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lowered the cost of maintaining far-flung branches and has increased the
relative advantage of being a big bank. This view is supported by a survey
reported in the G-10 (2001) study. The study concluded that the enabling
forces encouraging consolidation have been improvements in information
technology, financial deregulation, globalisation and increased shareholder
pressure for financial performance.
Boyd and Graham (1991) further argue that “safety” is the last popular
explanation for consolidation, as average bank size increases reflect a natural
attempt to improve efficiency in the banking industry. They opine that,
reforms of banking laws must provide for diversification of risk, larger
institutions and a national regulatory scheme. The argument highlighted by
Boyd and Graham (1991) is consistent with the driving forces for
consolidation in emerging markets. The Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) (2001) identified banking crises and the privatization of state owned
banks as the two other factors contributing to consolidation in emerging
market countries. Beck et al. (2003 p. 6) define a banking crisis as “a
systemic crisis episode in which significant segments of the banking sector
become insolvent or illiquid, and cannot continue to operate without special
assistance from the monetary or supervisory authorities”. BIS (2001) states
that in some emerging market countries, failed banking institutions merged
with other institutions. In other cases, failed banking institutions were
recapitalised with government assistance or nationalized.
Allen and Gale (2000) cited some theoretical arguments and country
comparisons, which suggest a less concentrated banking sector with many
small banks is more prone to financial crises than a concentrated banking
sector with a few large banks. According to their findings, concentrated
banking systems may enhance profits and therefore lower bank fragility.
Advocates of the “concentration-fragility” (supporters of less concentrated
banking industries) oppose the view that a more concentrated banking
structure lowers bank fragility. Boyd and Runkle (1993) and Mishkin (1999)
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argue, that large banks frequently receive greater net subsidies than small
banks through implicit “too big to fail” polices. This greater subsidy for large
banks may in turn intensify risk-taking incentives, increasing the fragility of
concentrated banking systems. Proponents of the concentration-fragility
noted that size is positively correlated with complexity, and that large banks
may be more opaque than small banks, which would tend to produce a
positive relationship between concentration and fragility.
Guenther (1997) suggests that with consolidation, rural communities often
face a loss of deposits since the out of state bank often removes deposits
from local communities to use them for other economic opportunities, often
non-rural in nature. Gilbert’s paper of 1997 (in Guenther 1997) explains that
banking consolidation will have adverse effects on the access to bank credit
for rural residents. On the contrary, Colombo and Turati (2007) found that
the profitability and efficiency of the banks appear to be strictly correlated
with the institutional features of the local banking markets. In particular, the
presence of cooperative banks influences the performance of the banking
industry evaluated at the regional level. This is consistent with the well
known result that mutual institutions are important determinants of bank
performance. Unfortunately, Colombo and Turati (2007) fail to adequately
discuss the commercial forces that could prompt banks to invest deposits
removed from local markets in other non-local economic opportunities. These
authors examine the more general prevailing conditions in banking
consolidation; this study will focus on issues leading to consolidation in the
context of the Nigerian banking industry.
In mature markets the role of market forces was more dominant, as banking
consolidation has been a way to eliminate excess capacity more efficiently
than bankruptcy or other means of exists (International Monetary Fund
1998). This indicates that, unassisted resolutions were the most favoured
approach to resolving banking crisis in mature markets (George 1994;
Lindgren et al. 1999; Mishkin 2001; Pangestu and Habir 2002; Batunanggar
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2003; Honohan and Klingebiel 2003; Hoggarth et al. 2004). According to the
IMF (1998) report, the situation is different in emerging markets as
consolidation has been predominantly a way of resolving financial crises, with
authorities playing a major role in the consolidation process.
G-10 (2001) notes that, banking firms have grown larger and market an
even more diverse product range to clients in many more countries.
Arguably, the USA provides the clearest example of a casual link between
regulatory changes in the banking sector and financial consolidation
(Hagendorff et al. 2007). Hagendroff et al. (2007) specifically highlighted the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Efficiency Act of 1994, which eliminated
restrictions on interstate banking and the Gramm-Leach-Biley Financial
Modernisation Act of 1999 which repealed the Glass-Steagall 1932 type
restrictions and, thus, effectively introduced universal banking to the USA. In
this study, the effects of universal banking as a tool deployed by the CBN to
improve stability in the Nigerian banking industry are examined.
In Europe, Ayadi and Pujals (2005) suggest regulatory developments were
complemented by the creation of the single currency in 1999 and the
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), which consists of a long series of
regulator initiatives taken to ensure the full integration of the banking and
capital markets. Ayadi and Pujals (2005) found that this strategy consists of
merging domestic banking institutions, while maintaining the existing branch
network and secondly in implementing upstream cost synergies, i.e. at the
level of physical network management. The desire to achieve greater
economies of scale can be seen in the recent operations of several retail
banks: HVB in Germany, SCH and BBVA in Spain, CIC-Credit Mutuel in
France, UniCredit in Italy and Lloyds TSB-HBOS or RBS-Natwest in the United
Kingdom.
The ever-growing scale of bank mergers and acquisitions the world over
raises challenging policy questions. This includes banking concentration at
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the national and trans-national levels, which present systemic risk concerns
that must be addressed by policymakers in the course of promoting economic
efficiency while safeguarding the nation’s financial system.
2.2 Banking Consolidation in East Asia: The case of Malaysia and
Indonesia.
Aminu (2007) states that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) gained practical
experience from the banking consolidation carried out in Malaysia. The East
Asian currency and banking crisis of 1997 stands out as one of the major
crises of the 20th century. Aykut (2003) notes that banking failure occurs
when excessive rising liquidity, credit, interest-rate, or exchange-rate risk
pushes the bank to suspend the internal convertibility of its liabilities. If the
bank failure problem undermines an entire banking system, the crisis turns
out to be systemic. On the other hand, the IMF (1998 p. 74) World Economic
Outlook defines currency crisis as a situation “when a speculative attack on
the exchange value of a national currency results in the devaluation (or sharp
depreciation) of the currency, or forces the authorities to defend the currency
by expending large volumes of international reserves or by sharply raising
interest rates”.
The world recession and the dramatic oil price drop in the early 1980s
prompted the government of Indonesia to change its development strategy.
As their current account deficits widened, thus threatening the external
position of the country, and GDP growth dropped to 2.3% in 1982, the
government took sweeping adjustment measures (Alamsyah et al. 2005).
Under the June 1983 reform, BIS (2001) indicates that the government of
Indonesia decided to reduce the interest rate subsidies and refinancing credit
while simultaneously introducing discount window facilities. In implementing
an IMF-led Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), the banking industry
grew rapidly in terms of number of banks as well as total assets. Batunangga
(2002) notes that Bank Indonesia granted licenses for 73 new banks and 301
commercial banks’ branches in two years. These measures effectively
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marked the new and liberalized financial era in Indonesia and raises
questions about the availability of management talent to support this.
In the early 1980s, the economies of Malaysia and Indonesia had specialised
in transforming intermediate and raw material imports into finished
manufactured export goods and thus enjoyed large current account
surpluses. Hickson and Turner (1999) believe the contractionary monetary
and fiscal policy pursued by Japan caused a reversal of these current account
surpluses. In effect the undervaluing of the yen, led to increased Japanese
competition and a reduction of Malaysian and Indonesian exports to western
nations. Hickson and Turner (1999) note that Malaysia and Indonesia
operated fixed exchange rate regimes that pegged their currencies to the US
dollar. This implied that balance of payments shortfalls had to be financed by
foreign short-term capital loans. Maintaining their existing pegs to the dollar
otherwise would have required these countries to implement a contractionary
monetary policy and adopt severe fiscal austerity measures. Policy makers
believed that such a policy would have slowed their economic growth further.
In Malaysia, Sheng (1989) reports that the decline in commodity prices in
1981-82 saw deterioration in the terms of trade of 10.2%, and the current
account deficit in the balance of payments worsened from a near balance
position in 1980 to M$8.4 billion or 14.1% of Gross National Product (GNP) in
1982. The net result was a tripling in the foreign debt from M$10 billion in
1980 to M$31.8 billion at the end of 1983, or 48.5 GNP. Sheng (1989)
indicates that Malaysia embarked on a structural adjustment program to
control its fiscal and balance of payment deficits between 1983 and 1986.
Therefore, at the time of the crisis in 1997, the Malaysian government had
restricted borrowing of foreign currency above certain levels and most of the
capital inflows into Malaysia were of longer term nature in the form of foreign
direct investment. The inflation rate in Malaysia as at 1996 was 3.5%
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compared to 7.9% in Indonesia. The next section examines the drivers of
consolidation in Malaysia and Indonesia.
2.2.1 Drivers for Banking Consolidation in Malaysia and Indonesia.
According to Casserly and Gibb (1999) many banks merged in the United
States, Europe and Australia between 1987 and 1997, however over the
same period only 22 out of 1700 banks merged in Asia. Hawkins and
Mihaljek (2001) played a significant role in providing an insight into some of
the global and national forces that led to the consolidation of the financial
sectors in Malaysia and Indonesia. Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001 p. 3) believe
that the financial sector consolidation in Malaysia and Indonesia was driven
by four main factors: “the deregulation of financial services at national level
and opening-up to international competition; banking crisis, changes in
corporate behaviour; and technological innovation”.
Deregulation of financial services at national level opened Malaysia and
Indonesia to international competition. Bank for International Settlement
(2001) define deregulation as exposing existing players to greater
competition through new entry, freeing interest and deposit rates, and
allowing banks to move into geographical areas and products from which
they had been barred. Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) argue that these
economies traditionally had highly protected banking industries, living off
good spreads achieved on regulated deposit and lending rates and pervasive
restrictions on domestic and foreign entry. However, global market and
technology developments, macroeconomics pressures and banking crises in
the 1990s have forced the banking industry and the regulators to change the
old way of doing business, and to deregulate the banking industry at national
level and open up its financial markets to foreign competition. Hawkins and
Mihaljek (2001) opines that as a result, borders between financial products,
banks and non-bank financial institutions and the geographical locations
started to break down. Catalysts for increased competition at the domestic
level have been the removal of ceilings on deposit rates and the lifting of
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prohibitions on interest payments on current accounts. Intensified
competition has made it harder for banks to cross-subsidise different
activities and has forced them to price risks more realistically and change
explicitly for previously free services. With deregulation, greater emphasis
was placed on capital adequacy, improved efficiency, privatisation of state-
owned banks, mergers and consolidation, and a large increase in the
presence of foreign banks.
Shortly after the deregulation of their banking industries, Malaysia and
Indonesia experienced a banking crisis. For state banks, the lack of credit
analysis was a major problem because most of the credit policies were
influenced by government. Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) identify non-
performing loans within private banks to be normally related to loans within
the banking group, violating the statutory lending limit, which was only
minimally enforced by dependent central banks. In Indonesia for example;
the problem loans, which increased gradually from 6% in 1990 to 11% in
1991 and 17% in 1992 (17% of problem loans is not a benchmark trigger for
panic), were the main sources of bank failure in the 1990s. Banking crisis
thus became a driver for consolidation as Montinola (2003) argues that this
situation triggered panic and capital flight, leading to government bailouts or
intervention, thus producing fiscal deficits. The banking crises made it too
costly for government to defend a peg by raising interest rates and this led to
a currency collapse. Gbosi (1996) notes that prior to 1986 exchange rates in
Nigeria were administratively determined by the CBN, but since 1987
exchange rates have been determined by the forces demand and supply.
Even though the Nigerian government did not have a currency peg in place in
the period under review, the need to prevent a similar situation as seen in
Malaysia and Indonesia precipitated the CBN’s consolidation drive.
Another driver for consolidation in Malaysia and Indonesia was the new
emphasis on economies of scale. Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) believe that
as a result of the need for economies of scale in management and
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diversification of credit risks, banks have an incentive to merge with other
institutions, including foreign banks, which in turn leads to consolidation and
a growing presence of foreign banks in the banking industry. The implication
of these developments is that commercial banks in bank-centred financial
systems can no longer maintain their traditional, close relationships with
corporate customers (organisations with bank accounts). This is because of
pressure from alternative funding sources and other domestic and foreign
banks, there was growing emphasis on shareholder value as the sole
commercial objective of banks. Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) found that
banks in many emerging economies with bank-based financial systems were
therefore increasingly divesting their non-financial shareholdings,
establishing arm’s length relationships with their traditional corporate
customers, cutting operating costs, and concentration on core activities
where they generate the highest rate of return.
Likewise, the potential for rapid development of commercial banking
functions offered by alternative delivery channels such as ATMs (Automated
Teller Machine), debit cards, telephone, internet and electronic banking,
support the drive for consolidation. The vast majority of banks in emerging
economies see such channels as a must for their industries, despite the still
low level usage of such channels. Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) believe that
in East Asia, the major issue about new IT is its impact on the processing of
information, which is the very essence of the banking business. They argue
that the development of financial instruments such as derivatives enabled
risk to be reallocated to the parties most willing and able to bear that risk,
thereby inducing more investment in real assets and fostering the
development of banking and financial markets in general; is perhaps the
most significant innovation.
In summary, the review of drivers for consolidation in Malaysia and
Indonesia indicates that these countries deployed consolidation as a
corrective and efficiency measure. Primarily, the aim here is to identify these
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drivers and enablers and benchmark them with events leading to
consolidation in Nigeria. The parallels drawn from the review in this section
with events leading to consolidation in Nigeria, are discussed in section 2.4.
2.2.2 Policy Instruments/Objectives in Malaysia
Lindgren et al’s. (1999 p. 13) IMF occasional paper description of the
structure of the financial system in Malaysia at the end of 1996 states that:
“In Malaysia, the financial system included 35 commercial
banks, 39 finance companies, 12 merchant banks, 7 discount
houses, 4 pension and provident funds, 62 insurance
companies, 6 unit trusts, 7 development institutions, and a
savings bank. Total assets of the system were equivalent to 300
percent of GDP. Commercial banks accounted for 70 percent of
total of the banking system (comprising the commercial banks,
finance companies, and merchant banks), and merchant banks
and finance companies for 30 percent of total assets”.
Malaysia’s policy response to the crises was guided by a National Economic
Recovery Plan (NERP) launched on 23 July 1998. Hui and Chee (2003) note
that the policies aimed (i) to enlarge and strengthen individual banking units
in the country (ii) to enforce structural efficiency in the banking system as
fundamental in ensuring the quantity and quality of domestic banks an
effective intermediary in the economy. Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank
of Malaysia) identified the following objectives for the consolidation program:
 The substantial reduction in the number of domestic banking
institutions.
 To improve profitability and efficiency for the proposed banking groups
through an effective merger structure.
 Minimal disruption in the provision of banking services following the
rationalization of branches and employees.
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 To minimize post-integration costs that might otherwise affect the
viability of the merged entity.
 Upon completion of the merger, to ensure each banking group was of
the sufficient size with a minimum shareholders’ fund of RM2 billion
and asset base of at least RM25 billion.
 To protect consumers of banking services.
(Comparative analysis of the objectives deployed by consolidating authorities
in Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria, and its relevance in the context of this
study are examined in section 2.4.)
To implement these policies Athukorala (2007) notes that an asset
management company Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad, was set up
to acquire and manage non performing loans from banks. This was followed
by the establishment of Danamodal Nasional Berhad; a banking and
corporate recapitalisation company and a Corporate Debt Restructuring
Committee to facilitate the restructuring of corporate debts through out-of-
court settlement between debtor and creditors. This special agency was
tasked with recapitalising those financial institutions whose capital adequacy
ratio (capital that provides banks with cushion against losses; Singer 2004)
had fallen bellow 9%.
Hui and Chee (2003) state that the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara
Malaysia) announced a consolidation program for domestic financial
institutions in July 1999. Subsequently, another announcement of 10 anchor
banks was made in mid-February 2000, with a target date of end-December
2000 for the completion of the entire consolidation exercise. Hui and Chee
(2003) note that as at 31 December 2000, 54 domestic financial institutions
were consolidated in 10 banking groups as shown in the Table 2.1 below,
while 13 foreign-owned banks were left untouched. Effectively, about 70
percent of the total assets of the entire banking sector had been rationalized
and consolidated.
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Table 2.1: The Revised 10 Anchor Banking Group (as at 2003)
Anchor Bank Banking Institutions in Group
Malayan Banking Berhad Malayan Banking Berhad
Mayban Finance Berhad
Aseambankers Malaysia Berhad
Phileo Allied Bank Berhad
The Pacific Bank Bhd
Sime Finance Bhd
Kewangan Bersatu Bhd
Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd
Bumiputra-Commerce Finance Bhd
Commerce International Merchant Bankers Bhd
RHB Bank Bhd RHB Bank Bhd
RHB Sakura
Merchant Banks Bhd
Delta Finance Bhd
Interfinance Bhd
Public Bank Berhad Public Bank Bhd
Public Finance Bhd
Hock Hua Bank Bhd
Advance Finance Bhd
Sime Merchant Bankers Bhd
Arab Malaysian Bank Berhad Arab-Malaysian Bank Bhd
Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd
Bank Utama Malaysia Bhd
Utama Merchant Bank Bhd
Hong Leong Bank Berhad Hong Leong Bank Bhd
Hong Leong Finance Bhd
Wat Tat Bank Bhd
Credit Corporation Malaysia Bhd
Perwira Affin Bank Berhad Perwira Affin Bank Bhd
Affin Bank Bhd
Perwira Affin Merchant Bankers Bhd
BSN Commercial Bank Bhd
BSN Finance Bhd
BSN Merchant Bank Bhd
Multi-Purpose Bank Berhad Multi-Purpose Bank Bhd
International Bank Malaysia Bhd
Sabah Bank Bhd
MBF Finance Bhd
Bolton Finance Bhd
Sabah Finance Bhd
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers Bhd
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Anchor Bank Banking Institutions in Group
Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd
Southern Bank Berhad Southern Bank Bhd
Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd
Cempaka Finance Bhd
United Merchant Finance Bhd
Perdana Finance Bhd
Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd
EON Bank Berhad EON Bank Bhd
EON Finance Bhd
Oriental Bank Bhd
City Finance Bhd
Perkasa Finance Bhd
Malaysian International Merchant Bankers Bhd
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2003)
Athukorala (2007) advocates that the standard Keynesian therapy deployed
by Malaysia marked a significant departure from the IMF-centered approach
adopted by other crisis-hit countries in the region. Palley (2007 p. 62) states
that the Keynesian model “allows monetary policy to have long-run effects on
unemployment, real wages, and income distribution, but growth is not
affected”. However, there is an intense debate on whether this episode holds
lessons for using capital controls as a tool of crisis resolution (Athukorala
2007). The application of the standard Keynesian therapy is not the focus of
this study.
Bank Negara Malaysia (2003) notes that The Financial Sector Master Plan
(FSMP) launched in March 2001 set out the broad strategies for the
development of the financial sector over a ten year period. The end objective
is to evolve the financial sector into a competitive, resilient and dynamic
system. The initial implementation of the FSMP were predominantly directed
towards enhancing the capability of domestic financial institutions in order to
enhance their level of effectiveness and competitiveness, strengthening the
regulatory and supervisory framework, promoting a safe and efficient
payment system as well as developing the framework on consumer education
and protection.
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Bank Negara Malaysia (2003 p. 116) indicates that priority was accorded to
strengthening the capability of domestic banking institutions. To improve
their level of “effectiveness and competitiveness”, domestic banks aimed to
re-assess their performance management systems, so as to meet consumer
demands in an effective and efficient manner and thus provide high quality
services at competitive prices to benefit the overall economy. The “regulatory
and supervisory framework” was further strengthened as, the Central Bank
of Malaysia Act 1958, the banking and Financial Institution Act 1989, the
Islamic Banking Act 1983 and the Takaful Act 1984 were amended in 2003. A
new Payment System Act 2003 was also enacted during the year to provide
for a comprehensive legal framework to ensure that the payment systems
are protected from disruptions that may affect financial stability while the on-
site examination and off-site surveillance in supervising banking institutions
continued to be premised on the risk-based supervisory approach.
“Consumer education and protection” was enhanced by encouraging active
consumerism. As outlined in the FSMP, banking consumers will take greater
responsibility for their financial decisions. Once the relevant information and
risks have been appropriately disclosed and explained, consumers must be
actively involved in comparing, examining and deciding on investments or
purchases to be made, and assume responsibility.
In promoting a “safe and efficient payment system” the authorities in
Malaysia introduced a deposit insurance system. BNM (2002 p. 123) states
that the “Deposit insurance provides an explicit guarantee on insured
deposits up to a specified amount in the event that a deposit-taking
institution that is a member of the deposit insurance system is unable to
meet its obligations to depositors”. The framework for the Financial System
Master Plan is shown in figure 2.1 below.
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Figure 2.1The Financial System Master Plan
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2003).
Maintaining stability in the financial sector was one of the core objectives of
the Financial Systems Master Plan (FSMP). The FSMP focused on promoting
an efficient and stable payment system infrastructure on the premise that, a
safe and reliable payments system facilitates the smooth functioning of the
financial markets and economic activities and hence, is central in preserving
consumer confidence (Bank Negara Malaysia 2003). Bank Negara Malaysia
(2003) states that several recommendations in the FSMP focused on the
development of financial institutions and strengthening the strategic business
focus and risk management practices as well as the formulation of relevant
rules and regulations.
Furthermore, Bank Negara Malaysia (2003) notes that in line with the FSMP,
an Enforcement Action Framework was developed to provide a
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comprehensive and incremental approach towards enforcing actions to be
taken following supervisory exercise on banking institutions. The first phase
involving Informal Enforcement Action Framework (IEAF) was implemented
while the second phase where a Formal Enforcement Action Framework
(FEAF) developed as an extension of the existing informal framework. Under
the formal framework, action will be taken in institutions with problems or
where informal actions have been unsuccessful in achieving the desired
outcome.
Some of the most notable research on Malaysian banking efficiency during
the 1989-1995, 1991-1997 and 1998-2003 were conducted by Katib and
Mathews (2000), Okuda and Hashimoto (2004) and Sufian (2004). Sufian
(2004) builds on the work of these authors and utilises the nonparametric
frontier approach, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), to analyse the technical
and scale efficiency of domestic incorporated Malaysian commercial banks
during the merger year, pre and post merger period. Efficiency measures
shows how a firm is doing relative to the benchmark. This benchmark is
called the best practice frontier. Sufian (2004) describes the DEA (first
introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) to measure the efficiency of each
Decision Making Unit (DMU), that is obtained as a maximum of a ratio of
weighted outputs to weighted inputs) as a method that allows for the
decomposition of the efficiency and productivity differences into one
representing the bank’s efficiency and productivity levels relative to their
peers’ best practice frontiers. Thus DEA is a linear (mathematical)
programming technique which forms a nonparametric surface over the data
points to determine the efficiencies of each DMU relative to this frontier.
Bauer et al. (1998) found that DEA is less data demanding, as it works fine
with small sample size and does not require knowledge of the proper
functional form of the frontier, error and inefficiency structures.
Sufian (2004) suggests that during the sample period, Malaysian banks have
exhibited a commendable overall efficiency level of 95.9% suggesting
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minimal input waste of 4.1%. Sufian (2004) found that during the merger
year, Malaysian banks’ overall efficiency level deteriorated significantly
compared to the pre-merger period, which was mainly due to scale
inefficiency. Despite this short run effect, post merger Malaysian banks’
mean overall efficiency has not only recovered but is higher compared to the
pre-merger period. The nonparametric techniques generally do not allow for
random error, thus a key drawback (Rabtsun 2003). However, banking
industry seems to minimize the drawback of the nonparametric methods
since accounting data are usually very precise by definition.
Saunders (2000) presented a model of financial analysis for financial
institutions based on the DuPont system of return on equity. Collier et al
(2006) state the DuPont formula shows that the rate of return on assets can
be found as the product of the profit margin multiplied by the total assets
turnover. They argue the DuPont system implies that the return on equity
model disaggregates performance into three components: net profit margin,
total asset turnover and the equity multiplier. Thus the DuPont system of
financial analysis provides a means for the firm to monitor performance
through the planning period and to post-audit planning process. Collier et al.
(2006) applied this model to Maybank in Malaysia which is one of the ten
anchor banks in Malaysia that must satisfy the requirement of having a
minimum RM2 billion shareholder fund and minimum total assets of RM25
billion.
Collier et al. (2006) found that over the period of study (i.e. 1998-2003)
during which substantial financial difficulties existed, Maybank’s assets rose
gradually. Both income and expenses dropped during the study period with
unusually large decrease in expenses in 2000, because of decreases in both
interest expense and loan loss and provision. This combination leads to an
increase in net profit margin and a subsequent increase in return on equity
leading to an increase in the stock price. Maybank appears to have benefited
from the financial restructuring of the Malaysian banking industry.
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Unfortunately, the DuPont model as applied by Collier et al. (2006) fails to
address long term effects of consolidation on financial performance. This
study examines the effects of banking consolidation on credit availability and
not the rate of return on assets. Thus the DuPont model is not appropriate
for the kind of analysis required here.
Sufian (2005) found that earlier authors on the Malaysian banking industry
have not examined the sources of productivity changes among Malaysian
banks. Berg et al. (1992), Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996) and Wheelock and
Wilson (1999) were among the first to investigate productivity changes in the
banking industry. By applying the non-parametric Malmquist Productivity
Index (MPI) methodology, Sufian (2005) attempted to investigate the
sources of productive efficiency changes of the Malaysian banking sector
during the post crisis period of 1998-2003. Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996)
argue that the Malmquist index has three main advantages relative to the
Fischer and Tornqvist indices. First it does not require the profit or cost
maximization assumption, secondly it does not require information on the
input and output prices, and finally it allows the decomposition of
productivity changes into two components (technical efficiency change and
changes in best practice). Sufian (2005) argues its main disadvantage is the
necessity to compute the distance function, although DEA technique can be
used to solve this problem.
The Malmquist results suggest that Malaysian banks have reported
productivity decline in 1999 (14.4%), 2000 (7.8%), 2001 (5.8%) and 2002
(4.7%). Sufian (2005) notes that Scale Efficiency (SE) components suggest
the smallest bank in the sample is too small to reap the benefits of
economies of scale, while the largest bank is too large to be scale efficient.
The importance of scale efficiency in banking consolidation is highlighted,
even though this model fails to adequately address the commercial and
competitive pressures facing the banks. These findings provide relevant
lessons for authorities in Nigeria, as scale and efficiency gains form part of
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the expected benefits of banking consolidation in Nigeria (CBN 2005).
However, the non-parametric MPI methodology is not deployed as a tool for
analysis in this study, as the focus here is on credit availability and not scale
efficiency.
Zeithaml et al. (1996) utilises a framework built around the service quality
(SERVQUAL) methodology developed by Zeithaml et al. (1990). Zeithaml et
al. (1990 p. 19) define service quality as “the extent of discrepancy between
customer’ expectations or desires and their perception”. According to
Zeithaml et al. (1996) the behavioural consequences of service quality
mediate between service quality and the financial gains or losses from the
retention or defection. Zeithaml et al. (1996) identifies favourable
behavioural intentions to include saying positive things and recommending
the services to others, paying the price premium and expressing cognitive
royalty to the organisation. There is similarity with Zeithaml et al’s. (1996)
model and the study conducted by Ndubuisi (2004). Ndubuisi (2004)
indicates that the issue of customer retention is an important one for service
organisations, as superior service with customer perceived mutualism is
associated with customer support, in which outcomes include increasing
market share and/or profits. Izah and Wan Zulqurnain (2005) suggest a new
dimension called “Compliance with Islamic Law” be added to Parasuraman’s
five dimensions in studying service quality in Islamic banks in Malaysia.
Izah and Wan Zulqurnain (2005) argue that assessing customer service
quality in the financial industry such as banks and insurance is vital in
determining the standard expected of the industry, thus Islamic banks and
Insurance companies are no exception to this requirement. Izah and Wan
Zulqurnain (2005) found negative indicators, as delivered service level did
not meet expectations of service quality in the financial services industry in
Malaysia. The author suggests the negative gap could be as a result of
behavioural intentions in Islamic law. However, these analyses highlight the
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importance of customer expectations in achieving intended objectives in
banking sector consolidation.
In summary, this section highlights various methods deployed to analyse the
effects of banking consolidation in Malaysia. Primarily, analysts focus on scale
efficiency, rate of return on assets, and service quality before and after
banking consolidation. Issues of scale efficiency present relevant lessons for
consolidating authorities in Nigeria, as the CBN expected consolidating
Nigerian banks to achieve sizable scale efficiency gains (CBN 2005).
However, these authors (in terms of my literature review) do not examine
the effects of banking consolidation on credit availability to the private
sector, and as a result the methods used to analyse the effects of
consolidation in this section are not appropriate for the analysis required in
this study.
2.2.3 Policy Instruments/Objectives in Indonesia
Lindgren et al’s. (1999 p. 13) IMF occasional paper description of the
structure of the financial system in Indonesia at the end of 1996 (this study
will not examine rural banks) states that:
“Commercial banks dominated the financial system in Indonesia.
Out of a total of 238 commercial banks, there were 7 state-
owned banks, 27 regional government banks, 160 private
banks, 34 joint-venture banks, and 10 foreign banks. In
addition, there were approximately 9,200 rural banks (provides
credit facilities to people in rural communities). Nonbank
financial institutions included 252 finance companies, 163
insurance companies, about 300 pension and provident funds,
and 39 mutual fund companies. Total assets of the system were
equivalent to about 90 percent of GDP. Commercial banks held
about 84 percent of total assets while rural banks held about 2
percent. The remaining assets were held by finance companies
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(7 percent of total assets), insurance companies (5 percent),
and other nonblank financial institutions (2 percent)”.
Goeltom (2005) identifies Indonesia Banking Architecture (IBA) as a
comprehensive framework for the Indonesian banking system. In the
architecture, the policy direction for the future development of the banking
industry is based on the vision of building a sound, strong and efficient
banking system to create financial system stability for the promotion of
national economic growth. However banking policy broadly aimed at
addressing two main agendas: (i) Banking recovery: Government guarantee
(based on Presidential Decree no. 26/1998), Recapitalization and Loan
restructuring. (ii) Banking system strengthening: Improvement of banking
infrastructure, the implementation of good governance, and improving the
effectiveness of banking regulation and supervision (Banking Supervision
Report 2004). Goeltom (2005) states that the main objectives of the IBA
were:
 To establish a robust structure for the domestic banking system,
capable of meeting the needs of the public and promoting sustainable
economic development.
 To create an effective system for bank regulation and supervision in
line with international standards.
 To build a strong, highly competitive banking industry, resilient in the
face of risk.
 To increase the percentage of statutory reserves in rupiah, from 5% to
a progressive varied percentage level based on total bank assets, as
follows:
i. Banks that have deposits in rupiah of more than 50 billion have
to maintain 8% statutory reserves in rupiah of the total deposit
in rupiah.
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ii. Banks that have deposits in rupiah of 10-50 billion have to
maintain 7% statutory reserves in rupiah of the total deposits in
rupiah.
iii. Banks that have deposit in rupiah of 1-10 billion have to
maintain 6% statutory reserves in rupiah of the total deposit in
rupiah.
 To ensure good corporate governance for internal strengthening of the
national banking industry
 To provide a complete range of infrastructure to support the creation
of a healthy banking industry.
 To empower and protect consumers of banking services.
(Comparative analysis of the objectives deployed by consolidating authorities
in Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria, and its relevance in the context of this
study are examined in section 2.4.)
From November 1997-2000, there were six major rounds of intervention
taken by the authorities, including “open bank” resolutions and bank
closures: (i) the closure of 16 small banks in November 1997; (ii)
intervention into 54 banks in February 1998; (iii) the takeover of 7 banks
and closure of another 7 in April 1998; (iv) the closure of four banks
previously taken over in April 1998 and August 1998; (v) the closure of 38
banks together with a takeover of 7 banks and joint recapitalisation of 7
banks in March 1999; and (vi) a recapitalisation of 6 state-owned banks and
12 regional banks during 1999-2000 (Batunanggar 2002). This is shown in
Table 2.2 below:
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Table 2.2: Banking Groups in Indonesia
Source: Bank Indonesia (2004)
Sato (2005) reports that a Letter of Intent to the IMF described the blanket
guarantee as a temporary measure, which would expire by 2004. The
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government decided to establish a deposit insurance agency in 2004, with
the phased introduction of a payoff system. This plan called for the gradual
lowering of the ceiling on guaranteed deposits from the full amount to 5
billion rupiahs, to 1 billion rupiahs, and then to 100 million rupiahs by 2007.
This payoff system is expected to encourage depositor confidence in banks,
and therefore make positive contributions to competition and soundness of
the banking sector. The framework for financial system stability in Indonesia
is shown in figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2: Framework for Financial System Stability (FSS)
Source: Bank Indonesia (2004)
Batunanggar (2002 p. 42) notes that the authorities in Indonesia developed
a framework for Financial System Stability (FSS), with four major pillars of
“coordination and cooperation”, “surveillance”, “regulation”, and “crisis
management”. The authorities focused on establishing “coordination and
cooperation” both internally and externally with other related institutions,
especially the Ministry of Finance, Indonesian Banking Regulation Agency
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(set up in January 1998), the Supervisory Authority (Independent of Bank
Indonesia) and the Deposit Insurance Agency. Most importantly a clear
definition of the role and responsibilities for each institution and a
coordination mechanism between them were spelt out. Secondly, for
effective “surveillance” an early warning system consisting micro and macro-
economic indicators to identify, assess and monitor risk, and related aspects
of the financial system. Thirdly through “regulation” a proper financial
architecture for fostering market discipline formed the basis for promoting
financial stability. Finally, in accordance with the regulations the “crisis
management” framework allowed Bank Indonesia through deposit insurance
policies to provide short-term financing facilities for banks undergoing
liquidity difficulties, thus acting as lender of last resort.
Unfortunately this framework does not adequately address the problem of
asymmetric information facing the banking community in Indonesia. The FSS
framework ignores the need to initiate efforts that provide more information
on the credit-worthiness of borrowers. As established Credit Bureaus, (rating
agency) improve transparency and availability of debtor information, thus
reducing asymmetric information problems.
The strategic alignment framework outlined by Iman and Hartono (2007)
follow a similar approach to that of Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) and
they consider the use of business strategy and information systems to boost
business performance. Iman and Hartono (2007) opine that the use of
information systems is a fundamental issue in business, especially in the
banking sector. They develop their concept of strategic alignment from co-
variation between a business strategy’s importance level attributes and
information technology/system strategy’s importance level attributes at a
particular time. To achieve a detailed examination, the constructs of business
strategy, Information System/Information Technology strategy and
organisation performance are considered non-observed or latent variables,
measured by specific observed variables. Iman and Hartono (2007) found
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that the information technology/system expenditures of most respondents
(Bankers) have reached more than 20 percent of the total income after
consolidation in Indonesia. This implies that consolidation has led banks to
expand the technical capacities of their operating systems, which could
positively impact on customers. The effects of such increase in information
technology/systems expenditures as an enabler to credit management and
availability is an important aspect of this study.
The framework of Iman and Hartono (2007) highlight the infancy of IS/IT in
the Indonesian banking sector, but fails to holistically address some of the
threats faced by senior executives. This includes the application of
information technology to achieve competitive advantage based on generic
strategies of cost leadership, market focus and product differentiation. Gates
(1997) (in Iman and Hartono 2007 p. 254) argues that “Technology will let
banks get closer to customers, deliver a wider range of services at lower
costs, and streamline internal systems, so that all customer data is
integrated and can be used to spot trends that can lead to new products. The
web will offer banks great opportunities-It will be interesting to see which
banks step up to this opportunity”.
Majid (2007) employs a battery of time-series techniques based on the
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model, to examine the short and
long-run relationship between financial development and economic growth
during the post-1997 financial crisis in Indonesia. Majid (2007) notes that the
ARDL model introduced by Pesaran et al. (1996) provides long-run estimates
and takes a sufficient number of lags to capture the data generating process
in a general-to-specific modelling framework. From the long-run ARDL
coefficient estimates Majid (2007) found that inflation is the only variable
significantly (negatively) affecting economic growth in Indonesia, while in the
short run, development of the Indonesian economy hinges crucially on the
performance of investment, particularly the conduciveness of the stock
market in the country. Financial development proxied by financial depth and
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share of investment are insignificant in promoting the Indonesian economic
growth. An interpretation of Majid’s (2007) work is that government must
maintain price stability by reducing the rate of inflation below two digits to
promote growth in the Indonesian economy.
Hall (2005) estimated the deposit insurance liabilities incurred by regulators’
guarantees in Indonesia using the Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997)
(FMP) model. Hall (2005) adopts the FMP model and uses the American-style
option model to calculate the authorities’ liabilities arising from the provision
of depositor protection in form of deposit insurance. The FMP model balances
the lump-sum bankruptcy costs against the cost of monitoring to keep a
bank operating as a going concern, using data from Indonesian banks. In the
period under review Hall (2005) found that three banks most likely to face
imminent bankruptcy are Bank MJB (1.21), Bank USK (1.32), and Bank ABX
(1.32); while the three least likely to face imminent bankruptcy are Bank EJK
(9.51), Bank FKE (6.55), and Bank SRH (4.78). The cost of insuring deposits
is a significant concern, as this study notes that the CBN tasked the Nigerian
Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) to liquidate 13 banks that did not
meet the 25 billion capital requirement. The policy implications resulting from
high bankruptcy costs could lead to better resource allocation to monitor
banks more closely. The focus of this study however is on the availability of
credit to the private sector and as a result the FMP model is not deployed as
a tool for analysis.
In summary, this section highlights various methods deployed to analyse the
effects of banking consolidation in Indonesia. Primarily, analysts focus on the
enabling effects of information system/information technology, the impact of
inflation on economic growth, and deposit protection costs. The use of
information system/information technology as an enabler to improved credit
availability is an important aspect of this study, and will be drawn on to
interpret the study’s findings. Issues of deposit protection costs present
relevant lessons for consolidating authorities in Nigeria, as the CBN employed
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the NDIC to liquidate banks that did not meet the N25 billion capital
requirement (CBN 2005). However, these authors do not examine the effects
of banking consolidation on credit availability to the private sector, and as a
result the methods used to analyse the effects of consolidation in this section
are not appropriate for the analysis required in this study.
2.2.4 Lessons from the Malaysian and Indonesian Experience
According to the IMF (1998) banking consolidation in emerging markets has
predominantly been a way of resolving financial crises, with authorities
playing a major role in the consolidation process. Consolidation was used as
a corrective measure in Malaysia and Indonesia after the East Asian financial
crises in 1997 (Bank Negara Malaysia 2003; Batunanggar 2002). Therefore,
a careful evaluation of the Asian financial sector crises highlights some
salient lessons to be learnt by policy makers in Nigeria.
This study notes that the fixed exchange rate regime operated by Malaysia
and Indonesia failed to cope with rapid capital flows and financial
globalisation. Das (2000) states that an economy could either rigidly tie its
currency to another or allow its currency to float. The experience of Malaysia
and Indonesia provide a critical lesson for policy makers in Nigeria as an
exchange rate peg provides short-term lenders and borrowers with a
guarantee against adverse exchange rate movement. Thus lenders and
borrowers perceive an exchange rate peg as a link in the chain of implicit
guarantees, which could lead to overinvestment and poor quality risk
assessment (Hawkins and Mihaljek 2001). Monetary authorities should
therefore introduce flexible exchange rates, as the risk associated with
flexible exchange rates can play a useful role in moderating the volume of
short-term capital inflows. It is however important to note, that Nigeria did
not operate an exchange rate peg in the period under review and this will not
be part of the investigation in this study.
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Numerous analysts (e.g. Batunangga 2002; Hawkins and Mihaljek 2001) also
agree that large capital inflows can have a destabilizing impact on the
recipient economy, particularly when the currency is convertible. Noteworthy
is the fact that short-term capital is particularly volatile and loss in
confidence result in massive portfolio reallocation. For monetary authorities
in Nigeria, cautious management of capital inflow and a strict watch over
short-term borrowings denominated in foreign currencies are critical lessons
from the Asian crises.
Monetary authorities in Nigeria and particularly the IMF should understand
that stringent monetary and fiscal policies are not the answer to the financial
problems of all member economies, as different crises call for different
solutions. Policy analysts such as Radelet and Sachs (1998), Wade and
Veneroso (1998) (in Montinola 2003) acknowledge that IMF financing can be
vital to recovery, but they fault the fund’s policy conditions. These analysts
note that the IMF’s response to economic crises could be improved with
policy conditions tailored to meet the specific economic needs of troubled
countries. This is evident in the experiences of Malaysia and Indonesia, in
which the IMF implemented its standard Structural Adjustment Programme-
more or less a one-size-fits-all strategy-to correct balance of payment
problems in these economies. The IMF needs to develop support programmes
and lending policy conditionality in collaboration with governments of crisis
affected countries, as this will help convince the market that the reforms can
be implemented successfully within realistic targets and timetables in the
reform programme.
The Malaysian and Indonesian experience confirms that liberalising the
capital account is a difficult process and could lead to systemic disturbances
in which important segments of the financial sector are likely to be driven
into insolvency. Sequencing therefore in liberalising capital accounts is an
important tool that ensures problems in the domestic financial systems are
addressed before removing restrictions on capital accounts, as weak or
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financially troubled institutions develop a crisis situation more rapidly.
However, this depends on the pace and depth of change required, as a slow
response could entail tolerating inappropriate behaviour while a too fast
response could create a crisis in its own rights. Das (2000) advocates that
prompt recapitalisation of banks and restructuring of corporate debt should
be attempted by policy makers, if financial crisis causes large-scale corporate
and financial insolvency. The main policy options could include unassisted
resolutions, assisted resolutions and liquidation (George 1994; Lindgren et
al. 1999; Mishkin 2001; Pangestu and Habir 2002; Batunanggar 2003;
Honohan and Klingebiel 2003; Hoggarth et al. 2004), and an exit strategy
should be devised for firms that cannot return to financial health in a short
time span. The Malaysian and Indonesian experience shows that with a
blanket guarantee, timing is critical. It is required as a temporary measure at
the outset when bank closures occur.
Prudential banking regulation and supervision is important in creating and
maintaining financial system stability. The significance of prudential norms,
regulations and supervision helps declare minimum norms in the banking and
financial sector, as surveillance of financial and corporate sector should focus
on identifying vulnerabilities, assessing the quality of policies and ensuring
transparency of information and regulations. Table 2.3 shows some of the
lessons learnt in developing a strategy for restructuring banks through a
process of consolidation from the Malaysian and Indonesian experience:
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Table 2.3: Lessons Learnt From the Malaysian and Indonesian
Banking Consolidation
Lessons Learnt From the Malaysian
and Indonesian Banking Consolidation
Relevance to Consolidating Authorities
in Nigeria
The provision of Institutional and legal
framework for restructuring. For example:
The Financial Systems Master Plan (Bank
Negara Malaysia 2003) in Malaysia and
Framework for Financial System Stability
(Bank Indonesia 2004) in Indonesia.
Provided benchmarks for the development
of a policy response, to the banking reforms
required in Nigeria (Aminu 2007).
Allocation of qualified human resources to
manage the changes necessitated by
consolidation. For example: the emphasis
on well-managed financial institutions in
the Framework for Financial System
Stability (Bank Indonesia 2004) in
Indonesia.
Highlighted the need for adequate human
capital, to manage changes in Nigerian
banks (CBN 2005).
Standard requirements for discriminating
between sound banks that need no public
support (unassisted resolution), banks that
are viable but need public support (assisted
resolution) and those that should exit the
system (liquidation). For example: the
requirement of a minimum shareholders’
fund of RM2 billion and asset base of at
least RM25 billion (Bank Negara Malaysia
2003) in Malaysia, and the statutory
requirement of reserves in rupiah from 5%
to a progressive varied percentage level
based on total bank assets (Goeltom 2005)
in Indonesia.
The CBN stipulated N25 billion as the
standard recapitalisation requirement, for
newly consolidated banks in Nigeria (Imala
2005). According to Imala (2005), the
CBN’s policy stance notes that, fewer bigger
banks are secure and as a result a fixed
amount (N25 billion) was favoured over the
sliding scale approach used in Indonesia.
Provision of methods for dealing with
troubled banks (i.e. liquidation, mergers
The CBN’s guidelines for consolidation
stated that the only legal modes of
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and acquisitions, nationalisation). For
example: mergers were deployed in
Malaysia (Sufian 2004).
consolidation allowed are going solo,
mergers and outright acquisition/takeover.
It further stated that mere group
arrangements were not acceptable for
meeting the N25 billion capital base
(Ezeoha 2007).
Financing arrangements should include;
target level of recapitalisation, types of
instruments, terms and conditions, and
guided by the principle of minimizing
government‘s contribution (Bank Negara
Malaysia 2003; Goeltom 2005).
Financing arrangements in Nigeria include:
Initial Public Offers, Private Placement,
Group Injection of Funds and Partnership
with Strategic Investors (CBN 2005). The
target level of recapitalisation was N25
billion (Ezeoha 2007).
Prompt creation of agencies to manage the
restructuring programme and problem
assets. For example: the creation of
Danamodal Nasional Berhad
(Recapitalisation Company) and Danaharta
Nasional Berhad (an asset management
company) to handle the Malaysian crisis
immensely aided the implementation and
success of the banking sector reform.
These agencies had an estimated life span
of 7 to 10 years (Bank Negara Malaysia
2003).
The creation of the Asset Management
Company of Nigeria (CBN 2005).
Provision of an appropriate timeframe for
the different steps in operational and bank
restructuring. For example: the timeframe
for the Malaysian banking consolidation
was between July 1999- December 2000
(Hui and Chee 2003).
The CBN provided an 18 mouths timeframe
between July 2004- December 2005 for all
banks to consolidate (CBN 2005).
Exit strategy from government ownership
of banks and blanket guarantee. For
example: the 7 to 10 years estimated life
span of the Danaharta Nasional Berhad
All banks which did not meet the
recapitalisation requirements were
liquidated by the Nigerian Deposit
Insurance Corporation (NDIC), however no
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asset management company in Malaysia
(Bank Negara Malaysia 2003).
blanket guarantees was deployed.
Effective and transparent information
campaign, to ensure public confidence and
credibility. For example: periodic
announcement by the Bank Negara
Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia 2003).
The provided a number of press releases to
inform the general public of the changes
being implemented in the Nigerian banking
industry (CBN 2005).
Source: Author Generated (Based on a synthesis of: Bank Negara Malaysia
2003; Hui and Chee 2003; Bank Indonesia 2004; Sufian 2004; Imala 2005;
CBN 2005; Imala 2005; Goeltom 2005; Aminu 2007; Ezeoha 2007)
The lessons highlighted above are important for authorities involved in
implementing banking consolidation in Nigeria. The ability to adapt these
lessons will help in the successful implementation of consolidation, as
parallels (section 2.4) can be drawn from the context of banking crises
experienced in Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria.
Furthermore, Table 2.3 shows that increased capital requirement, legal
modes for consolidation, creation of asset management companies, provision
of timeframes for consolidation, deposit insurance guarantees, and
communication were lessons directly applied by authorities in Nigeria. Some
other lessons such as the framework for restructuring and human capital
requirements were modified. The next section examines the banking
consolidation in Nigeria.
2.3 Banking Consolidation in Nigeria
Nigeria experienced major debt and unemployment crises in the 1980s. By
1983, Nigeria’s short-term trade arrears amounting to over N4 billion had
accumulated, while unemployment was aggravated and serious balance of
payments deficits incurred, these events were serious enough to precipitate
an IMF intervention. As a result, Olukoshi (1998) believes the IMF presented
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with its market orientation, as
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inevitable and having no alternative. Obadan and Ekuehare (1989) state that
SAP was implemented in 1986 and designed to fit the standard IMF-World
Bank structural adjustment package. SAP was expected to effectively alter
and restructure the consumption and production patterns of the Nigerian
economy, eliminate price distortions and heavy dependence on the export of
crude oil and imports of consumer goods. To achieve economic efficiency and
long-term growth, the programme will promote stabilisation policies designed
to restore balance of payments equilibrium and price stability. Figure 2.3
shows a timeline of events leading to banking consolidation in Nigeria.
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Figure 2.3: Timeline of Events Leading to Banking Consolidation in
Nigeria
Source: Author Generated (Based on a synthesis of: Gbosi 1996; Lewis and
Stein 1997; Olukoshi 1998; Hesse 2007)
According to Olukoshi (1998) the IMF through SAP, deployed expenditure
switching policies, as well as using the private sector as the engine for
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growth. The IMF encouraged commercialisation, privatisation of government
owned enterprise and deregulation of the financial sector.
Thus, the Central Bank of Nigeria eased restrictions on bank licensing,
interest rates, foreign exchange, capital movement and bank ownership.
These opportunities led to a massive influx of new entrants as the number of
banks tripled from 40 in 1986 to 120 by 1992 (Lewis and Stein 1997). This
raises questions about the capacity in the banking sector to provide
management of appropriate calibre, the ability of existing regulatory
frameworks to cope with this growth and issues of too many banks chasing
the same business. Lewis and Stein (1997) believe the original expansion of
the banking activities was driven by two parallel elements in the SAP: the
abolition of import licensing and the movement towards a floating exchange
rate. They note that the end of direct administrative rationing of foreign
exchange and the simultaneous withdrawal of subsidized commodities from
domestic markets, abruptly curtailed access to leading sources of commercial
rent. Partial compensation emerged through opportunities in the growing
multi-tiered foreign exchange market, where currency trading, financing and
arbitrage promised substantial gains in Nigeria. This study notes that these
partial compensation opportunities led Nigerian banks to move focus away
from their primary function of intermediation, with significant effects on the
availability of credit.
Beck et al. (2005) state that the financial sector boom, was however,
accompanied by financial disintermediation. Deposits in financial institutions
and credit to the private sector, both relative to GDP, decreased between
1987 and 1993 (Gbosi 1996). The increasing number of banks and human
capital in the financial sector was thus channelled into arbitrage and rent-
seeking activity rather than financial intermediation. As a consequence the
banking sector suffered deep financial distress as half the licensed banks
were insolvent, the extent of non-performing loans became evident, thus
placing two-thirds of assets and close to 75% of deposits at risk (Beck et al.
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2005). Lewis and Stein (1997) note that during 1992-1993, the Nigerian
Deposit Insurance Corporation (established 1988) announced that 24 banks
were insolvent and 26 in serious trouble; these 50 banks had two-thirds of
total banking assets and three-quarters of deposits in Nigeria’s financial
system. As a result the Nigerian authorities established some prudential
guidelines and a moratorium on new bank licenses.
Hesse (2007) reports that 26 bank licenses were revoked in 1998, reducing
the total number of banks from 115 to 89. Even though the macroeconomic
environment improved with civilian government rule after 1999, the Nigerian
financial system was still characterised by very high fragmentation, low
intermediation, poor supervision and weak regulatory controls. Furthermore,
poor shareholding practices and marginalisation of shareholders in corporate
democracy, reduced the level of shareholders influence in corporate decision-
making process (Amao and Amaeshi 2008). The appointment in May 2004 of
Prof Charles Soludo as Nigeria’s Central Bank Governor marked a major
turning point in the financial sector reforms. As a proactive response to the
weakening of the banking system, Soludo (2007) suggested the Nigerian
financial system was characterised by structural and operational weaknesses
and that their catalytic role in promoting private sector led growth could be
further enhanced through a financial reform. Ajayi (1992) asserts that, in the
oil boom years a lot of capital did leave Nigeria as petrodollar created the
opportunity for outflow of capital which was not re-invested in the economy.
Therefore, banking consolidation will help reduce if not totally eliminate
capital flight, through the restoration of confidence in the Nigerian financial
systems, provision of profitable investment opportunities and economic
growth.
2.3.1 Drivers for Banking Consolidation in Nigeria
Ajayi (2005) believes that the banking consolidation in Nigeria, implemented
through government regulation was influenced by three generic factors
driving consolidation globally. These factors are the economics of scale and
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scope, potential for risk diversification as well as bank management personal
incentives (Ajayi 2005). The findings are similar to the global factors driving
consolidation identified by Kwan (2004). Thus, the need for growth in market
share and the desire to invest excess capital propels potential acquirers,
while lack of management succession, inability to keep pace with change,
regulatory pressures and perceived opportunity to cash out at a high price
could lead potential sellers to sell. Aside from the findings identified by Ajayi
(2005) and Kwan (2004), other factors leading to banking consolidation in
Nigeria are discussed below.
As a result of liberalising the Nigerian economy, most public enterprises,
trade and exchange systems were restructured. The Structural Adjustment
Programme implemented by the IMF attempted to restore normality to
economic activities by correcting the imbalances in the payment system
(Gbosi 1996). The National Centre for Economic Management and
Administration (2004) notes that the performance of the economic reform
programmes was disappointing, as SAP policies were misguided and
incoherent in its implementation leading to uncoordinated expansion of the
banking industry. The CBN aimed to reposition the banking industry to
effectively play their financial intermediation role by implementing the
banking consolidation.
Imala (2005) notes that the average capital base of Nigerian banks is US$ 10
million, which is very low compared to banks in other developing countries
like Malaysia where the capital base of the smallest bank is US$ 526 million.
The aggregate capitalisation of the Nigerian banking system at N311 billion
(US$2.4 billion) is grossly low in relation to the size of the Nigerian economy.
The 89 banks in Nigeria as at the end of May 2005, had a total of 3,382
branches whereas the 8 banks in South Korea had about 4,500 branches.
Imala (2005) suggests that the top 10 banks in Nigeria control 50.8% of the
aggregate assets; 51.7% of total deposits and 45% of the aggregate credits.
Thus there was the need to implement banking consolidation to correct these
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short falls. There might also be certain underlying factors such as differences
in the standards of living, or differences in the propensity to save, or cultural
issues that can not be addressed by banking consolidation, in the countries
identified (compared) above. However, this study will not focus on the multi-
facet ways in which an economy grows.
A detailed analysis of the condition of individual banks in Nigeria as at
December, 2004, showed that no bank was rated very sound. The rating of
licensed banks using the Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and
Liquidity (CAMEL) parameters, revealed that only 10 were adjudged sound,
with 51 satisfactory, 16 marginal and 10 unsound (Imala 2005). Corporate
governance in most Nigerian banks was characterised by non-compliance
with regulatory requirements, inaccurate reporting, and gross insider abuse
which lead to high levels of non-performing loans. This was primarily because
of a combination of weak regulatory systems and bad bank management
behaviour. Imala (2005) highlighted the negative capital adequacy ratios of
some banks (most banks in this category were liquidated after the
consolidation process), completely eroded shareholders’ funds caused by
operational losses, over-dependence on public sector deposits, and the
neglect of small and medium scale private savers caused most banks to be
insolvent. One could conclude that, there was the need to consolidate the
banking industry and restore efficiency, competition, earn depositor and
investor trust, and develop a reliable banking system which will facilitate
economic growth.
The limited development of information technology infrastructure in the
Nigerian banking industry, was a major factor driving banking consolidation
in Nigeria. Ezeoha (2005) highlighted a survey by the CBN in September
2002, on the extent of e-banking adoption by Nigerian banks. The CBN found
that of the 89 licensed banks in the country, only 17 were offering internet
banking, 24 were offering basic telephone banking, 7 had ATM (Automated
Teller Machines) services while 13 of the banks were offering other forms of
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e-banking. This implies that as of then, 19.1% of the banks were offering
internet banking, signifying that internet banking was yet to take centre
stage despite its widely acclaimed benefits against the traditional branch
banking practice (Ezeoha 2005). The results in Nigeria is also significantly
low in comparison to Malaysia, where in the same period Sulaiman et al.
(2005) note that all major local banks provided e-banking services. Thus the
development of minimum efficiency scale in IT infrastructure in banking
through banking consolidation; is envisaged to bring tremendous
improvement in terms of policy formulation and legal framework design. Ayo
and Babajide (2006) suggest that increased development in IT infrastructure
would enhance e-commerce participation by Nigerian banks. Furthermore,
the factors identified above indicate that developments in IT infrastructure
are enablers to banking consolidation in Nigeria.
2.3.2 Policy Instruments/Objectives for Consolidation in Nigeria
The very nature of banking and the great adverse effects on the economy of
bank failures created public policy concerns in Nigeria. This explains why
amongst other reasons banks in Nigeria are more rigorously regulated than
other industries (CBN 2008). Claessens and Klingebiel (1999 p. 2) note that
“the framework for financial services provision in a country includes laws
governing financial institutions, the deposit insurance law (if an explicit
deposit insurance scheme exists), securities markets’ laws and regulations,
and other regulations and agreements, including those of an international
nature”. These laws and regulations define the role and activities of deposit-
taking financial institutions (banks) relative to non-bank financial institutions,
influence the degree of competition in the financial systems (through the
setting of minimum capital requirements, and the definition of degrees and
modes of permissible entry), define in a significant way the incentive
framework under which financial intermediation takes place, and provide for
the necessary formal enforcement and exit rules. Ultimately, this framework
and the way it is enforced determines to a large degree the structure,
stability and efficiency of a country’s financial system (Claessens and
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Klingebiel 1999). In Nigeria, the framework for financial intermediation is
determined by the CBN. Thus, the CBN was tasked with the formal
enforcement of policy instruments and objectives required for banking
consolidation (CBN 2005).
The financial sector reform in Nigeria was embedded in the National
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) prepared in
2003 (Soludo 2006). According to Balogun (2007), the policy thrust of the
NEEDS document on financial sector reform aimed to build and foster a
competitive and healthy financial system to support development and to
avoid systemic distress. This is to be achieved by deepening the financial
system in terms of asset volume and instrument diversity, a drastic reduction
and ultimate elimination of government deficits by the financial systems in
order to free up resources for lending to the private sector. Furthermore, a
review of the capitalisation of financial institutions through the development
of a structure of financial sector incentives that would support real sector
financing.
In line with provisions of the NEEDS document, Hesse (2007) notes that the
CBN decreed on July 6, 2004 that banks had to increase their minimum
capital requirement from N2 billion to N25 billion and consolidate their
operations through mergers and acquisition by the end of 2005. Imala
(2005) highlights the following as objectives of the banking sector reforms:
 Requirement that the minimum capitalisation for banks should be N25
billion with full compliance before end-December 2005.
 Phased withdrawal of public sector funds from banks, starting July
2004.
 Consolidation of banking institutions through mergers and
acquisitions.
 Adoption of a risk focused and rule based regulatory framework.
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 Adoption of zero tolerance in the regulatory framework, especially in
the area of data/information reporting. All returns by banks must now
be signed by the Managing Directors of banks.
 The automation process for rendition of return by banks and other
financial institution through the electronic Financial Analysis and
Surveillance System (e-FASS).
 Establishment of a hotline, confidential internet address
(Governor@cenbank.org) for all Nigerians wishing to share any
confidential information with the Governor of the Central Bank on the
operations of any bank or the financial system. Only the Governor has
access to this address.
 Strict enforcement of the contingency planning framework for
systemic banking distress.
 The establishment of an Asset Management Company as an important
element of distress resolution.
 Promotion of the enforcement of dormant laws, especially those
relating to the issuance of dud cheques and the law relating to the
vicarious liability of the Board of banks in cases of failings by the
banks.
 Revision and updating of relevant laws and drafting of new ones
relating to effective operations of the banking systems.
 Closer collaboration with the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) in the establishment of the Financial Intelligence
Unit (FIU) and the enforcement of the anti-money laundering and
other economic crime measures.
 Rehabilitation and effective management of the Mint to meet the
security printing needs of Nigeria.
(Comparative analysis of the objectives deployed by consolidating authorities
in Nigeria, Malaysia and Indonesia, and its relevance in the context of this
study are examined in section 2.4.)
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The primary research questions of this study focus on two of these
objectives: (i) Requirement that the minimum capitalisation for banks should
be N25 billion with full compliance before end-December 2005, and (ii)
Consolidation of the banking institutions through mergers and acquisitions.
The focus on these two objectives is justified because the CBN particularly
expected increased capital requirements of N25 billion and its effects on bank
structure to stimulate growth in the Nigerian economy (CBN 2005). Therefore
this study examines change management practices of senior managers in
consolidating banks, and the effects of these changes on credit availability to
the private sector in Nigeria.
2.2.3 Nature of Banking Consolidation in Nigeria
In order to achieve and set the pace for the consolidation of banks in Nigeria,
an unassisted resolutions approach was deployed, as the CBN approved a set
of guidelines and incentives (CBN 2005). The guidelines stated that the only
legal modes of consolidation allowed are mergers and outright
acquisition/takeover. Mere group arrangements were not accepted for the
purpose of meeting the stipulated N25 billion capitalization requirement for
banks. Therefore, all banks that have other banks as subsidiaries or have
common ownership were encouraged to merge. Foreign banks were not
allowed to merge with or acquire Nigerian banks; however they were
encouraged to provide the stipulated N25 billion minimum capital base
requirement (Soludo 2004). CBN (2005) further states that several options
open to Nigerian banks to meet the stipulated minimum capital base
requirement include:
 To approach the capital market for funds through an Initial Public Offer
(IPO), Private placement or Rights Issue, funds from strategic
investors.
 To consolidate through a merger with like-minded and synergy-
producing banks (no further definition was provided to explain what
this meant in practice).
 To acquire another bank or be available for acquisition.
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 To close shop and surrender the banking licence.
However the CBN anticipated some likely problems that may be encountered
in the consolidation process. These problems included doubts that the
Nigerian capital market has the depth, breadth and resilience to absorb the
many bank issues that have emerged from the market, as the lack of
adequate absorptive capacity of the capital market may be a constraint for
banks wishing to raise capital from the market. Thus the CBN provided some
incentives for banks that consolidate and/or are able to achieve the set
minimum capital base within the stipulated period. These include:
 Authorization to deal in foreign exchange.
 Prospects of managing parts of Nigeria’s external reserves, subject to
prevailing guidelines.
 Tax incentives in the areas of capital allowances, company income tax,
stamp duties, etc.
 Reduction in transaction costs with the CBN.
 Provision of technical assistance by the CBN.
The CBN through a press release on the 3rd of January 2006 (see Appendix
1), reported the close of the first phase of the banking consolidation program
on 31st December 2005, has resulted in the shrinkage of the number of
banks from 89 to 25 through mergers/acquisition involving 76 banks which
altogether accounted for 93.5% of the deposit share of the market (Table
2.4). Figure 2.4 reflects the size of the Nigerian banking industry before and
after consolidation.
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Figure 2.4: Size of Nigerian Banking Industry Before and After
Consolidation
Source: Author Generated
The capital market received a boost with a total of N406 billion raised and
N360 billion accepted by the CBN including foreign capital inflow of US $654
million and £161,933 (CBN 2006). The 13 banks that were unable to meet
the end-December 2005 deadline, accounted for only 6.5% of the deposit
share in the industry. The Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC)
was directed to obtain court approval to commence the process of liquidation
of the affected banks (CBN 2006). The Nigerian banking industry witnessed
further shrinkage from 25 to 24 banks on the 31st of March 2008. Standard
Bank (2008) confirmed the successful conclusion of the merger of Stanbic
Bank Nigeria Limited (a member of The Standard Bank Group of South Africa
Limited) and IBTC Bank PLC, in which Standard Bank had in August 2007
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secured 50.1% shareholding of IBTC Chartered. Table 2.4 shows the list of
CBN approved banks in Nigeria.
Table 2.4: Component Members of Consolidated Banks
Name of Banks Consolidating
Institutions
New
capital
Base in
Billions of
Naira
New Capital
base in Millions
of Dollars (At
$1=N130)
1 Access Bank Plc Marina Bank 28 215,384,615.4
Capital Bank
Access Bank
2 Afribank Plc Afribank Plc 29 223,076,923.1
Afrimerchant Bank
3 Diamond Bank Diamond Bank 33.25 255,769,230.8
Lion Bank
African International
Bank (AIB)
4 EcoBank Alone 25 192,307,692.3
5 Equitorial Bank Plc Equatorial Trust Bank 26.5 203,846,153.8
Devcom Bank
6 First City Monument
Bank Plc
First City Monument
Bank
30 230,769,230.8
Cooperative
Development Bank
Nig-American Bank
Midas Bank
7 Fidelity Bank Plc Fidelity Bank Plc 29 223,076,923.1
FSB International
Bank
Manny Bank
8 First Bank of Nigeria
Plc
First Bank of Nigeria 44.62 343,230,769.2
FBN Merchant Bank
MBC International
Bank
9 First Inland Bank Plc First Atlantic Bank 28 215,384,615.4
Inland Bank
International
Merchant Bank
Nigerian Universal
Bank
10 Guaranty Trust Bank
Plc
Alone 34 261,538,461.5
11 Intercontinental
Bank Plc
Intercontinental Bank 51.7 397,692,307.7
Global Bank
Gateway Bank
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Name of Banks Consolidating
Institutions
New
capital
Base in
Billions of
Naira
New Capital
base in Millions
of Dollars (At
$1=N130)
Equity Bank
12 Nigerian
International Bank
Alone 25 192,307,692.3
13 Oceanic Bank Oceanic Bank 31.1 239,230,769.2
International Trust
Bank
14 Platinum-Habib Bank
Plc
Platinum Bank 26 200,000,000
Habib Bank
15 Skye Bank Plc Prudent Bank 37 284,615,384.6
Bond Bank
EIB
Reliance Bank
Cooperative Bank
16 Spring Bank Plc Citizens Bank 25 192,307,692.3
ACB International
Guardian Express
Bank
Omega Bank
Transinternational
Bank
Fountain Trust Bank
17 Stanbic IBTC Bank
Plc
Stanbic Bank Limited 60 461,538,461.5
IBTC
Chartered Bank
Regent Bank
18 Standard Chartered
Bank Limited
Alone 26 200,000,000
19 Sterling Bank Plc Trust Bank of Africa 25 192,307,692.3
NBM Bank
Magnum Bank
NAL Bank
INMB
20 United Bank for
Africa Plc
United Bank for Africa 50 384,615,384.6
Standard Trust Bank
CTB
21 Union Bank Plc Union Bank of Nigeria 58 446,153,846.2
Union Merchant Bank
Broad Bank
Universal Trust Bank
22 Unity Bank Plc Intercity Bank 30 230,769,230.8
First Interstate Bank
Tropical Commercial
Bank
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Name of Banks Consolidating
Institutions
New
capital
Base in
Billions of
Naira
New Capital
base in Millions
of Dollars (At
$1=N130)
Centre Point Bank
Bank of the North
New African Bank
Societe Bancaire
Pacific Bank
New Nigerian Bank
23 Wema Bank Plc Wema Bank 26.2 201,538,461.5
Lead Bank
National Bank of
Nigeria
24 Zenith Bank Plc Alone 38 292,307,692.3
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (2008)
IMF (2008) suggests that the approved banks can be divided into four groups
for analytical purposes. Group 1 (First Bank, Guaranty Trust Bank, Union
Bank, Intercontinental Bank, Oceanic Bank and Zenith Bank) comprises the
first generation banks, which were the largest traditional banks that achieved
the capital threshold mostly on their own and may have also consolidated
long established affiliates and acquired one or two smaller banks. Thus, this
group have significant advantages in terms of franchise and a large resource
base. Group 2 (Access Bank, Diamond Bank, EcoBank, Equitorial Bank,
Fidelity Bank, Platinum-Habib Bank and Wema Bank) constitutes banks that
achieved the capital threshold by merging through voluntary partnerships.
Group 3 (First City Monument Bank, First Inland Bank, Skye Bank, Spring
Bank, Sterling Bank and Unity Bank) comprises banks that achieved the
capital threshold through four or more banks partnering out of necessity.
While Group 4 (Nigerian International Bank, Stanbic IBTC Bank and Standard
Chartered Bank) is made up of banks with majority or wholly foreign
ownership.
However, for the purpose of this study three categories of banks are
deployed. These categories are highlighted in Table 2.5 below.
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Table 2.5: Three Categories Banks in Nigeria
Stand Alone Banks Common Ownership
Banks
Common Interests
Banks
1) EcoBank
2) Guaranty Trust
Bank Plc
3) Nigerian
International Bank
4) Standard Chartered
Bank
5) Zenith Bank Plc
1)AfriBank Plc
2) Equitorial Bank Plc
3) Intercontinental Bank
Plc.
1) Access Bank Plc
2) Diamond Bank
3) First City
Monument Bank Plc
4) Fidelity Bank Plc
5) First Bank of
Nigeria Plc
6) First Inland Bank
Plc
7) Oceanic Bank
8) Platinum-Habib
Bank Plc
9) Skye Bank Plc
10)Spring Bank Plc
11)Stanbic IBTC Bank
Plc
12)Sterling Bank Plc
13)United Bank for
Africa Plc
14)Union Bank Plc
15)Unity Bank Plc
16)Wema Bank Plc
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (2008)
Table 2.5 shows that the Stand alone group comprise of 5 banks, the
Common ownership group comprise of 3 banks and the Common interest
group comprise of 16 banks and these form the three main categories of
banks used for this study. In their quest to unify banks (Groups with
common ownership, and common interests), managers try to achieve
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strategic and cultural fit aside just bringing these institutions together. Hill
and Brown (2007) suggest that there are two dimensions in determining
strategic fit for organisations and these are: “External strategic fit” and
“Internal strategic fit”. “External strategic fit” exists when the actions and
interests of all company employees are focused on key goals. This involves
the consistency between the competitive configuration in the market and the
operations processes and infrastructure in the business. “Internal strategic
fit” exists when employees from different levels and functions within an
organisation agree on what is most important for the organisation to
succeed. This involves the consistency between the operations strategy and
the overall business strategy, consistency with the other functions in the
company, and consistency between the constituent elements and processes
of the operations system. In the case of Nigerian banks, the proactive
measures of managers in the CBN proved that adjustments were inevitable.
These adjustments led to the formation of different banking groups.
In summary, the nature of the Nigerian banking consolidation examined in
this section reveals some situational challenges faced by banks and senior
managers directly involved in the consolidation process. These include
effective management of change (planned change), and subsequently the
need to find strategic and cultural fit in mergers and acquisitions. These
subject areas are vital elements in the drive to restructure the Nigerian
banking industry and will inform the selection of relevant change
management literature for this study. Parallels of banking consolidation
drawn from the Malaysian, Indonesian and Nigerian experience are examined
in the next section.
2.4 Parallels drawn from the Malaysian, Indonesian and Nigerian
Experience
This section examines parallels in the experiences of Malaysia, Indonesia and
Nigeria, with the aim of highlighting perceived similarities (basis for policy
transfers) and differences in these countries (Casey and Dostal 2008).
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Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria incurred serious balance of payment deficits
in the early 1980s, as the dramatic drop in oil price prompted authorities to
change their development strategies. Governments could no longer provide
recourses to subsidise interest rates, re-finance credit and fund other
liquidity support incentives. Therefore the need arose to lift the barriers to
entry and encourage banks to mobilise deposits, hence reduce their reliance
on government, as balance of payment shortfalls had to be financed by
foreign short-term capital loans.
Authorities in these countries turned to the IMF for help. The IMF for its part
insisted on the implementation of a standard Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) under its guidance as a requirement for short-term capital
loans, as the need to follow through on difficult structural reforms were
critical to restoring the long-term health of these economies. However, the
introduction of structural reforms encouraged the rapid growth of banks,
branches and aggressive tapping in the deposit market as result of lifting the
barriers to entry. It was also evident in Malaysia and Indonesia as in Nigeria
that banks started lending money without sound credit analysis. The lack of
credit analysis and constant violation of statutory lending limits led to high
numbers of non-performing loans (NPLs). The need to address these issues
encouraged authorities to deploy consolidation as a corrective measure.
Consolidation was also expected to achieve various objectives reflective of
prevailing economic conditions; this is shown in the Table 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8.
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Table 2.6: Comparative Analysis of Drivers in the Malaysian,
Indonesian and Nigerian banking consolidation.
Parameters Malaysia Indonesia Nigeria
Drivers for
Banking
Consolidation
Financial
deregulation
through SAP lead
to systemic crisis
and exposed the
high level of non-
performing loans in
banks.
Unable to defend
peg as result of
banking crisis, thus
the currency
collapsed.
Economics of scale,
diversification of
credit risk,
emphasis on
shareholder value
and developments
in Electronic
Banking.
Improper
sequencing of SAP
policies, caused an
influx of banks and
increase in problem
loans.
Capital flight and
currency collapse
as result of
systemic crisis.
Diversification of
credit risk,
economics of scale,
emphasis on
shareholder value
and developments
in Electronic
Banking.
SAP guidelines
eased restrictions
on bank licensing,
abolished import
licensing and
moved towards a
floating exchange
rate. These lead to
an influx of banks
and put two-thirds
of assets and close
to 75% of deposits
at risk.
Very low capital
base, dependence
on public sector
deposits, gross
insider abuse and
high levels of non-
performing loans.
Globalisation,
economics of scale,
potentials for risk
diversification,
shareholder value
and developments
in Electronic
Banking.
Source: Author Generated. (Based on a synthesis of: Hawkins and Mihaljek
2001; Montinola 2003; Bank Negara Malaysia 2003; Bank Indonesia 2004;
Ajayi 2005; Imala 2005; Ezeoha 2005; CBN 2005; Ayo and Babajide 2006;
Soludo 2006; CBN 2008)
The implementation of the standard IMF structural adjustment programme
(SAP) as a corrective measure in the countries under review, resulted is
serious systemic crisis. Other issues leading to banking consolidation include
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the inability to defend a currency peg in Malaysia and Indonesia, and the
very low capital base of Nigerian banks. The forces of globalisation, the
potential for risk diversification, economics of scale and developments in
electronic banking were key drivers and enablers of banking consolidation
across these countries.
Table 2.7: Comparative Analysis of Objectives in the Malaysian,
Indonesian and Nigerian banking consolidation.
Parameters Malaysia Indonesia Nigeria
Objectives of
Banking
Consolidation
Reduction in the
number of
domestic banks
through mergers
and acquisition.
Banking groups to
achieve sufficient
size with minimum
shareholders’ fund
of RM2 billion and
asset base of at
least RM25 billion.
To improve
efficiency and
profitability, and
the rationalization
of branches and
employees to
minimize disruption
in banking
services.
Robust structure
for domestic
banking system
and an increase in
the percentage of
statutory reserves
in Rupiah, from 5%
to a progressive
varied percentage
level based on total
bank assets.
Effective system
for bank regulation
and supervision in
line with
international
standard.
Competitive
banking industry
resilient in the face
of risk.
Ensure good
corporate
governance for
internal
strengthening of
banks and
infrastructural
support to create a
healthy banking
Consolidation of
banking institution
through mergers
and acquisition and
an increase in
minimum capital
requirement from
N2 billion to N25
billion.
Risk focused and
rule based
regulatory
framework and an
automated process
for rendition of
returns by banks
(e-FASS).
Withdrawal of
public sector funds
from banks.
Updating relevant
laws relating to
effective operations
of the banking
systems and a
Financial
Intelligence Unit
(FIU) to enforce
anti-money
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Parameters Malaysia Indonesia Nigeria
industry. laundering and
other economic
crime measures.
Source: Author Generated. (Based on a synthesis of: Lindgren et al. 1999;
Hui and Chee 2003; Bank Negara Malaysia 2003; Bank Indonesia 2004;
Goeltom 2005; Imala 2005; CBN 2005; Soludo 2006; CBN 2008)
Table 2.7 shows that all three countries aimed to reduce the number of
banks through mergers and acquisitions, and increase the minimum capital
base for the emergent banks or banking groups. Secondly, all three countries
aimed to improve the efficiency, competition and profitability of the banking
industry by proposing the implementation of stringent supervisory and
regulatory reforms. The emphasis in Indonesia to improve its banking
infrastructure is reflective of the severity of distress suffered by Indonesian
banks in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This was however
different in Malaysia as the impact of the Asian financial crisis was better
managed and Nigeria where the banking reforms was a pre-emptive measure
to avoid financial meltdown (BNM 2002; CBN 2006). Another objective which
specifically applied to the case for banking consolidation in Nigeria was the
phased withdrawal of public sector funds from the Nigerian banking industry.
This was because of the very high dependence on public sector funds by
Nigerian banks. This situation did not apply in Malaysia or Indonesia as
dependence on public sector fund was not as high as in Nigeria or did not
pose as much a problem. The authorities in Nigeria also expected to fight
money laundering and economic crime with the establishment of a Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) as millions of dollars had been laundered through the
banking system, thus undermining the credibility of the Nigerian banking
system (CBN 2006).
69
Table 2.8: Comparative Analysis of Policy Instruments in the
Malaysian, Indonesian and Nigerian banking consolidation.
Parameters Malaysia Indonesia Nigeria
Policy
Instruments for
Banking
Consolidation
Payment System
Act 2003 provided
a comprehensive
legal framework to
protect the
payment systems
from disruptions
that may affect
financial stability.
Banks to achieve
sufficient size with
minimum
shareholders’ fund
of RM2 billion and
asset base of at
least RM25 billion
by merging or
acquisition.
Implementation of
a Deposit
Insurance System
and the
establishment of
Asset
management
companies acquire
and mange non-
performing loans.
Consolidated
Supervision of
Financial
Conglomerates
and multi-pronged
risk based
strategies which
involved on-site
examination and
off-site
Government
Blanket Guarantee
(based on
Presidential
Decree no.
26/1998).
Self-
recapitalisation by
bank owners alone
or with new
investors; or joint
recapitalisation
between bank
owners, investors
and Government.
Based on the
Banking Law
(1998), Article 37
authorises BI to
resolve a problem
bank, while Article
37A grants wider
authority to IBRA
to restructure
insolvent banks
Creation of a
Financial Service
Supervisory
Agency (FSSA)
and transfer of
bank supervision
to the agency.
Risk-based and
Consolidated
supervision.
Replacement of
the government
CBN/BOFIA Act
Amendment Bill
improved the
autonomy of the CBN
in its monetary policy
decisions.
Legal modes for
consolidation
allowed: are mergers
and outright
acquisition/takeovers,
while minimum
capitalisation base for
banks is set at N25
billion.
CBN/NDIC adopted
the bank resolution
option known as
Purchase and
Assumption.
Consolidated
supervision of banks
was developed to
complement risk-
based supervision
and implemented on
on-site and off-site
bases.
Establishment of an
asset management
company for distress
resolution.
New code of
corporate governance
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Parameters Malaysia Indonesia Nigeria
surveillance. blanket guarantee
with a deposit
insurance scheme.
Source: Author Generated. (Based on a synthesis of: Lindgren et al. 1999;
Batunangga 2002; Hui and Chee 2003; Bank Negara Malaysia 2003; Bank
Indonesia 2004; Goeltom 2005; Ajayi 2005; Imala 2005; Ezeoha 2005; CBN
2005; Soludo 2006; Ezeoha 2007; CBN 2008)
Analysis of Table 2.8 also suggests that policy instruments applied by the
countries under review were influenced by their economic situations which
necessitated banking consolidation. For example the authorities in Indonesia
applied a blanket guarantee as part of its banking recovery plan, because the
effects of the Asian financial crises were severe in Indonesia. While a deposit
insurance system was put in place in Malaysia and Nigeria, with the reasons
being that the effects of the Asian financial crises were less severe in
Malaysia and the Nigerian authorities implemented banking consolidation as
a pre-emptive measure. However, the blanket guarantee in Indonesia was
later replaced by a deposit insurance system. This action, Batunanggar
(2002) argues is justified as a blanket guarantee is required at the outset of
the crisis when bank closures occur and political/social conditions are not
stable. Batunanggar (2002) also suggests that in the long run it is quite likely
that the blanket guarantee with inherent moral hazards could make future
banking crises more likely. Therefore, a blanket guarantee should be
replaced with a deposit insurance scheme once the banking system has been
stabilised.
The policies in Malaysia and Nigeria for managing non-performing loans were
also similar, as asset management companies were set up to acquire and
manage non-performing loans from banks (The Asset Management
Corporation of Nigeria Bill was signed into law on the 19th of July 2010). The
situation was a little different in Indonesia because the Indonesian Bank
Restructuring Agency (IBRA) an agency under the Ministry of Finance with
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the authority to restructure insolvent banks, also engaged in restructuring
non-performing loans. There are also a wide range of similarities in the policy
instruments used to consolidate the banking industries in Malaysia, Indonesia
and Nigeria. These similarities include mergers and acquisition as the only
legal modes for banking consolidation, increase in capital base requirement
for banks and banking groups, the implementation of risk-based and
consolidated supervision, and the enforcement of codes of corporate
governance particularly in Nigeria. In order to examine these parallels in
more detail, measures used to foster coordination and cooperation,
regulation, surveillance, crisis management and credit risk management are
highlighted.
2.4.1 Coordination and Cooperation
Batunanggar (2002) notes that authorities in Indonesia achieved
coordination and cooperation with related institutions especially the Ministry
of Finance, IBRA, the supervisory authority and Deposit Insurance Agency by
clearly defining roles and responsibilities for each institution. In the case of
Nigeria, the consolidation of the banking system threw up new challenges,
particularly the imperative of seamless integration of people, processes and
systems, corporate governance and the supervision of emergent financial
conglomerates (CBN 2006). To address these concerns, the CBN adopted
risk-based and consolidated supervision techniques as the major tool for
banking supervision (CBN 2006). Collaboration was intensified locally
between the CBN, Ministry of Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Corporate Affairs Commission, Federal Inland Revenue Service and all other
relevant agencies while international development partners such as Office of
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), Financial Service
Authority (FSA) and the Federal Reserve System were encouraged to help
Nigeria build the needed supervisory capacity (CBN 2006). The persistent
threat of money laundering in the Nigerian financial system has necessitated
the CBN to collaborate with various law enforcement agencies, these include
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Economic and Financial
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Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and
the Nigeria police, to address this menace (CBN 2006).
A consultative committee on banking sector reforms monitored the
implementation of banking reform programme. The membership of the
committee chaired by the Governor of the CBN, included representatives of
the Presidency, the Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, Director-General
of Securities and Exchange Commission, Director-General of Nigerian Stock
Exchange, Registrar-General of Corporate Affairs Commission and the
Managing Director of the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC).
CBN (2006) states that a CBN/NDIC committee on supervision was also
established to foster cooperation among regulatory and supervisory agencies.
2.4.2 Regulation
BNM (2003 p. 117) define regulation as the “balance between allowing group
synergy and efficiency, and ensuring that the activities of the financial
conglomerates do not introduce excessive risks to the financial system”. As a
solid basis for promoting financial stability, the authorities in Indonesia and
Malaysia provided a comprehensive formal regulatory framework and a
proper financial architecture to foster market discipline (Batunanggar 2002).
With the banking consolidation in Nigeria and the need for a regulatory
framework that supports a safe, sound and stable banking system, the CBN
took some proactive measures. CBN (2006) states that the CBN issued a
code of corporate governance on April 1, 2006. The CBN suggests that a
weak regulatory framework, thus the non-adherence to sound corporate
governance principles was a major cause for the failure of the 13 banks,
whose licenses were revoked by the CBN in January, 2006. Therefore, to
ensure regulatory attention and strict compliance, the CBN put the following
measures in place:
 Making compliance with the provisions of the code mandatory.
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 Banks were required to forward monthly returns to enable CBN to
determine, from time to time, the level of compliance.
 On-site visits were undertaken by examiners to verify banks level of
compliance.
 Sanctions which may include monetary penalties, non participation in
certain operations and suspension of a bank’s license could be imposed
for non-compliance with the provisions of the code.
 The CBN in conjunction with the Financial Institute Training Centre
(FITC), organised a training programme for non-executive directors of
banks to enable them appreciate their oversight responsibilities and
equip them with basic knowledge of financial control and risk
management.
2.4.3 Surveillance
Klein (2005) and Claessens and Klingebiel (1999) found that there is less
clarity on a preferred institutional design for supervisory functions, as cross-
country experience shows that countries have adopted different institutional
structures depending on the objectives of regulations and the type of
regulatory approach taken. In Nigeria however, the CBN deployed a
consolidated supervision framework, to strengthen bank supervision (CBN
2007). Bank of England (1998) (in CBN 2007) defines consolidated
supervision as a comprehensive approach to banking supervision which seeks
to evaluate the strength of an entire group to which a bank belongs, taking
into account all the risks which may affect the bank, regardless of whether
such risks are carried in the books of the bank or related entities.
Based on the FSS framework Batunanggar (2002) identified attempts by
Indonesia to meet international surveillance and supervision standards,
particularly the Basel Core Principle for Effective Banking Supervision. In the
case of Indonesia, Batunanggar (2002) suggested that this will be achieved
by adopting a clear responsibility for supervision within the Board of
Governors, a uniform supervision standard for all public and private banks,
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risk based consolidated supervision, placing an on-site supervision team in
each of the systemically important banks and the transfer of banking
supervision into a new established Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA).
However, in Nigeria the main agency of government for the surveillance of
the financial system is the CBN, which was empowered by CBN Act no.24 of
1991 and Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) no.25 of the
same year (Ezeoha 2007). The CBN as the apex of the financial system
maintains supervisory control while the Nigerian Deposit Insurance
Corporation protects deposits and help to promote confidence in the banking
system through the deposit insurance scheme.
With the implementation of banking consolidation in 2005, it became
imperative that the CBN needed to embrace international best practice as
regards the supervision of banks. CBN (2007) states that the CBN in
conjunction with the NDIC developed a framework for the consolidated
supervision of banks in Nigeria, to complement the risk-supervision policy
earlier released in 2005. The framework suggested that consolidated
supervision provides a useful basis for effective banking supervision, but
should not be regarded as an alternative to the normal supervision of
individual banks. Rather, it should be seen as complementing the supervision
of banks on a solo basis. To further strengthen this initiative IMF (2008)
found that the CBN assigned each bank to an experienced supervisory team
who would be responsible for overseeing that bank. This model (on-site and
off-site supervision) has been found to be effective in other jurisdictions and
would be relevant to Nigeria given that some supervision groups are in Lagos
while others are in Abuja (CBN 2007). The live run of the electronic Financial
Analysis and Surveillance System (eFASS) commenced on October 3, 2006,
with the daily online submission of bank reports, the upgrade of eFASS in the
month of October, 2006 marked the beginning of the submission of monthly
returns and consequently returns from banks were no longer received
through the Banking Analysis System (BAS) with effect from October 2006
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(CBN 2007). The increased data gathering capacity provided by eFASS,
enhanced the ability of the CBN to monitor bank activities.
2.4.4 Crisis Management
The use of the lender of last resort and blanket guarantee policies in
Indonesia is reflective of the level of systemic crisis faced by the banking
industry. Batunanggar (2002) found that the authorities in Indonesia
implemented the lender of last resort and deposit insurance policies in a bid
to manage the banking crisis. The situation was however different in Nigeria,
as the banking consolidation carried out by the CBN was pre-emptive and
intended to avert crisis in the Nigerian banking industry. Thus the CBN
provides temporary accommodation to banks in the performance of its
function as lender of last resort.
BNM (2002) defines deposit insurance as an explicit guarantee on insured
deposits up to a specified amount in the event that a deposit-taking
institution that is a member of the deposit insurance system is unable to
meet its obligation to depositors. CBN (2008) reports that the NDIC promptly
filed the necessary applications whereby it sought the order of the federal
high court to commence the winding up process of the 14 failed banks by
taking over ownership of their assets and liabilities in accordance with the
law. In an effort to ensure that depositors have seamless access to their
funds, the CBN and NDIC adopted the bank resolution option known as
Purchase and Assumption. This arrangement allows a healthy bank to
assume the private deposit liabilities and purchase some of the good assets
of a failed bank, while the shortfall is financed by the CBN on behalf of the
Treasury.
2.4.5 Credit Risk Management
Following the bank restructuring programme in Indonesia, Batunanggar
(2002) suggests that the banking system performance improved as indicated
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by an increase in profit, capital and deposits. However, the banking system is
still vulnerable and its capacity to support economic growth remains
constrained by poor capitalisation and continued high credit risk in the
economy. The main problems facing the Indonesia banking industry include:
(i) high credit risk indicated by continued high level of non-performing loans
(by value); (ii) slow progress in loan and corporate restructuring and; (iii)
slow credit growth due to unfavourable economic condition. Soludo (2006 p.
3) defines credit risk as “the risk that an issuer of debt securities or a
borrower may default on interest and or principal payments or become
bankrupt. If either event occurs, the investor stands to lose part or all of the
investment”. CBN (2008) notes that the decision to establish a Credit Bureau
in Nigeria featured in the Presidential Budget Speech of 1990. Thereafter, it
was given legal backing by the CBN Act No.24 of 1991 [sections 28 and 52]
as amended. The enabling legislation empowered the CBN to obtain from all
banks, returns on all credit with a minimum outstanding balance of
N100,000.00 (now N1,000,000.00 and above of principal and interest), for
compilation and dissemination by way of status report to any interested
parties (operators or regulators).
CBN (2008) points out that with the banking reforms in place, the Credit Risk
Management System (CRMS) is presently web-enabled, thus allowing banks
and other stakeholders to dial directly into the CRMS database for the
purpose of rendering the statutory returns or conducting status enquiry on
borrowers. Banks are also required to update the CRMS database on a
monthly basis as well as make status enquires on any intending borrower to
determine their eligibility or otherwise (Banks are penalized for non-
compliance with the provisions of the Act). The CRMS was migrated to the
eFASS with effect from August 22, 2006, and thereafter eFASS/CRMS went
live on August 28, 2006 (CBN 2006). The adoption of improved credit risk
management parameters are justified, as CBN (2008) notes that banks in
Nigeria raised over N350 billion from the capital market and Foreign Direct
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Investment inflow of $652 million. Thus the total capitalization of banks is
almost N1 trillion compared to less than N300 billion pre 2004.
Through an examination of drivers, objectives, and policy instruments, this
section provides a comparative analysis of banking consolidation in Malaysia,
Indonesia and Nigeria. This also highlights the degree to which events in
these countries are similar or different and provides a clearer understanding
of the situational challenges faced by consolidating authorities and therefore
helps explain the imperative of undertaking a study of banking consolidation.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the literature on banking consolidation in Malaysia,
Indonesia and Nigeria. The pressures for globalisation, the need to achieve
economies of scale, potential for risk diversification, increased emphasis on
shareholder value and developments in electronic banking emerged as major
drivers and enablers for consolidation. Whilst the Asian crisis of 1997
triggered reforms in Malaysia and Indonesia, it was the proactive measures
of the CBN that led to banking consolidation in Nigeria.
These countries aimed to reduce the number of banks through mergers and
acquisitions, and increase the minimum capital base for the emergent banks
or banking groups. Secondly, all three countries aimed to improve the
efficiency, competition and profitability of the banking industry by proposing
the implementation of stringent supervisory and regulatory reforms. It is
expected that capital injection will address the problem of weak
capitalisation, and liquidity from the new investment into the banking
industry will induce interest rates to fall, improve overall liquidity in the
system and increase lending to the private sector.
Academic commentators such as Katib and Mathews (2000), Okuda and
Hashimoto (2004), Sufian (2005), Collier et al. (2006), Goeltom (2005),
Batunanggar (2002), Iman and Hartono (2007), Majid (2007), and Hall
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(2005) have deployed a range of analytical tools to analyse the impact of the
post-Asian financial sector crises and banking consolidation in Malaysia and
Indonesia. The above review of literature on the Nigerian banking
consolidation has highlighted some situational challenges faced by
consolidating banks and their senior managers. These include the effective
management of change (planned change) and the need to find strategic and
cultural fit in mergers and acquisitions. Following on from this, is the CBN’s
expected economic benefits from banking consolidation, which forms the
basis on which this study examines the availability of credit to the private
sector before and after consolidation. The relevance of these subject areas
present dimensions of context, content and process of change in banking.
These dimensions and their application in the context of the Nigerian banking
consolidation is used as a structuring device, and helps inform the selection
of topics to be examined in the next literature review chapter.
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Chapter 3: Review of Change Management Literature
3.0 Introduction
Much of the literature reviewed in chapter 2 highlights the use of banking
consolidation to achieve financial efficiency and stability in emerging
economies. Particularly, the drivers, objectives and policy instruments for
banking consolidation in Nigeria, Malaysia and Indonesia were discussed. The
literature also identified the effective management of change (planned
change) and the need to find strategic and cultural fit as the greatest
challenges to banking stability in these countries. Secondly, the implied
reasoning from the literature reviewed in chapter 2 presents dimensions of
context, content and process as critical in the banking transformation
process, thus these dimensions are deployed as an organising framework in
this chapter. Furthermore, the Central Bank of Nigeria expected the
increased bank capital base to lead to economic benefits in Nigerian, and
thus justifies this study’s focus on the availability of credit post consolidation.
These subject areas were vital elements in the drive to restructure the
Nigerian banking industry.
Therefore, this chapter will examine the change management literature to
identify aspects of the literature required to analyse the actions or inactions
of managers in the Nigerian banking industry. The overlap of strategy and
organisational culture in mergers and acquisitions encompasses a host of
pressures which ultimately influence the performance of these banks. The
review presented in this study fully recognises the importance of
organisational culture and the influence of commercial pressures in shaping
strategic development. Literature is also examined to identify appropriate
tools for examining the effects of consolidation on credit availability.
3.1 Review of the Change Management Literature
Beugelsdijk et al. (2002) state that the intention of any organisational
change is to move the organisation from its current state to a more desirable
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state. Hayes (2007 p. 17) defines change management as an “alignment
between existing organisational components in order to do things better and
improve the efficiency of the organisation”. Mabey and Mayon-White (1993)
argue that change occurs, when managers determine that the configuration
of the current state is not effective and as a result they reshape the
organisation. According to Dawson (1994) change management is linked to
developments in markets, work organisation, systems of management
controls and the shifting nature of organisational boundaries and
relationships. Gilgeous (1997 p. 3) suggests that change is “a response to
some significant threat or opportunity arising outside the organisation.”
However, change management is the process of continually reorganising the
structure and goals of the organisation and its employees to meet political,
economic, social, legal and technological demands. It is also possible that
pressure from a combination of these demands could force an organisation to
effect change. In the case of Nigeria, the proactive measure of the CBN
forced banks (senior managers) to embark on organisational change or lose
their operating license.
The CBN’s consolidation drive created an imperative for change in the
Nigerian banking industry. Schmidt and Radaelli (2004) note that policy
change itself generally follows from the discourse representing those
pressures of economic imperative for change. They further state that the
change imperative presents situations which require action to be taken
urgently. Graetz (2000) believes that, other forces which would normally
influence the change situation are drivers. Drivers impact the way business is
done in organisations, however organisation would require enablers to help
facilitate necessary changes (Graetz 2000). For the purpose of this study, the
imperative, drivers and enablers for change in the Nigerian banking industry
are highlighted in section 2.3.
The framework outlined by O’Connor (1993) indicates that there are three
basic varieties of change: “Routine”, “Improvement” and “Innovative”.
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“Routine” change is planned and built into company procedures. These
changes are regular and provide a systemic aspect to work-flow and
production, it is appropriate when organisations are merely responding to
outcomes of previous iterations of a routine. “Improvement” refers to change
which adds benefit or value to what the company already does. These
changes build on existing procedures and activities rather than challenge
them. Improvements best serve organisations in particular circumstances
were internal or external forces advocate minor changes to existing practice.
The “Innovative” kind of change basically alters the way in which the
company does business. It requires staff to rethink the way in which they
behave and to alter long-standing work patterns. In most circumstances
organisations tend to alter long-standing work patterns in a crisis situation
which necessitates new thinking and generation of ideas. The innovative
change approach identified by O’Connor (1993), highlights the kind of
change implemented in the Nigerian banking industry (section 2.2.3). The
process of consolidation necessitated senior bank managers to alter the way
banking was done and in order to explore this phenomenon; this study
(through semi-structured face-to-face interviews) will probe industry actors
on the level of alteration of work patterns required to implement banking
consolidation.
Stace and Dunphy (2001) suggest change can be transformations in form of
development, task-focused, charismatic and turnarounds. Kanter et al.
(1992) argue that change can be achieved by either a bold stroke approach
leading to rapid overall change or a long march approach leading to
transformation over an extended period of time. Pettigrew et al. (1992)
recognise that the kind of change embarked on by organisations is reflective
of the scale and importance of the changes required. They argue that spans
of small-scale operational changes may be relatively unimportant, while
major strategic and structural changes may be of more importance to the
organisation. Secondly, the urgency of change required will influence what
approach managers apply in implementing change. The views of these
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authors are similar, as they all suggest that the change situation determines
the appropriateness of a chosen approach. In Nigeria, the CBN provided an
18 months window for all banks to consolidate, and this window should
significantly impact on the approach deployed by banks to achieve the CBN’s
requirements.
Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) argue that people and departments naturally
aim to prevent an alteration in the status quo. They describe “Parochial self-
interest”, “Misunderstanding and lack of trust”, “Different assessments”, and
“Low tolerance for change” as the four basic reasons why people resist
change. Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) identify six methods which managers
can apply in dealing with resistance to change and these are: Education and
communication, Participation and involvement, Facilitation and support,
Negotiation and agreement, Manipulation and co-optation and Explicit and
implicit coercion. In order to effectively employ these methods, managers
must be sensitive of their strengths and limitations, and appraise the
situation realistically so as to implement change in a manner that is internally
consistent and able to achieve fit with key situational variables. These
methods can be deployed to examine events at the bank level; however this
study does not have access to observe teams or individuals in the banks
under review.
Johnson et al. (2008) developed the cultural web and identified key elements
of behaviour, when attempts are made to change organisations. These are:
“Paradigms”, “Symbols”, “Power Structures”, “Organisational Structures”,
“Control Systems”, “Rituals and Routines”, and “Stories”. “Paradigms” are
the collective experience applied to a situation to make sense of it and inform
a likely course of action. “Symbols” are objects, events, acts or people that
convey, maintain or create meaning over and above their functional purpose.
“Power Structures” suggests that the most powerful groupings within an
organisation are likely to be closely associated with core assumptions and
beliefs. “Organisational Structure” is likely to reflect and show important
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roles and relationships. “Control Systems” present measurements and reward
systems that emphasise what is important to monitor in the organisation.
“Rituals and Routines” identify the way things are done on a day-to-day
basis, and presents activities or events that emphasis what is especially
important in the culture. “Stories” are told by members of an organisation to
each other, to outsiders, to new recruits, and so on, and may act to embed
the present in its organisational history and also flag up important events
and personalities (Johnson et al. 2008). This framework presents an effective
tool for assessing the behaviour of people in a change situation; however
elements such as rituals and routines, stories, symbols, and control systems
are not the core focus of this study. Thus, this framework is not appropriate
for the kind of analysis required here.
Peters and Waterman (1982) developed McKinsey’s 7-S contingency
framework and identified seven areas which organisations must pay attention
to if they must succeed in the business arena. These are: “Shared values”,
“Strategy”, “Structure”, “Systems”, “Style”, “Staff”, and “Skill”. They further
state that “Strategy” defines the plan or course of action for the allocation of
scarce resources in order to achieve specific goals. “Structure” refers to the
main features of the organisation chart and how the various parts of an
organisation are linked. “Systems” means the organisation’s formalised
procedures and processes. “Staff” is the composition of the workforce, and
has to do with recruiting, motivating, rewards, and education. “Style” refers
to management style and has to do with how the manager manages
employees. “Shared values” are the guiding concepts and meanings that
infuse the organisation’s members. “Skills” are the distinctive capabilities
possessed by individuals, groups and the organisation as a whole. The
McKinsey’s 7-S framework provides a greater picture of the inter-connected
aspects of the change management activities examined in this study, and
therefore will be deployed to analyse actions or inactions of senior managers
in the Nigerian banking industry.
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3.1.1 Planned and Emergent Approach to Organisational Change
There is considerable disagreement in the change management literature as
regards the most appropriate approach to changing organisations (Bamford
2006). However, the planned change approach is well developed and
understood, and is supported by a coherent body of literature, methods and
techniques. The planned approach to organisational change is principally
based on the work of Lewin (1951). He asserted that any organisational
change process can be conceived of as a movement in the equilibrium
position towards a desired or newly established position. Mabey and Mayon-
White (1993) and King and Anderson (1995) advocate that Lewin’s (1951)
model for change implementation remains one of the simplest
representations of the change process. First it states that old patterns must
be unfrozen by creating awareness for the need for change and thus
dissatisfaction of the current state (could be done through surveys and
feedbacks). Secondly, changes should be made where necessary by methods
such as retraining, structural alteration to jobs, team building, participative
decision making and organisational design. Thirdly, there should be
refreezing to help reinforce the new patterns and implement new system
controls. The author argues that the planned change approach is more robust
than its detractors acknowledge, as most change initiatives involve some of
the basic principles of Lewin’s (1951) model. However, the inflexibility of this
approach is a major weakness and its appropriateness is questioned because
business environments and the pace of change are increasingly uncertain. In
order to address these concerns, the action research model which could
sometimes be used along side planned change is reviewed.
French and Bell (1999) state that another model used along side the planned
approach to change is Action Research. This model is credited to two
principal founders namely John Collier and Kurt Lewin. Lewin (in Bruce and
Wyman, 1998 p. 13) believes that “applying action research to an
organizational setting calls for the joining of organizational members and
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internal or external practitioners in a continuous collaborative process of
reconnaissance, fact finding, planning, action, and evaluation”. French and
Bell (1999) argue that Action research attempts to meet the dual goals of
making action more effective and building a body of scientific knowledge
around that action. Action research stresses that for change to be effective;
it must take place at group level, and must be a participative and
collaborative process which involves all concerned. Thus change interventions
should concentrate on factors such as group norms, roles, interactions and
socialization processes to create ‘disequilibrium’ and change (Burnes 2004;
Schein 1988). In effect the action research approach is used when managers
have time and resourses to conduct a research and engage all stakeholders
and participants. Unfortunately the pace of change may not afford managers
the time and resourses to conduct action research and engage all
stakeholders and participants as prescribed by this model. The action
research model is not appropriate for this study, because the phenomenon of
banking consolidation is analysed as an “event” over an 18 month window
(July 2004-December 2006). Furthermore, this study does not require any
intervention to drive change on the part of the researcher, nor did the
researcher have access to observe senior bank managers at work
(implementing banking consolidation).
The emergent approach clearly differs from Lewin’s (1951) planned change
model of ‘unfreezing’, ‘moving’ and ‘refreezing’. This school of thought argues
that pre-planned change ignores the increasingly dynamic and complex
nature of the environment and the need for employee flexibility and
continuous structural adaptation. This approach further stresses that the
nature of change is unpredictable and unfolds through the interplay of
multiple variables within an organisation (Burnes 2004). Leifer (in Nelson,
2003 p. 19) regards change as “normal and simply a natural response to
environment and internal conditions. He argues change is consistent with
open systems in which learning occurs and goes on to describe the stable
state as a myth”. Dawson (1994) argues that the continuing and dynamic
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nature of change in today’s business world makes it impossible to implement
a planned process for ‘freezing’ changed behaviours.
Proponents of emergent change assume that the environment organisations
operate in is uncertain, and these uncertainties make planned change
inappropriate. Beer and Nohria (2000) suggest that emergent change tends
to be valued more highly when inertia is seen as a peripheral rather than as
a central issue in organisational effectiveness; when the foundations of
change are seen to consist of direction, updating and dialogue rather than of
programmatic directives; and when sensitivity to ongoing processes of
change leads people to favour intervention strategies of rebalancing rather
than strategies of unfreezing. Beer (1987) argues that it is important for
organisations to effect a complementary shift in the softer elements of
management, relationships, style, values, and culture. This Implies that
organisations should gear its structures, systems, style, staff, skills, and
shared values towards flexibility and not stability. The elements identified
here, highlight key components of the analysis required to examine change
management practices of senior bank managers in Nigeria.
Burnes (1988), Pettigrew (1988), and Whipp and Clark (1986) support the
combination of strategy and change, with strategic change regarded as a
continuous process. Thus, the emergent approach proposes the extensive
understanding of strategy, structure, systems, people, style and culture and
how these can function either as source of inertia that can block change or as
levers to encourage an effective change process. Burnes (2004) suggests the
emergent approach is more suitable for the turbulent environment in which
modern firms now operate, because unlike the planned approach it
recognises the need for organisations to align their internal practices and
behaviours with changing external conditions.
A combination of the planned and emergent approach based on the merits
and demerits earlier highlighted, allows for change to be planned and
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continually improved on as the situation arises. The merits of the combined
approach when necessary, is its ability to effect change based on the
prevailing situation inside and outside an organisation. The combined method
is appropriate for the kind of research required in this study.
Wilson (1992) notes that organisational theories have long recognised the
topic of change as an important sub-discipline in its own right and
approaches to change permeate virtually every aspect of organisational
behaviour and organisational analysis. O’Connor (1993), Burnes (2004),
Stace and Dunphy (2001), Kanter et al. (1992) and Pettigrew et al. (1992)
fail to adequately discuss the commercial implications of the kind of change
embarked on by organisations. This is a significant flaw as these frameworks
ignore the general competitive environment which ultimately influence
organisations to either incrementally or rapidly implement change. Thus,
these authors have produced generic frameworks that are independent of
their contexts. In this study, this weakness is addressed by examining the
context of banking consolidation (commercial implications) and its effects on
the management of the change process.
In summary, a combination of the planned and emergent approach is
deployed in this study. The planned approach examines actions of senior
managers in relation to the CBN’s 18 months window for consolidation, while
the emergent approach examines the implementation of continuous change
in the structures, systems, style, staff, skills, and shared values in Nigerian
banks in response to issues emerging as a result of consolidation. The
method proposed by Burnes (1988), Pettigrew (1988), and Whipp and Clark
(1986) which supports the combination of the planned and emergent
approach, and which allows change to be planned and continually improved
provides an appropriate method for examining the phenomenon of banking
consolidation in Nigeria and will be used for the analysis in this study. The
process of organisational change is discussed in the next section.
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3.2 Process of Organisational Change
The act of managing the relationships between the firm and different
stakeholders, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the firm’s decisions
and strategies is an important aspect of organisational change processes
(Amaeshi and Crane 2006). The frameworks presented by French and Bell
(1999) and Hayes (2007) significantly overlap. French and Bell (1999)
identify three basic components of all organisational development programs.
These are: “Diagnosis”, “Action” and “Program management”. The
“Diagnosis” component represents a continuous collection of data about the
total system, its subunits, its process, and its culture. The “Action”
component consists of all the activities and interventions designed to
improve the organisation’s functioning. The “Program management”
component encompasses all interventions all activities designed to ensure
success of the program. While Hayes (2007) proposes a six step change
process and these are: “Step 1: Recognition”, “Step 2: Start of the change
process”, “Step 3: Diagnosis (reviewing the present state and identifying the
preferred future state)”, “Step 4: Prepare and plan for implementation”,
“Step 5: Implement change”, and “Step 6: Review and consolidate”. In
formulating these frameworks French and Bell (1999) and Hayes (2007)
utilises the general principles of Lewin’s (1951) planned change model. These
frameworks appear appealing and present change as a linear process, but
they fail to fully present the change process in practice as change is rarely a
movement from one steady state to another. Secondly the commercial forces
driving change in the business environment often present new pressures for
change even before the completion of an intervention.
Kotter (1998) has played an important role in shaping the change
management literature and he puts forward eight guidelines in implementing
successful change. These are: “Establishing a sense of urgency”, “Forming a
powerful guiding coalition”, “Creating a vision”, “Communicating the vision”,
“Empowering others to act on the vision”, “Planning for and creating short-
term wins”, “Consolidating improvements and producing still more change”
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and “Institutionalising new approaches”. Kotter (1998) believes that change
involves numerous phases which together usually take time and critical
mistakes in any of these phases can have a devastating impact, slowing
momentum and negating previous gains. Beer et al’s. (1990) study report
that one third of resource-intensive change initiatives actually made
situations worse. They argue that most change programs fail because they
are guided by a theory of change that is fundamentally flawed, thus the place
to begin organisational change is with the knowledge and attitudes of
individuals.
Taylor (1994) provided a framework that suggests the change process can be
implemented while employees conduct their “business as usual”. To achieve
this he outlines two approaches, first is the need to simplify and make major
improvements to cross functional processes, and secondly to re-engineer a
vision-led approach to key processes. The analysis presented by Taylor
(1994) is based on the assumption that improvements in the business as
usual approach will lead to 10%-20% increase in efficiency, while
simplification is providing 100% improvements and re-engineering 1000%
improvements. There is a possibility here, that this approach could reduce
resistance to change within organisations. Unfortunately, Taylor (1994) fails
to adequately discuss other contextual issues that could influence this
approach, thus assuming change to be a linear process.
Balogun and Hope-Hailey (2004) use a diagnostic framework, known as the
change “Kaleidoscope” to help with the process of organisational response to
triggers for change. They identify the “organisational strategic change
context”, “change contextual features” and “design choices” as determinants
of how an organisation will respond to a trigger for change. The
“organisational strategic change context” refers to the broader strategic
analysis conducted to determine why the organisation should change and
what it should change to. The “change contextual features” are aspects of
the organisation to do with its culture, competences and current situation,
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which change agents should consider before selecting the change approach.
The “design choices” are the range of options a change agent needs to
choose from when selecting an appropriate change approach. Balogun and
Hope-Hailey (2004) state that these features will constantly shift according
to the organisation being analysed, as the Kaleidoscope for an organisation
will also change through time in response to earlier change interventions put
in place.
This study suggests that the most developed discussion of the change
management process is presented by Pettigrew (1988). Pettigrew (1988)
states that the change process involves not only the content of a chosen
strategy or the analytical process which reveals various content alternatives,
but also the management of the change process, and the contexts in which it
occurs. Thus, the “why” of change is derived from an analysis of inner and
outer context, the “what” of change is encapsulated under content, and the
“how” of change can be understood from an analysis of the process.
Pettigrew’s (1988) framework suggests that two aspects of “context” are
considered: the inner and outer context of the firm. Inner context refers to
the structure, corporate culture and political context within the firm through
which ideas for change have to proceed. Outer context refers to the
economic, business, political and societal formations in which firms must
operate. The “content” basically describes the strategy’s central objectives;
the source of the strategy; and the extent to which the strategy anticipates
the means of implementation. The “process” of change refers to the actions,
reactions and interactions from various interested parties as they seek to
move the firm from its present state to a future state. These broad classes
are presented in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Three broad Classes of the Change Process
Source: Pettigrew (1988)
Porter (1980), Hofer and Schendel (1978), French and Bell (1999), Hayes
(2007) and Caves (1980) approach change from the process and outer
context link but ignore the inner context of change in organisations, thus
suggesting the change process is externally driven and rational. These
scholars de-emphasise the explanatory role of inner context variables and
the analytical exploration of alternative content areas for strategic change.
The main weakness with the change management literature is its failure to
address the fundamental gap between these two schools of taught.
This weakness is addressed by integrating Lewin’s (1951) force field analysis
with the framework developed by Pettigrew (1988). The integration is
particularly important because the force field analysis makes it possible to
appreciate process-inner context of change in organisations. The force field
analysis is derived from Lewin’s (1951) field theory, which states that
stability within organisations is dynamic thus opposing and countervailing
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forces continuously operate to produce a stable environment. Dent and
Goldberg (1999), Paton and McCalman (2000), Hayes (2007), Burnes
(2004), Grundy (1993), Carnall (1999), and Bruce and Wyman (1998) define
force field analysis as a tool that brings to bare the underlying forces which
may pull a particular change forward or prevent the change process. Paton
and McCalman (2000) note that force field analysis is a positioning tool and
assists in answering questions such as: what forces are at play and what is
their likely magnitude? Who is for the change and who is against? The aim is
to determine the nature and magnitude of the forces acting upon the change
environment. Figure 3.2 exemplifies and summarises the range of
implementation issues for a Biodiversity Action.
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Figure 3.2: Generalised force field showing principal opportunities
and barriers.
Source: Watts and Selman (2004 p. 17).
Figure 3.2 shows the force field analysis of a biodiversity action and acts as a
positioning tool. The opportunities for the biodiversity planning (forces
working for change) are represented on the left side of the diagram, these
are: partnership approach, inventories and aerial photographs, indicative
planning projects, introduction of grants schemes, advisor field visits and
cross-compliance. While the barriers to the biodiversity planning (forces
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working against change) are represented on the right side of the diagram,
these are: lack of agreement/consensus, lack of knowledge of marginal
habitats/species, lack of monitoring, absence of indicative planning, lack of
established habitat restoration techniques, problems with grant schemes,
mutual mistrust between farmers and conservationists, adverse state of the
agricultural economy, and unforeseen crises. These differing forces all fall
into broad subject areas of agreement, knowledge, technology, economic,
social, and political issues. The force field analysis presents managers with a
clear description of what forces within and outside the organisation will
positively drive the change process, and identifies forces that will negatively
restrain change. Thus, managers are able to proactively address these
negative restraining forces.
Bargal and Schmid (1993) identify three levels which the force field analysis
must focus, these are: “Individual”, “Group” and “Organisational” levels.
They argue that while each level is significant to appraise and strategies for
organisational change, the assessment must be integrative thus
incorporating data related to all three. Bargal and Schmid (1993) found that
organisational behaviour is influenced by a disparate and complex set of
variables. These variables include the effects of organisational structure, the
dynamics of social problems or service need, the political preference of
various participants, the impact of technology on the organisation and its
service, the economics of agency funding and the regulatory environment
within which it is located. These highly differing orders of concern must all be
incorporated into a valid assessment of change feasibility and strategy. This
implies that, the force field analysis presents managers with a clear and
practical assessment of the opportunities and barriers associated with the
process of organisational change. Figure 3.3 summarises an integration of
Pettigrew’s (1988) three broad lenses and Lewin’s (1951) force field theory
as a criteria for evaluating the banking consolidation in Nigeria.
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Figure 3.3: Three broad Lenses of the Change Process in the Nigerian
banking industry.
Source: Adapted from Pettigrew (1988), and Lewin (1951) and utilising data
developed from analysis presented in chapter 2
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The integration of Pettigrew’s (1988) three broad lenses and Lewin’s (1951)
force field theory, provide an evaluation framework that help address the
weakness identified in the literature reviewed above. Figure 3.3 presents
industry level data from the review of literature in chapter 2, and helps direct
data collection and analysis in this study. Hence, this framework will guide
the collection of data and analysis in the subsequent chapters. The next
section will discuss these three broad lenses of the change process in the
context of Nigeria’s experience.
3.2.1 Inner and Outer Context
Triggers for organisational change could be externally or internally generated
depending on the nature of change. This section will look at “why” the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) consolidated the Nigerian banking industry,
thus highlighting the events that influenced this decision. Pettigrew (1985)
(in McCalman and Paton 1992 p. 6) argues that “changes within an
organisation take place both in response to business and economic events
and to processes of management perception, choice and action”. Change
could also be triggered where the organisation itself tries to go ahead of the
issues by being proactive (McCalman and Paton 1992). Below are some of
the possible triggers:
 Government legislation
 Advances in process or product technology
 Changing customer requirements, expectations or taste
 Competitor or supply chain activities
 General economic or social pressures
 Acquisition or merger
 Unpredictable environmental catastrophes.
The triggers for organisational change outlined by Sadler (1996) follows a
study of 178 organisations and suggest that financial loss, new chief
executive officer, proactive-ness and staff utilization could also cause change
in organisations.
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In Nigeria, the proactive measures by the CBN to enhance financial sector
stability and the emergence of a well capitalized banking industry triggered
changes in the banking sector. As identified in section 2.3, the actions of the
CBN were influenced by global events such as: the abolition of geographic
restrictions on banks and the potentials for risk diversification, emphasis on
economics of scale, and advances in communication and data processing
technology. Secondly, the Nigerian banking industry was in a poor state: as
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) implemented by the IMF in 1986 led to
deep financial distress and close to 75% of deposits at risk, low capital base
of Nigerian banks, poor corporate governance and gross insider abuse
resulting in huge numbers of non-performing loans.
Paton and McCalman (2000 p. 32) state that “The way in which a ‘trigger’
impacts upon a situation will, to a certain extent , depend upon its source, as
well as its nature”. They argue that the Tropics test provides an analytical
framework and a means for managers to efficiently and effectively enter the
change situation. In applying the Tropics test managers should consider the
following factors. These are: “Time scale”, “Resources”, “Objective”,
“Perceptions”, “Interest”, “Control”, and “Source”. Table 3.1 illustrates the
use of Tropics.
Table 3.1: The TROPICS Test
Tropics Factor Clearly Defined Ill Defined Solution
Methodology
(tendency
towards)
Time Scales Short to medium
term (A)
Medium to long
term (B)
A= Hard
B= Soft
Resources Clearly defined and
reasonably fixed
(A)
Unclear and
variable (B)
A= Hard
B= Soft
Objectives Objective and
quantifiable (A)
Subjective and
visionary (B)
A= Hard
B= Soft
Perceptions Shared by those
affected (A)
Creates conflict of
interest (B)
A= Hard
B= Soft
Interests Limited and well Widespread and ill A= Hard
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defined (A) defined (B) B= Soft
Controls Within the
managing group
(A)
Shared outwith the
group (B)
A= Hard
B= Soft
Source Originates
internally (A)
Originates
externally (B)
A= Hard
B= Soft
Source: Paton and McCalman (2000 p. 24)
The Tropics test presents an effective analytical framework with which to
consider the change situation faced by managers in the Nigerian banking
industry. The CBN clearly spelt out the “Time scale” and “Objectives”, they
also indicated what kind of “Resources” to be used by banks for the
consolidation, all stake holders “Interest” were addressed and “Control”
strengthened through consolidated supervision of banks. The Tropics test can
be applied as an early warning device to access both the impact and the
magnitude of the impending change, and therefore the
complexities/difficulties in trying to manage the change.
Paton and McCalman (2000) further state that the nature of change
influences our reaction to it. When a change is of a purely technical nature,
such as a machine or component upgrade, the expectation would be that
existing system-based knowledge would be applied in a mechanistic manner
to implement change. A purely technical problem will be placed at the
extreme “hard” end of the change spectrum. While the extreme “soft”
change situations are at the other end of the spectrum. In these situations
the objectives and time scales might be unclear, the affected environment
will be highly dynamic and difficult to specify, with exceptionally subjective
performance measures. Typically this kind of change involves personal
relationships and emotional responses (Paton and McCalman 2000).
However, in practice it is uncommon that organisations will be faced with a
purely “hard” or “soft” change situation, as the majority of change situations
managers are called upon to address involve an interface of the “hard” and
“soft” spectrum. This is particularly true in the case of Nigeria, as mergers
and acquisitions brought about by forced change by the CBN resulted in
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some degree of “hard” and “soft” change spectrum. The “hard” spectrum
involves the unification of bank’s systems and technology, while the “soft”
spectrum involves managers establishing the rational for change and the
ability to influence employees to follow.
In summary, the tropics test presents a useful tool for examining the change
situation faced by industry actors, aspects of this model is used to analyse
the response of senior managers directly involved in the Nigerian banking
consolidation. Furthermore, the phenomenon of banking consolidation
requires senior managers to deploy the hard and soft change spectrums, and
the ability to effectively manage these spectrums is an important aspect of
this study.
3.3 Content
To address the structural and operational weaknesses of the Nigerian
banking industry, the CBN implemented a number of policy changes. This
section will highlight “what” key policy instruments were used by the CBN as
it went about consolidating the banking industry.
Soludo (2006) stated that the financial sector reforms will be embedded in
the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS)
prepared in 2003. Figure 3.3 shows that the CBN/Banks and Other Financial
Institutions (BOFI) Act which gave autonomy to CBN on monetary policy
decisions, a new minimum capital base of N25 billion, an 18 months time
frame given to banks to meet the new capital base, mergers and outright
acquisition as the legal mode for consolidation, consolidated supervision to
complement risk based supervision implemented on an on-site off-site bases,
and a new code of corporate governance were the key policy instruments
used by the CBN to implement the banking consolidation.
Policy instruments are a means by which governments effect their policies.
Poole (1970) defines policy instruments as controlled variables which can be
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set to achieve practical purposes. Howlett and Ramesh (1993) state that the
literature is shaped by the theoretical debates between neoclassical and
welfare economists on the proper role of the state in the economy, even
though both prefer market based instruments leading to relative efficiency of
the market over state allocation of society’s scarce resources. Welfare
economists argue that numerous market failures exist, a condition which
necessitates government intervention. While the neoclassical theorists tend
to argue that the market only fails to provide pure public goods, warranting
only limited intervention by a government in their provision (Howlett and
Ramesh 1993). However, recent events in international financial markets
leading to a global credit crunch favours arguments presented by welfare
economists. It is not the intention of this study to join the debate, as the
focus here is on the effects of consolidation on credit availability to the
private sector.
3.4 Process
This section provides an analysis of “how” the banking consolidation was
achieved and highlights various activities of banks in a bid to meet the new
industry requirements set by the CBN.
Policy instruments deployed by the CBN for banking consolidation allowed
banks to come together only through mergers and acquisitions. This primary
growth strategy is expected to transform regional banks into national banks
or even in some cases international banks. It provides a platform where
organisations are able to deploy resources, usually through combination or
integration, using inter or intra-organisational processes to achieve desired
objectives. Thus, making it possible for firms to explore their competitive
advantages and achieve scope in the exploration of its core competence.
Successful mergers and acquisitions require managers with experience and
ability to acquire information and then make effective planning for transitions
(Lin et al. 2006). Lin et al. (2006) argue that a major reason for the failure of
mergers and acquisitions is the lack of adequate preparation of the personnel
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involved and a failure to provide training which fosters self-awareness,
cultural sensitivity, and the spirit of cooperation.
During the late 1980’s Burnes (1988), Pettigrew (1988), and Whipp and
Clark (1986) started to combine strategy and change. They argued that
strategic change involved aligning and realigning an organisation to its
changing environment. Mintzberg and Quinn (1998 p. 3) define strategy as
“the pattern or plan that integrates an organization’s major goals, policies,
and action sequences into a cohesive whole”. Johnson (1987) states that
strategy can exist at a number of different levels in an organisation, however
issues that have to be dealt with in managing the strategy of an organisation
are of a different nature from many of the day-to-day activities of managing.
He argues that these differences include a higher degree of uncertainty, the
likely demand for an integrated approach, and decisions concerned with
change. Thus, implementing strategic decisions is therefore also likely to
involve the persuasion and organisation of people to change from what they
are used to doing. Bowman (1976) notes that strategy must guide the
continuing stream of decisions, determining the organisation’s environmental
domains, essentially its product markets, the nature of its interactions with
these domains, and the internal adjustments suggested by these choices.
Johnson (1987) believes it is unlikely that managers will foresee a future in
which there is no change and therefore they will have to consider how their
organisations should adjust to such change.
Stoney (2001) notes that the once ubiquitous principles and practices
incorporated in scientific management has been forcefully challenged by a
new stream of writers, from a critical labour process perspective. Stoney’s
(2001) examination of managerial initiatives such as Total Quality
Management, Business Process Reengineering, and Just-in-time Management
found these writers to conclude that scientific management is not a failed
system replaced by more sophisticated behavioural theories, but a set of
guiding principles which continue to inform and influence the role and
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function of modern management. Mintzberg and Waters (1985), Knights and
Morgan (1991), Pettigrew et al. (1992), Hardy (1995), Alvesson and Willmott
(1995), Barry and Elmes (1997), and Thomas (1998) have from a broadly
sociological perspective attempted to incorporate sociological ideals such as
power and politics into the conceptualisation and implementation of strategic
management.
Mintzberg et al. (1998) outline ten schools of thought in the strategic
management literature. These ten schools fall in three groupings as
highlighted in Table 3.2:
Table 3.2: Ten Schools of thought in the Strategic Management
Literature
Prescriptive Process of Strategy
Formulation
Integrative
1) The Design school
2) The Planning school
3) The Positioning
school
4) The Entrepreneurial
school
5) The Cognitive
school
6) The Learning school
7) The Power school
8) The Cultural school
9) The Environmental
school
10) The Configuration
school
Source: Mintzberg et al. (1998)
The first three schools are prescriptive in nature and more concerned with
how strategies should be formulated than with how they necessarily do form.
The six schools that follow consider specific aspects of the process of strategy
formation, and have been less concerned with prescribing ideal strategic
behaviour than with describing how strategies do, in fact, get made. The final
group contains one school and people in this school seek to be integrative,
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they cluster the various elements of the strategy making process, the
content of strategies, organisational structures and their contexts into
distinct stages or episodes. Unfortunately, Mintzberg et al’s. (1998) idea of
the 10 schools of strategic thought offers little attention to organisational or
executive knowledge. They suggest that the focus is on content, on what
should be known rather than the manner of knowing it. The significance of
this argument to forced change as implemented in Nigeria by the CBN, is the
possibility of less resistance to change brought about by an understanding of
its necessity. Spender and Grant (1996) believe that this issue reflects the
growing belief that responding to the changes we see going on around us
means bringing a better understanding of managerial and organisational
knowledge and learning into a central place in the field’s analyses and
theories.
The purely systemic process of strategic management and planning must
develop methods to deal with the uncertainties of management information.
Thus, managers involved in the process of strategic planning must consider
the uncertainties in the organisational environment, its internal process, the
relationship between them, and prepare for relevant probabilities. Grinyer
and Spender (1979) suggest that managers can justify their reasoning and
those judgments that are not publicly justifiable only in terms of patterns of
belief about their situation and its potentialities. They note that the industry’s
pattern of managerial beliefs is called a “Recipe”, and if this recipe for action
can be made explicit, management has a way of evaluating its own
judgments and beliefs against a wider pattern judged reasonable by others in
the industry. Webster (1969) approaches the process of knowledge and
managerial judgement differently by suggesting that socialisation is
restricted to a particular company’s pattern of beliefs, and notes that
companies are less likely to socialize into an industry wide pattern of beliefs.
In the case of this study, the recipe is created by the CBN (the imperative of
N25 billion minimum capital requirement) and senior bank managers are
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expected to evaluate available options of going solo, merging or acquiring
other banks.
Behery and Paton (2008) define cultural fit as the extent to which units
within an organisation share common values. It is important however to note
that difficulties could emerge in a merger and acquisition as to what culture
to adopt for the union. Cooke and Szumal (1993) and Cooke and Rousseau
(1988) suggest that managers must have a two-dimensional focus. First is
“Direction”; this involves the specific styles of thinking, behaving, and feeling
adopted in order to fit into and to succeed in an organisation. The second is
“Intensity”; this involves the extent to which members of an organisation
prefer one particular system to another and the degree to which there is
preference consensus. This consensus could be based on the culture of the
dominant organisation in the union or a fusion of the cultures of the
organisations in the union.
Paton and McCalman (2000) emphasize the importance of culture as it
relates to the creative management of change. They note that every
enterprise, public or private, will possess a unique cultural blueprint, which
dictates how it interacts with its environment and manages its people. Beeby
and Simpson (1995 p. 21) define organisational culture as “the patterns of
meaning and understanding, anchored in core values, that are shared by
members of an organization or management team”. Bate et al. (2000) argue
that culture is a process as opposed to a set of variables. They suggest that
the process of developing a culture comprises four linked sub processes.
These are: Manifestation: these are assumptions manifested in beliefs and
values, Realisation: these are values materialised into artifacts,
Symbolization: these are artifacts acquiring surplus meaning and coming to
stand for something more than they actually are, and Interpretation: this
involves acting back upon and changing the initial assumptions. Based on
these sub processes Bate et al. (2000) define culture and cultural change as
any ongoing changes in assumptions, values, artifacts, or symbols resulting
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from the interaction of these four characteristics. To understand the nature
of change and the situation that a plausible implementation strategy will
develop, Paton and McCalman (2000) note that the “Recipe” is made up of
two categories of ingredients. The first is tangible. It involves dress codes,
control mechanisms, communication systems and so on. The second “Recipe”
is intangible. It involves informal values systems, the politics of power, and
the symbols of success.
Hofstede (2000 p. 11) argues that “societal norms have led to the
development and pattern maintenance of institutions in society with
particular structures and ways of functioning”. Therefore it is expected that
managers of the three categories of banks which emerged after the Nigerian
banking consolidation faced varying structural issues. Ideally stand alone
banks, would not encounter the same structural and cultural pressures with
banks in groups with central ownership or groups with common interests.
The same applies to the pressures for strategic fit, as expected stand alone
banks and banks in groups with central ownership are better placed to find
strategic fit than banks in groups with common interests.
In summary, authors in this section start to combine strategy and change in
the process of transforming organisations. They further suggest that culture
is a critical component of any change process, and thus emphasize cultural fit
as an essential feature of any merger or acquisition. The measures used by
senior bank mangers to achieve cultural fit in consolidating banks, is an
important part of the analysis in this study.
3.5 Force Field Analysis
The force field analysis presented in figure 3.3 identifies reduction in
operational cost, cheaper credit facilities, faster economic development,
better capitalized banks, and geographic spread as positive forces for the
Nigerian banking consolidation. While personnel insecurity (fear of losing
jobs), regional opposition to central authority, and shortage of skilled
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personnel are forces that oppose the consolidation of banks. Balogun and
Hope-Hailey (2004) argue that the success of the change program is based
on a key pivotal figure, who should be aware and responsive to forces in
favour or against change. In a merger and acquisition this figure (Leader)
may be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Managing Director (MD), or
another senior manager acting as the internal change agent. Eccles (2002)
notes that managers must transform their companies and themselves, as
radical change, risky and prone to failure though it may be, is their only
hope. He suggests that in a turbulent world the pressure of competition and
rapid technological change demand nothing less.
The force field analysis is deployed in this study to examine forces for and
against the changes required to implement banking consolidation in Nigeria.
The next section presents a critical review of methods and techniques for
analysing consolidation.
3.6 Review of Methods and Techniques for Analysing Consolidation
Academic studies follow one of two approaches to evaluate and estimate the
significance of banking consolidation. Pilloff and Santomero (1997) note that
the first approach compares the pre-consolidation and post-consolidation
performance of institutions using accounting data to determine whether
consolidation leads to changes in reported cost, revenue or profit figures.
They argue that this is a fairly straightforward approach as accounting
performance can be directly measured and the data used are both easily
obtained and well understood. However, there could be several drawbacks to
this approach, as accounting data designed to measure actual performance
may be inaccurate in an economic sense or other events may have occurred
during the period investigated which may more accurately account for the
observable performance changes. In this study, the drawbacks of this
approach is compensated for, by collecting primary data (face-to-face
interviews) from senior managers directly involved in the Nigerian banking
consolidation.
107
The second approach used by academic researchers for evaluating banking
consolidation is the stock market reaction to merger announcements. Pilloff
and Santomero (1997) found that proponents of this approach believe the
stock market reaction more accurately conveys the implied value of merging
two independent entities. In essence, they argue that accounting data are
unreliable and the market’s reaction is likely to be a better indicator of the
real economic effects of the announced deal. However, Grinyer et al. (1998)
argue that the stock market approach could lead to managerial short-
termism, whereby managers seek short-term gains (reference to
considerations of short-term accounting profits) in a way that constrained
commitments to revenue investments. The stock market reaction approach is
not deployed in this study, as it does not relate to credit availability to the
private sector. Most recently, a third approach has emerged in the literature
which incorporates and extends these two basic methods of analysis. This
approach does not only analyse the relationship between consolidation
activities with changes in accounting figures and stock market returns, but
go a step further to measure the correlation between changes in accounting
data and abnormal returns (Pilloff and Santomero 1997). Karceski et al.
(2005), Spindt and Tarhan (1993), Kahn et al. (2000), and Berger et al.
(1998) are some of the most prominent authors on the effects of banking
consolidation in the financial sector.
Karceski et al. (2005) estimated the impact of banking consolidation on
borrower welfare by analysing the share price reactions of publicly traded
borrowers in Norway to the announcement that their banks are merging.
Secondly, their study looked at how bank mergers influence the switching
behaviour of borrowers and relate borrower propensities to terminate a bank
relationship to their announcement-day abnormal returns. Karceski et al.
(2005) found that borrowers of target banks lose about 0.8% in equity value,
while borrowers of acquiring banks earn positive abnormal returns,
suggesting that borrower welfare is influenced by a strategic focus favouring
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acquiring borrowers. Also large merger-induced increases in relationship
termination rates are associated with less negative abnormal returns,
suggesting that firms with low switching costs switch banks, while similar
firms with high switching costs are locked into their current relationship. This
study’s focus is on the supply side and not the demand side of credit, and
therefore Karceski et al’s. (2005) method of analysis is not appropriate for
the kind of analysis required here.
Spindt and Tarhan (1993) used non-parametric tests to compare the
performance changes of merged banks with a group of matched pairs. Their
result from a sample of 192 commercial bank mergers completed in 1986,
indicate that mergers led to operational improvements which could be
attributed to economies of scale. The study suggests that scale economics
exists for institutions holding less than $100 million in assets. Unfortunately,
it is not clear if their findings are relevant to large mergers clearly a typical
characteristic transforming the banking industry. Scale efficiency is
highlighted in section 2.3.1 as an important driver of the Nigerian banking
consolidation, however the focus of this study is on credit availability to the
private sector.
A critical review of the experiences of Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria
(Chapter 2) suggests that credit risk and availability pose great challenges to
bank management in developing economies. This study draws some parallels
and highlights lessons for authorities in Nigeria from the experiences of
Malaysia and Indonesia. Thus, the methods used by academic commentators
to evaluate the effects of banking consolidation in Malaysia and Indonesia are
of particular interest to this study. Sufian (2004), Collier et al. (2006),
Zeithaml et al. (1996), Iman and Hartono (2007), Majid (2007), and Hall
(2005) are the most cited academic commentators who analysed the
performance of the banking consolidation implemented in Malaysia and
Indonesia.
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Sufian (2004) utilises the non-parametric frontier approach DEA (Data
Envelopment Analysis) to analyse the technical and scale efficiency of
domestic Malaysian commercial banks during the merger year, pre and post
merger period. He assesses the performance of Malaysian banks by
measuring efficiency to see how banks are doing relative to industry
benchmarks. Collier et al. (2006), unlike Sufian (2004), presented the
DuPont formula to show that the return on equity model disaggregates
performance into three components namely: net profit margin, total asset
turnover, and the equity multiplier. Thus the DuPont system of financial
analysis provides a means for Malaysian banks to monitor performance
through the planning period and post-audit planning process. This study does
not deploy the non-parametric frontier approach DEA, as the focus here is on
credit availability and not scale efficiency.
Zeithaml et al. (1996) argue that customer service quality in service
industries such as banks and insurance is vital in determining the standards
expected in the industry. They utilise a framework built around the
SERVQUAL methodology to study behavioural consequences and to mediate
between service quality and the financial gains or losses from the retention
or defection.
Majid (2007) employs a battery of times-series techniques based on the
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model, to examine the short and
long-run relationship between financial development and economic growth
during the post-1997 financial crisis in Indonesia. He argues that the ARDL
model is particularly useful as it allow for interferences on long-run estimates
and takes a sufficient number of lags to capture the data generating process
in a general-to-specific modelling framework. This approach is similar to that
of Hall (2005). Hall (2005) adopts the FMP (Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin
1997) model to calculate the authorities’ liabilities arising from the provision
of depositor protection in form of deposit insurance in Indonesia. The main
determinants of the value of the government’s liabilities are shown to be the
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volatility parameter of the banks’ risky loan. The FMP model balances the
lump-sum bankruptcy costs against the cost of monitoring to keep a bank
operating as a going concern. Unfortunately, Majid (2007), and Hall (2005)
do not highlight the extent to which various static and dynamic effects may
interact to reach new equilibriums.
Despite the analytical value of models used by these academic commentators
in evaluating the Malaysian and Indonesian experience. They fail to
adequately discuss the effects of banking consolidation on credit availability
in these countries. The significance of increased credit to the Nigerian private
sector, is emphasised by the CBN as a key objective of the banking
consolidation (CBN 2005), and thus justifies the focus of this study.
The framework developed by Berger et al. (1998) in a study of mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) in the great majority of United States banking
institutions from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, uses ordinary least
squares regression (OLS) based on bank Gross Total Assets (GTA) and
Commercial and industrial lending (C&I) to measure four effects of banking
consolidation on credit, and these are: “The Static effect”, “The Restructuring
effect”, “The Direct effect” and “The External effect”. “The Static effect” is the
change in lending propensities which results from simply combining the
balance sheets of the participating banks into a larger pro-forma institution
with combined characteristics. “The Restructuring effect” identifies the
change in lending that follows from decisions to restructure the institution in
terms of its size, financial characteristics, and local market competitive
position. “The Direct effect” captures the change in lending propensities that
are attributable to a direct change in lending focus above and beyond the
changes associated with the static aggregation of banking assets in the
merger and acquisition and the restructuring of the size, financial
characteristics, and competitive position that follow the merger and
acquisition. “The External effect” captures the dynamic response to merger
and acquisition of other lenders in the same local market. Berger et al’s.
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(1998) framework is appealing since it recognises the influence of the
general and competitive environment on credit; in addition a more detailed
examination of tools, data sets and time frames used in analysing the
different effects highlighted above is presented in section 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7
respectively.
With a sample size of 22,642 commercial banking transactions over the
period January 1, 1991 to March 30, 1999, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006)
adapted Berger et al’s. (1998) framework to examine the real and social
effects of credit market competition resulting from bank mergers and
acquisitions in the United Sates (U.S.). Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006)
deployed ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and Herfindahl
concentration index to test the static effect of these mergers and
acquisitions. They found that credit market imperfections can have important
spill over effects on both economic and social outcomes, and that in
evaluating the impact of bank mergers and acquisitions, regulators would do
well to consider not only the present bank concentration of potentially
affected markets, but also the social fragility of these markets. Furthermore,
Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) note that the Berger et al. (1998)
framework presents an effective method for examining bank lending before
and after banks engage in mergers and acquisitions. The effects of banking
consolidation on credit availability to the Nigerian economy is an important
aspect of this study, while the impact of social, regulatory and infrastructural
issues on credit is acknowledged.
The usefulness of Berger et al’s. (1998) framework for examining the effects
of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on credit availability is further
reflected in the studies of Carow et al. (2006), and Patti and Gobbi (2007).
Carow et al. (2006) applied the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) model, to
estimate whether M&A announcements affect the value of intangible
customer relationships at target and acquiring banks. Using data for the ten
largest domestic U.S. bank M&As between 1991 and 2001, their findings
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indicate that increased bargaining power of megabanks adversely affects loan
customers of the acquired bank. Patti and Gobbi (2007) deployed a
regression model and Herfindahl index of loan market concentration to test
the impact of bank M&As on outstanding credit, credit lines, and the
sensitivity of investment to cash flow using a large sample of Italian
corporate borrowers over the period 1990 to 1999. They note that bank
M&As have an adverse effect on credit, particularly when the M&A is followed
by relationship termination. These authors use Berger et al’s. (1998)
framework to benchmark their analysis of bank lending resulting from M&As.
For example: the framework is drawn on by Carow et al. (2006) to show that
firm size is among the best proxies for customer bargaining power, while
Patti and Gobbi (2007) use the framework to benchmark their findings that
short-run shocks due to consolidation tend to be absorbed at the market
level after some time. Furthermore, Carow et al. (2006), and Patti and Gobbi
(2007) note that the Berger et al. (1998) framework provides a robust
method for analysing the effects of banking consolidation on credit
availability. A key focus of this study, is to examine the effects of banking
consolidation on credit availability to the Nigerian private sector.
In summary, the Berger et al. (1998) framework recognises the influence of
the general and competitive environment on credit and its availability, and
thus provides an appropriate method for the kind of analysis required in this
study. This framework will guide the approach to data collection and its
analysis, thus secondary data is first collected and analysed and then used to
inform the primary data collection process. The secondary and primary data
collected are later deployed to analyse the static effect, the restructuring
effect, the direct effect and the external effect of banking consolidation on
credit availability to the private sector in Nigeria. The next section presents
the conclusions drawn from this chapter.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter critically examined the change management and financial
analysis literature. It is evident in the literature that there are significant
differences on how to approach organisational change, while strategy and
organisational culture continue to influence its implementation. Much of the
change management literature reviewed presents three broad themes, these
are: Triggers for change, Readiness for change, and Implementing change.
In the case of this study, the triggers for change are examined in chapter 2,
while the readiness for change is mapped out through a critical review of
different models in this chapter. This also presents the theoretical
underpinning for the implementation of change, and will be utilised to
structure the analysis in chapter 5. Thus there is the need to develop a broad
framework in which the change process can focus on outer context but still
bring process-inner context into the picture. This weakness is addressed by
integrating Lewin’s (1951) force field analysis with the framework developed
by Pettigrew (1988). This conceptual framework helps present a reflective
evaluation of the situation in the Nigerian banking industry. The principal
elements of this proposed framework will ensure that managers do not see
change as a completely linear process, but a process more reflective of
external and internal pressures.
The critical review of literature in this chapter, also informs the evaluation
and benchmarking of actions or inactions of managers in the Nigerian
banking industry, as one of the primary research questions of this study is to
examine the change management practices of managers in the Nigerian
banking industry. In order to address this question, managers who were
directly involved in implementing consolidation will be interviewed.
Furthermore, tools previously used to analyse the effects of banking
consolidation on National economies are reviewed to identify the most
appropriate methods for examining credit availability pre and post
consolidation. Figure 3.4 shows a synthesis of findings in chapter 2 and 3.
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Figure 3.4: Synthesis of Findings in Chapter 2 and 3.
Source: Author Generated (Adapted from: Lewin 1951; Peters and Waterman
1982; Pettigrew 1988; Berger et al. 1998; Kotter 1998; CBN 2005)
Figure 3.4 provides a framework that examines required changes in banking
consolidation and its effects on credit to the private sector. These together
form the primary research questions in this study and will thus guide the
approach used for data collection and analysis. The next chapter presents the
methods of data collection and analysis of change management practices of
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senior managers, and the effects of banking consolidation on the availability
of credit to the private sector in Nigeria.
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology
4.0 Introduction
Through a critical review of literature in chapter 3, this study suggests
Pettigrew’s (1988) three broad lenses and the credit analysis approach used
by Berger et al. (1998) as key frameworks for examining change
management practices of consolidating banks in Nigeria and its effects on
credit availability to the private sector. The synthesis of findings in chapter 2
and 3, presents a conceptual framework (figure 3.4) which guides the
approach used for data collection and analysis. This chapter provides an
overview of the research methodology and methods deployed in this study. It
examines different theoretical perspectives, explains the choice of
methodologies adopted and builds an appropriate research design for data
collection and analysis. Figure 4.1 shows a flow diagram of research methods
deployed.
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Figure 4.1: Flow Diagram of Research Methods
Source: Author Generated
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The chapter starts with a broad examination of theoretical perspectives, to
identify dominant disciplines in the field of research that most appropriately
address the research questions. It then explores methodologies, theories and
models, and presents a detailed account of the methods deployed within the
chosen methodological stance. Finally research instruments for data
collection and tools used to examine specific research questions are clarified.
4.1 Methodology
Donaldson (2005) notes that methodologies clarify ways or procedures used
to explore and analyse a particular problem. In academia and particularly for
social sciences there is a wide range of philosophies dealing with how best to
represent reality. It is important to investigate these philosophies, as it helps
the researcher to understand established principles which underpin the way
the social world is constructed. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) suggest three
reasons why an understanding of philosophical issues is beneficial. First, it
helps establish the research design, what data to collect from where, and
how that data can be interpreted to provide good answers to the research
questions. Second, it highlights the practical limitations of particular
approaches. Third, it can enable researchers to develop designs which are
outside their experiences.
Positivism, Interpretivisim and Realism are some of the most common
philosophical stances in social science. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991 p. 22)
state that “the key idea of positivism is that the social world exists
externally, and that its properties should be measured through objective
methods, rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection
or intuition”. According to this school of thought, social science and
organisational research can match the achievements of natural science in
explanation, prediction, and control only by applying the methods of natural
science (Lee 1991). Marsh and Stocker (2002) argue that positivists are
concerned with establishing causal relationships between social phenomena
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to detect the regularities in nature, and therefore propose generalisation.
Their claims are based on two assumptions: (i) reality is external and
objective, and (ii) knowledge is only significant if it is based on observation
of external reality (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991).
The empirical methods of natural science which underpin the purely positivist
enquiry suggests the use of procedures as those associated with
mathematical analysis, hypothesis testing, inferential statistics, and quasi-
experimental design. Gill and Johnson (2002) note that it is frequently
advocated that the positivist researcher will likely use a highly structured
methodology in order to facilitate replication. This implies that, in the
positivist epistemology, knowledge may be based on observation which could
confirm or discard theories.
In contrast, interpretivism arose from the criticism of the positivist approach
to research. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) suggest that interpretists believe the
methods of the natural sciences are not appropriate because the social world
is not governed by law-like regularities but is mediated through meaning and
human agency. Delanty (2005) argues that the real strength of the social
sciences is not in predictive or explanatory theory but in reflexive
understanding, which is the weakness of the natural sciences. Consequently
the social researcher is concerned to explore and understand the social
world, as social science occupies an interpretative space in society (Ritchie
and Lewis 2003; Delanty 2005).
Though critics of this approach (positivists) argue that the interpretist merely
offers subjective judgement about the world and as such there are no bases
on which to judge or validate their claims. Bevir and Rhodes (2002) state
that the interpretive epistemology is developed on two main premises. These
are: (i) people act on their beliefs and preferences, and (ii) we cannot
presume objective facts, such as race, social class or institutional position by
looking at people’s belief and preferences. In accepting these
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intersubjectively created meanings as an integral part of the subject matter,
Lee (1991) claims that the social scientist must collect facts and data
describing not only the purely objective, publicly observable aspects of
human behaviour, but also the subjective meaning this behaviour has for
human subjects themselves.
However the argument presented by realists tends to bridge the gap between
positivism and interpretivisim (Sayer 2000). Sayer (2000) notes that the
defining feature of realism is the belief that there is a world existing
independently of our knowledge, while the independence of objects from
knowledge immediately undermines any complacent assumptions about the
relationship between them and renders it problematic. Realists state that not
all social phenomena and the relationships between them are directly
observable. Thus they acknowledge two points: (i) while social phenomena
exist independently of our interpretation of them, and (ii) our
interpretation/understanding of them affects outcomes. Therefore we need to
identify and understand both the external reality and the social construction
of that realty, if we are to explain the relationships between social
phenomena.
In applying this realist fundamental doctrine to the philosophy of science,
Bhaskar (1975) argues that reality exists in three overlapping domains: (i)
the “Empirical” are experiences or observed events, (ii) the “Actual” are
events whether observed or not, and (iii) the “Real” are those underlying
tendencies or mechanisms which may in a given situation give rise to events
or lie dormant, being cancelled by other forces. Therefore the social world,
like the natural world is real and we need not treat social facts as having an
existence independent of our consciousness of them. Contemporary realism
has been significantly influenced by the interpretist critiques who opine that
there are no structures that are independent of social action and no objective
basis on which to observe the actions or infer the deep structures (Marsh and
Stoker 2002). The interpretist critiques fail to acknowledge that knowledge
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and social phenomena are socially constructed, but this does not mean
external phenomena cannot influence our interpretation.
By implication, the realist school of thought necessitates an integration of the
positivist and interpretist ideology. It is expected that, the construction of a
positivist understanding without the aid of a careful interpretation of the
subjective meanings would be a methodological error. To avoid this, the
researcher simply makes sure that subjective meanings have been built into
the positivist understanding, which would then serve as the point of
comparison for judging the subjective meaning contained in the positivist
understanding (Lee 1991).
For example, Marsh and Stocker (2002 p. 31) state that “realists might use
quantitative methods to identify which financial markets are ‘globalised’.
However, they would also want to analyse qualitatively how globalisation is
perceived, or discursively constructed, by governments, because the realist
argument would be that both the ‘reality’ and the discursive construction
affect what government does in response to global pressures”. Their view is
that reality exists externally to organisational actors, whether or not it is
directly observable and that the consciousness of managers determines their
response to that reality. The approach deployed by Marsh and Stocker
(2002), seems to be the most appropriate for studying a complex
phenomenon such as banking consolidation, where the application of a multi-
level analysis is required to understand the interplay of forces within the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Nigerian banking industry, the different
categories of banks, and individual banks in Nigeria. Figure 4.2 identifies
different levels of banking activities examined in this study.
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Figure 4.2: Different Levels of Banking Activity
Source: Author Generated
Figure 4.2 shows the different levels of data collection and analysis required
to understand the phenomenon of banking consolidation in Nigeria. Thus,
quantitative tools are used to examine figures of bank performance in the
banking industry as a whole, while qualitative techniques are deployed at the
level of individual banks to explain the complex factors influencing these
results and the bank’s response to them. This imply that the purely objective
or subjective extremes will not be adequate for studying the financial
performance of Nigerian banks and the accounts of managers on the
response to changes in their business environment. Therefore, the
acknowledgment in the realist school of the utility of both qualitative and
quantitative data (Marsh and Stocker 2002), presents an ideal methodology
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for examining all aspects of the research questions arising from the
consolidation of the Nigerian banking industry.
4.2 Research Methods
Ritchie and Lewis (2003 p. 3) believe that qualitative research is a
“naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with understanding the
meaning which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs,
values etc.) within their social worlds”. Qualitative research through learning
about social and material circumstances, entails an in-depth and interpreted
understanding of the social world of research participants.
Bouma and Atkinson (1995) note that qualitative research can be described
as any social science research that produces results that are not obtained by
statistical procedures or other methods of quantification. They state that it
can refer to research about people’s lives, their stories, and behaviour, and it
can also be used to examine organisations, relationships, and social
movements. Some of the data may be quantified, but the analysis is
qualitative. Research done in this way produces descriptive data such as
people’s own spoken or written words or observable behaviour (Bouma and
Atkinson 1995). The qualitative approach will be effective for analysing lived
experiences of senior managers involved in implementing consolidation in the
Nigerian banking industry.
The quantitative approach is at the other extreme, it involves meaning
derived from numbers and collection of results in a numerical and
standardised form (Saunders et al. 2003). Black (1999) states that
quantitative research emphasizes the collection of considerable data from
representative samples of a large population for a few variables. Therefore it
describes tendencies derived from most common or only typical outcomes.
Sapsford and Jupp (1996) argue that quantitative research is designed to
obtain answers to the researcher’s questions; it does not yield an
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understanding of people’s lives in depth nor, generally leave space for them
to indicate what they regard as the important questions. Furthermore, they
suggest that quantitative methods typically isolate variables for study,
independent of the context in which they make sense and the sense which is
made of them in that context. Therefore, concepts, environments, social
interactions are all simplified by methods which lift them out of their context,
stripping them of the very complexity that characterises them in the real
world. The quantitative approach will be effective for analysing directly
observable events or experiences in the Nigerian banking industry.
The theoretical perspectives reviewed in the previous section, indicate that
the mixed method is best suited to examine the complex phenomena of
banking consolidation in Nigeria. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), McConney
et al. (2002), Yauch and Steudel (2003), Bryman (2006), Greene (2008),
Vitale et al. (2008) believe the mixed methods approach is sought when
practical demands of contexts call for:
 Both generality and particularity,
 Defensible patterns of recurring regularity as well as insight into
variation,
 Results that convey magnitude and dimensionality, and
 Results that portray contextual stories about lived experiences.
In the context of this study, all of the dimensions identified above apply. The
conventional logic is that different methods are combined to provide
complementary insights into the same empirical phenomenon with the aim of
enhancing the validity of representations (Modell 2009). This also highlights
the concept of triangulation discussed later in this section.
Miles and Huberman (1994) offer a list of reasons to combine methods, these
are: (i) Quantitative data can help with the qualitative side of a study during
design by finding a representative sample and locating deviant cases. (ii)
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Quantitative data can help during data collection by supplying background
data, getting missed information, and helping avoid elite bias (talking only to
high-status respondents). (iii) During analysis quantitative data can help by
showing the generality of specific observations, correcting monolithic
judgments about a case, and verifying or casting new light on qualitative
findings. Understanding the phenomena of banking consolidation requires
examining generality and analysing deviant cases through accounts of
industry actors, therefore this study will utilise both qualitative and
quantitative data.
Creswell (2003) states that four decisions go into selecting a mixed methods
strategy of inquiry, and these are: (i) What is the implementation sequence
of the quantitative and qualitative data collection in the proposed study? (ii)
What priority will be given to the quantitative and qualitative data collection
and analysis? (iii) At what stage in the research project will the quantitative
and qualitative data and findings be integrated? (iv) Will an overall
theoretical perspective be used in the study? These four decisions are
considered below:
(i) What is the implementation sequence of the quantitative
and qualitative data collection in the proposed study?
Collection of data will be carried out using sequential
triangulation. Modell (2009) notes that sequential triangulation
is used if the results of one method are essential for planning
the next method. For this study, quantitative data is collected
first, the intent is to analyse directly observable events so as to
inform aspects of qualitative data collection. Triangulation is
also achieved by interviewing more than one senior manager in
a couple of banks (Guaranty Trust Bank; Bank PHB) and an
independent financial analyst. Thus, these managers are able to
provide a corroboration of findings (data triangulation) in their
banks, while the independent financial analyst presents an
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external expert witness opinion of events in the Nigerian
banking industry, on which this study is able to cross-check the
findings and analysis of secondary and primary data collected.
The effectiveness of triangulation rests on the premise that the
weakness in each single method will be compensated by the
counter-balancing strengths of another (Jick 1979).
(ii) What priority will be given to the quantitative and
qualitative data collection and analysis? Robson (2002)
suggests fixed design research (quantitative approach) is more
effective at getting at structural aspects of social life, while
flexible design research (qualitative approach) is more effective
in dealing with processes, and combining them allows both
aspects to be covered. In this study, priority is given to a
combination of the fixed design research made up of secondary
data on bank performance and flexible design research made up
of primary data (face-to-face interviews) from senior managers
involved in implementing consolidation. These designs are
deployed to complement each other and analysed using a varied
range of analytical tools examined in sections 4.6 and 4.7. As
the complex nature of banking consolidation requires the
collection and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data
guided by the three broad lenses framework identified in figure
3.3.
(iii) At what stage in the research project will the quantitative
and qualitative data and findings be integrated?
Integration of qualitative and quantitative data will occur at the
interpretation stage. Results from qualitative themes or codes
will be compared with quantitative numbers. In chapter 5,
results and analysis of qualitative data is presented, while
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chapter 6 shows the results and analysis from quantitative data.
Findings from both chapters are later integrated in chapter 7.
(iv) Will an overall theoretical perspective be used in the
study? Realism (Lee 1991) is the theoretical perspective
guiding the entire design of this study. The justification for this
approach has been highlighted in section 4.1.
4.3 Research Design and Methods
This section builds on the initial choices in research methods to develop
details of the research design and methods. This choice of design and
methods presents a logical sequence that connects empirical data to the
study’s research questions and ultimately to its conclusions. Glaser and
Strauss (1967) note that this connecting process requires a defined purpose,
which in turn leads to the generation of hypotheses. Hypotheses are useful in
the comparison of differences and similarities among groups, through
evidence enough only to establish a suggestion and not an excessive piling
up of evidence to establish a proof (Glaser and Strauss 1967).
Characteristically, hypotheses are tested against some alternative, and could
be expressed in statistical terms or comparable figures. However, it is never
actually proven statistically that a hypothesis is right, but can only be
rejected or not be rejected (Sapsford and Jupp 1996).
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991), Yin (2003) identify surveys, experiments,
action research, histories, analysis of archival information, case studies and
ethnographies as accepted ways of researching organisational processes. The
case study strategy is chosen for the purpose of this research because of its
focus on understanding the complex dynamics present within organisations
and the context in which management behaviour takes place. Child and
Smith (1987) for example, opine that the dynamic complexity of
organisational change and plurality of possible perspectives from which to
study the phenomenon make the case study approach suitable. Other
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parameters presented in this section include procedures for data collection
and analysis.
4.3.1 The Case Study Research
Case study research consists of a detailed investigation of individuals or
groups, or one or more organisations, with the aim of providing an analysis
of the context and process involved in the phenomenon being investigated
(Cassel and Symon 2004). Yin (2003) defines case study research as an
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and
context are not clearly evident, necessitating the use of multiple sources of
evidence. Morris and Wood (1991) (in Saunders et al. 2003) believe that the
case study strategy is of particular interest if and when it’s necessary to gain
a rich understanding of the context of the research and the process being
enacted.
Stake (1995) identified three different types of case study: these are the
“Intrinsic case study”, “Instrumental case study” and “Collective case study”.
The “Intrinsic case study” where the focus is on its particularity and
ordinariness, and no attempt is made to generalise beyond the single case or
even to build theories. The “Instrumental case study” is a case examined
mainly to provide insight into an issue or to revise a generalisation. Although
the case selected is studied in depth, the main focus is on something else.
The “Collective case study” involves the study of a number of cases in order
to investigate a general phenomenon. The collective case study approach will
be implemented in this study, because of the multi-level analysis required to
understand the activities of the CBN, the Nigerian banking industry, different
categories of Nigeria banks and individual banks. These different levels
present case studies, and the collective case study approach makes it
possible to study a number of cases in order to understand a phenomenon.
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Yin (2003) outlined five important components of a case study research
design, considered below.
(i) The study’s questions: the primary research questions
developed in the previous chapters, are broadly concerned with
exploring and understanding why and how the CBN consolidated
the Nigerian banking industry and the response of banks to the
CBN’s consolidation drive. The case study approach is suitable
for answering these types of questions (Yin 2003).
(ii) The study’s propositions, if any: Yin (2003) states that
propositions direct attention to something that should be
examined within the scope of the study. Without such
propositions, an investigator might be tempted to cover
everything, which is impossible to do. Here, the purpose is to
examine the change management practices of senior bank
managers and the effects of banking consolidation on the
availability of credit in Nigeria.
(iii) The study’s unit(s) of analysis: Lofland and Lofland (1995)
presents a list of possible units of sociological analysis these
include: groups, organisations, settlements, practices, episodes,
encounters, roles, relationships, lifestyles and worlds. As a
general guide, a tentative definition of the unit of analysis is
related to the way a researcher defines the initial research
questions (Yin 2003). Here, the focus for analysis is on
secondary data of bank performance in the Nigerian banking
industry and primary data (interviews) from managers directly
involved in consolidation activities in Nigerian banks. At various
stages of this study, different levels of analysis are presented to
help examine and understand the activities of the CBN, the
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Nigerian banking industry, categories of banks (sub-groups),
and individual banks.
(iv) The logic linking the data to the proposition: This involves
the relationship between data collected and the research
proposition. It is the process of analysing collected data to test
the study’s proposition. Here, patterns between the banking
consolidations in Nigeria, Malaysia and Indonesia will be sought
and a range of parameters developed to characterize how
change was managed in these case studies with particular
emphasis on the lessons for Nigeria. The primary focus for data
collection and analysis is on the change management practices
of managers in Nigerian banks and the effects of consolidation
on credit availability. Yin (2003) believes pattern matching is a
promising approach for case studies, where several pieces of
information from the same case may be related to some
theoretical proposition.
(v) The criteria for interpreting the findings: There are well
established tests of statistical significance for interpreting
quantitative data. As tests for instance, are able to conclude
that the occurrence of two or more variables is unlikely to have
happened by chance or that it may have arisen because of an
inherent correlational relationship between the variables (Field
2005). Yin (2003) notes that there are no precise criteria for
interpreting qualitative data, however different patterns are
used in contrast and findings interpreted in terms of comparing
at least two rival propositions. The mixed method (qualitative
and quantitative) used for this research implies that the criteria
for interpreting quantitative findings will be clearly stated, but
the same may not apply to qualitative findings. Nevertheless,
Kidder and Judd (1986) outline four criteria for judging the
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quality of any empirical social research and these are:
“Construct validity”, “Internal validity”, “External validity”, and
“Reliability”. “Construct validity” involves establishing correct
operational measures for the concepts being studied. In this
study, mixed methods and the collective case study approach
are applied to understand the different levels of analysis
required (appropriateness of mixed methods is discussed in
section 4.2). “Internal validity” (for explanatory or causal
studies only) involves establishing a casual relationship,
whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other
conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships. In this
study, the phenomenon of banking consolidation is examined to
establish its effects on credit availability to the private sector.
“External validity” involves establishing the domain to which a
study’s findings can be generalized. In this study, secondary
data from all Nigerian banks were collected and analysed, and
competent senior managers involved in banking consolidation
were interviewed. “Reliability” involves demonstrating that the
operations of a study such as the data collection procedures can
be repeated, with the same results. Data for this study was
collected from authoritative sources which include: the CBN,
individual banks, online reports, news paper publications and
semi-structured interviews.
4.4 Data Collection Methods
Data collection methods are structured processes for obtaining information
about selected characteristics or variables in a target population (Frey and
Oishi 1995). Documented reviews and semi-structured interviews form the
main sources of data for this research.
The first phase consists of quantitative data collection through documented
reviews of secondary sources. Sapsford and Jupp (1996) note that secondary
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sources are those that relate to the period studied but are brought into being
at some time after it, or otherwise removed from the actual event.
Particularly, authoritative archival data from the central banks of Nigeria,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, journal articles, web sites, newspaper reports, and
bank publications will be reviewed. Robson (2002) argues that there are
clear advantages and disadvantages associated with such data. The
advantages include the possibility to tap into extensive data sets, often
drawn from large representative samples, well beyond the resources of the
individual researcher. However, the disadvantages flow from the fact that
even those surveys carried out for research purposes are unlikely to be
directly addressing the question the researcher is interested in. To address
this disadvantage, the focus of data collected is on this study’s research
questions and are from multiple sources to corroborate information gathered.
Further critical engagement is achieved through primary questions (senior
bank managers) to substantiate findings.
The second phase consists of qualitative data collection through semi-
structured interviews with industry executives and bank managers who were
directly involved in the consolidation process. Carter and Little (2007) note
that in qualitative data collection the researcher inquires through
observation, participant observation, shadowing, semi-structured interviews,
unstructured interviews, focus groups, diary studies about phenomena as
they occur in context and relies on the analysis of those textual data to
understand the meaning of human action. Table 4.1 presents an examination
of these methods and their application in the context of this study.
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Table 4.1: Methods for Qualitative Data Collection
Methods for Qualitative (Primary)
Data Collection
Application in the Context of this
Study
Observation This research is carried out in Aberdeen,
and the researcher did not have access
to physically observe senior bank
managers in Nigeria.
Participant Observation This method was not deployed as the
researcher was not part of the team
implementing consolidation in any of the
Nigerian banks.
Shadowing This method was not used as the
researcher did not have access to
shadow senior bank managers
implementing consolidation in any of the
Nigerian banks.
Semi-Structured Interviews This method was deployed because it
was appropriate for examining the lived
experience of senior bank managers in
Nigeria. Thus, face-to-face interviews
were conducted in Lagos, the commercial
capital of Nigeria.
Unstructured Interviews The need to structure the interviews
meant that unstructured interviews were
not appropriate for this study.
Focus Groups This method was not used because of the
difficulty of getting senior bank managers
to participate in a focus group discussion.
Diary Studies None of the senior bank managers
interviewed had a diary report of their
experiences during the consolidation
process.
Source: Author Generated
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The use of semi-structured interviews is appropriate for understanding the
experiences of senior managers in the Nigerian banking industry. Collis and
Hussey (2009) define interviews as a method of collecting data in which
selected participants are asked questions in order to find out what they do,
think or feel. Literarily, an interview is a conversation usually between two
people: in which one person-the interviewer-seeks responses for a particular
purpose from the other person-the interviewee (Gillham 2000). Kvale (1996
p. 1) states that “The qualitative research interview attempts to understand
the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’
experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations”.
Thus, the sensitivity of the interview and its closeness to the subjects’ lived
world can lead to knowledge that can be used to enhance the human
condition and enhance the investigated subject (Kvale 1996). The
competence of managers interviewed in this study is discussed in section
4.4.1.
In conducting qualitative research interviews, four main stages are
recommended by Gillham (2000): “Introductory Phase”: This is not just a
matter of what you say in an introductory way at the beginning of the
interview. It starts in advance of the actual interview. For this study, a letter
of introduction and invitation were sent in advance to all prospective
interviewees (Appendix 2). “The Opening Development of the Interview”: It
is expected that the purpose of the interview and research be explained to
the interviewee. In this study, the introductory letter sent to all participating
senior bank managers and presented in Appendix 2, clearly explained the
purpose of the interview to all interviewees. “The Central Core of the
Interview”: The question order should display some sort of logic
(chronological, thematic) so that one question could be seen as following on
from the previous one. In this study, a chronological and thematic flow is
achieved by first focusing on bank change management techniques and then
on-to the effects of these changes on credit availability to the private sector
(Table 4.2). “Bringing the Interview to a Close”: There are two main
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elements to closure: pulling together the content (cognitive) and the more
obvious social element. In this study, interviews were brought to a close by
pulling the content together and examining the most obvious social elements
affecting credit availability in the foreseeable future (Q14 in Table 4.2).
Gillham (2000) notes that the first and last stages though important are
most often neglected, because they are not centrally what the interview is all
about. But attention to them helps get the interview content into shape and
this is particularly true of the introductory phase where the purpose is
explained to the interviewee.
The semi-structured interview approach is to be used in this study because it
allows for matters discussed, to change from one interview to the next as
different aspects of a topic are revealed. May (1997 p. 111) believes the
semi-structured interview enables “the interviewer to have more latitude to
probe beyond the answers and thus enter into a dialogue with the
interviewee”. The process of open discovery is the strength of such
interviews, although emphasis and balance of the emerging issues may
depend on the order in which participants are interviewed (Collis and Hussey
2009). Key areas covered in the interview were developed from the research
framework discussed in chapter 3. Questions addressed broad topics such as:
(i) the primary drivers of banking consolidation in Nigeria and the response
of Nigerian banks (Q1-2 in Table 4.2), (ii) the process of design and
implementation of consolidation in Nigerian banks (Q3-5 in Table 4.2), (iii)
the performance of the CBN’s policy instruments (Q6-14 in Table 4.2), and
(iv) the impact and effects of banking consolidation on the Nigerian economy
(Q6-14 in Table 4.2).
The first stage of data collected in this phase was carried out through semi-
structured face-to-face interviews. This involved significant travel costs and
planning. Telephone interviews were used in the second stage of this phase
for respondents who were not available for face-to-face interviews or to
follow up on emergent issues which necessitate further clarification.
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Furthermore, this study’s findings are corroborated through telephone
interviews with the respected independent financial analyst and a senior
manager in the CBN (section 7.4).
Table 4.2 shows interview questions, the rationale why these questions were
asked, and sources from the review of literature that underpins these
questions. It is also important to note that these questions were developed
after an initial analysis of secondary quantitative data had been undertaken.
Table 4.2: Question for Primary Data Collection in the Nigerian
Banking Industry.
Questions Rationale for Questions Source of Questions
from Review of
Literature
Q1: What was the initial
response of your bank,
to the Central Bank of
Nigeria’s consolidation
drive?
An examination of the
varied response to
consolidation by individual
banks, as a determinant of
bank preparedness.
Ajasa et al. (2007) notes
that resistant banks were
characterised by low
capital base and came
together in a bid to raise
the mandated N25 billion
by the end of December
2005.
Q2: What options did
you have as a bank to
meet the new
requirements?
To identify what options
were readily available to
individual banks, based on
their capabilities and
capacity.
The CBN’s guidelines for
consolidation stated that
the only legal modes of
consolidation allowed are
going solo, mergers and
outright
acquisition/takeover. It
further stated that mere
group arrangements were
not acceptable for meeting
the N25 billion capital base
(Ezeoha 2007).
Q3: What were the key
steps used, and in what
sequence were they
implemented.
To highlight the content
and process of change
deployed by individual
banks to meet the
requirements for
consolidation.
McKinsey’s 7-S framework
proposed by Peters and
Waterman (1982), and
Kotter’s (1998) eight
guidelines for
implementing successful
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Questions Rationale for Questions Source of Questions
from Review of
Literature
change are deployed
respectively to achieve a
robust analysis of the
content and process of
change.
Q4: From my
understanding of
implementing change,
there could be positive
factors that drive the
change process. What
positive factors
influenced the change
process for your bank?
To highlight factors
perceived by managers to
have a positive influence
on the change process.
Balogun and Hope-Hailey
(2004) argue that the
success of the change
programme is based on a
key pivotal figure, who
should be aware and
responsive to forces in
favour or against change.
Q5: People naturally
tend to resist changing
old patterns. What sort
of challenges did you
face while trying to
implement these
changes in your bank?
To highlight factors
perceived by managers to
have a negative influence
on the change process.
Balogun and Hope-Hailey
(2004) argue that the
success of the change
programme is based on a
key pivotal figure, who
should be aware and
responsive to forces in
favour or against change.
Q6: The concentration
ratios of the Nigerian
banking industry shows
that, top 10 banks have
increased in size by
assets, deposits and
extended loans. How
has this changed your
bank’s risk
management and other
operational activities?
To examine if changes in
size as a result of
consolidation, has a
positive or negative effect
on risk management and
operational activities in
Nigerian banks.
The Static effect is the
change in lending
propensities which results
from simply combining the
balance sheets of the
participating banks into a
larger pro-forma
institution with combined
characteristics (Berger et
al. 1998).
Q7: My preliminary
research shows that the
banking industry
remained competitive
before and after
consolidation. What is
your observation in this
regard?
To identify the perceived
effects of consolidation on
competition in the Nigerian
banking industry.
Banking competition
impacts on economic
development, as a higher
degree of competition is
expected to provide
welfare gains by reducing
cost inefficiencies,
lowering monopoly rents,
favouring the reduction of
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Questions Rationale for Questions Source of Questions
from Review of
Literature
loan rates thereby
accelerating investment
and growth (Pruteanu-
Podpiera et al. 2007).
Q8: Do you think this
degree of competition
will have a positive or
negative effect on
availability of credit to
the Nigerian economy.
To examine if the level of
competition impacts on
credit availability to the
private sector in Nigeria.
Banking consolidation is
expected to drive down
cost structures of banks,
improve banks’ efficiency
and encourage
competition with the goals
of lowering interest rates
and providing cheap credit
to the economy (CBN
2005).
Q9: What are the key
factors that affect your
propensity to lend?
To see if lending decisions
in Nigerian banks, are
influenced by increased
capital adequacy ratios.
Capital provides banks
with cushion against
losses that result from
borrower default or
changes in asset prices.
Thus, adequate capital
ratios are necessary for
stability and provide an
incentive for bank
managers to lend (Singer
2004).
Q10: My analysis shows
a slight reduction in the
spread between deposit
and lending rates in
Nigeria. What
specifically do you think
has influenced this?
To see if managers
attribute the reduction in
spread between deposit
and lending rates to
consolidation/competition.
The problem of low
domestic savings and high
bank lending rates in the
Nigerian banking system,
had reduced access to
relatively cheap and stable
funds that could provide a
reliable source of credit to
the productive sector at
affordable rates of interest
(Soludo 2004).
Q11: My findings
confirm there has been
increased credit to the
private sector after the
consolidation. What
specifically do you think
To identify what features
of banking consolidation,
characterise increased
credit to private sector in
Nigeria.
The Static effect is the
change in lending
propensities which results
from simply combining the
balance sheets of the
participating banks into a
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Questions Rationale for Questions Source of Questions
from Review of
Literature
has influenced this? larger pro-forma
institution with combined
characteristics (Berger et
al. 1998).
Q12: What have been
the most prominent
effects of restructuring
on your bank’s risk
diversification and
lending policies?
To examine the change in
focus by banks as a result
of consolidation and its
effect on their lending
portfolios.
The restructuring effect
identifies the change in
lending that follows from
decisions to restructure
the institution in terms of
its size, financial
characteristics and local
market competitive
position (Berger et al.
1998).
Q13: How would you
characterise the key
drivers of lending
performance in the
newly consolidated
banking sector?
To highlight the difference
in lending policies in newly
formed big banks from the
traditional big banks
The Direct effect captures
the change in lending
propensities that are
attributable to a direct
change in lending focus
above and beyond the
changes associated with
the static aggregation of
banking assets in the
merger and acquisition
and the restructuring of
the size, financial
characteristics, and
competitive position that
follow the merger and
acquisition (Berger et al.
1998).
Q14: What do you think
are the key challenges
in credit performance of
your bank in the next
18 months?
To capture the reaction of
other lenders to the
changes in the competitive
conditions created by
consolidation.
The external effect
captures the dynamic
response to merger and
acquisition of other
lenders in the same local
market (Berger et al.
1998).
Source: Author Generated
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Questions 1-5 aim to critically examine the change management practices of
managers in Nigerian banks, while questions 6-14 explore the effects of
consolidation on the availability of credit to the private sector. The questions
presented above are designed to address the specific research questions of
this study. All participants interviewed were senior bank managers directly
involved and competent enough to discuss their bank’s strategic and
operational response to the changes required to implement consolidation. To
address all ethical issues resulting from this study, participants were
guaranteed anonymity and non-inclusion of commercially sensitive
information (Appendix 3).
4.4.1 Selection of Samples and Size
Sapsford and Jupp (1996) define a sample as a set of elements selected in
some way from a population. They suggest that the aim of sampling is to
save time and effort, but also to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of
the population status in terms of whatever is being researched. There are
different forms of sampling, such as; simple random, systematic, stratified
random, cluster, and multi-stage (Sapsford and Jupp 1996). In case study
research, samples are normally purposive. This means that samples are
selected based on respondents whom it is believed can give information
about the topic under investigation (Yin 2003). Purposive sampling is
selected for this study because it is most appropriate for the kind of research
embanked on. Thus, senior managers selected for interviews were directly
involved in implementing banking consolidation in Nigeria.
To address the likely issues resulting from generalisation, this study
attempted to collect relevant archival samples from all banks in Nigeria,
through a mixture of sources which include: the CBN (in some cases
individual bank records were not readily available), individual banks, online
reports, and other publications on the Nigerian banking industry. Secondly,
the selection of participants for the interview process was designed to
represent the three categories of banks in Nigeria as identified in Table 2.4.
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Particularly, the focus was on industry experts, bank managers and
employees who were directly involved with the banking consolidation in
Nigeria. Table 4.3 shows categories of participating banks and their
strategies.
Table 4.3: Categories of Consolidating Banks in Nigeria
Categories of Participating Banks Strategies
Stand-Alone Banks
Guaranty Trust Bank Plc
Standard Chartered Bank
Banks in this category had the capacity
to raise the CBN’s mandated N25 billion
on their own, and as a result opted to
stand alone. These set of banks also
wanted to avoid the difficult process of
finding strategic and cultural fit,
necessary in a merger situation.
There are a total of 5 banks in this
category, and 2 banks representing 40%
of banks in this category participated in
the interviews.
Common Ownership Banks
Intercontinental Bank Plc
AfriBank Plc
This category is made up of different
banks with the same ownership
structure. To meet the CBN’s mandated
N25 billion, the owners of these banks
merged the different entities.
There are a total of 3 banks in this
category, and 2 banks representing 67%
of banks in this category participated in
the interviews.
Common Interest Banks
Diamond Bank
First City Monument Bank Plc
Bank PHB Plc
Unity Bank Plc
United Bank of Africa Plc
First Bank of Nigeria Plc
FIN Bank Plc
Banks in this category were completely
independent entities, but all came
together to meet the CBN’s mandated
N25 billion. In these mergers or
acquisitions, the size of banks
determined power distribution.
There are a total of 16 banks in this
category, and 7 banks representing 44%
of banks in this category participated in
the interviews.
Source: Author Generated
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The three categories highlighted in Table 4.3 provide a representative sample
of all banks and banking groups involved in the consolidation process in
Nigeria. In all three categories, at least two banks which represent a typical
bank (i.e. organisational structure, size, and banking activities) in that
category, participated in the interviews. A letter inviting participation was
sent to all banks in the Nigerian banking industry; however only eleven
banks agreed to have their senior employees interviewed. All senior
managers invited were competent enough to handle questions on their
bank’s strategic and operational response to the CBN’s consolidation drive.
Detailed information about the process of gaining access, selecting
respondents, conducting interviews, and the context under which interviews
were carried out is provided in Appendix 3. The next section presents the
process of analysing collected samples for this research.
4.5 Data Analysis
Sapsford and Jupp (1996) note that the preparation stage of an analysis
involves devising a good form in which to reproduce the data so that they (i)
provide a fair summary of what has been studied and (ii) can be analysed
readily to answer the researcher’s questions. Keywords which arise from
these objectives are: error reduction/minimization, data representation, and
data reduction. This section aims to highlight methods used to critically
examine the practices of senior managers in consolidating banks and to
develop hypotheses on the effects of consolidation on credit availability to
the private sector in Nigeria.
In order to examine the practices of managers in consolidating banks,
Pettigrew’s (1988) three broad lenses of “Context”, “Content” and “Process”,
are used to structure the findings arising from the series of in-depth
interviews (Q1-5 in Table 4.2; sample transcript Appendix 4). The focus for
this analysis is to set the argument to address these three aspects of change
as it applies to the Nigerian banking industry. To achieve a detailed and
robust analysis McKinsey’s 7-S framework proposed by Peters and Waterman
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(1982), Kotter’s (1998) eight guidelines for implementing successful change
and Lewin’s (1951) force field analysis, all of which were reviewed in chapter
3 are deployed.
This study will also adapt the framework developed by Berger et al. (1998),
to explore the effects of consolidation on credit availability to the private
sector in Nigeria (Q6-14 in Table 4.2; sample transcript Appendix 4). Berger
et al. (1998) identified the following criteria that seem to permeate existing
debates, these are: “The Static effect” is the change in lending propensities
which results from simply combining the balance sheets of the participating
banks into a larger pro-forma institution with combined characteristics. “The
Restructuring effect” identifies the change in lending that follows from
decisions to restructure the institution in terms of its size, financial
characteristics, and local market competitive position. “The Direct effect”
captures the change in lending propensities that are attributable to a direct
change in lending focus above and beyond the changes associated with the
static aggregation of banking assets in the merger and acquisition and the
restructuring of the size, financial characteristics, and competitive position
that follow the merger and acquisition. “The External effect” captures the
dynamic response to merger and acquisition of other lenders in the same
local market.
Berger et al. (1998) use ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and data
sets (Gross Total Assets (GTA); Commercial and Industrial lending) of bank
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the United States from the late 1970s to
the early 1990s to test for four effects highlighted above. To maintain
uniformity, these tests are conducted 1 to 3 years before and after M&As.
Berger et al. (1998) used data on loan proportions such as: proportion of
GTA lent to small business, proportion of GTA lent to medium businesses,
and proportion of GTA lent to large business for each bank, to test if these
loan proportions have changed after M&As. These tests were based on large
lists of explanatory variables. The explanatory variables deployed include: log
144
of bank GTA, bank size variables, bank equity to GTA ratio, bank loan loss
reserve to total loan ratio, bank other real estate owned to total loan ratio,
bank non-performing loans to total loan ratio, purchased funds to GTA ratio,
bank financial variables, Herfindahl index for local market, bank’s share of
market deposits, bank comp position variables, weighted average proportions
of past M&A variables, plus 16 dummy variables. Berger et al’s. (1998) main
equations of the model (MEM) are of the form:
In(Pit /(1- Pit ))
=fi(BANK AND ORG SIZEt-1, BANK AND ORG FINANCIALt-1,
BANK AND ORG COMP POSITIONt-1, ORG COMPLEXITYt-1,
PAST M&At-1,t-2,t-3, MARKET PAST M&At-1,t-2,t-3, TIMEt-1,
ENVIRONMENTt-1)
Berger et al. (1998) note that the ORG SIZE variables replicate the BANK
SIZE variables, except that they are based on organisation GTA, which
includes all the banking assets in the organisation. The BANK AND ORG
FINANCIAL variables measure the equity position and condition of the loan
portfolio at the bank and organisation level. The COMP POSITION variables
are the Herfindahl index and market shares of the bank and organisation.
The ORG COMPLEXITY variables control for the organisational structure of the
institution, which may affect small business lending. The PAST M&A variables
account for the bank’s M&A activity in the past three years and are used for
measuring the direct effect of M&As. The MARKET PAST M&A variables are
the weighted averages of the PAST M&A variables of all the banks. The
remaining variables control for differences in time period and economic
environment of the bank (Berger et al. 1998). The data are annual and all of
the right-hand side variables are lagged at least one year relative to the
lending proportions on the left-hand side to eliminate endogenous feedback
effects (except for the time and environmental variables). Thus lending
decisions in one year are functions of the bank and organisation size,
financial condition, M&A activity, etc. in the previous year or years. All of the
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right-hand side variables except for the M&A variables are stock figures as of
year-end t-1 and occur before the lending on the left-hand side, which is a
flow that occurs throughout year t (Berger et al. 1998).
This study does not have access to the kind of individual bank data required
to conduct tests based on the original Berger et al. (1998) framework
presented above. For example: data on dependent variables such as:
proportion of GTA lent to small business, proportion of GTA lent to medium
businesses, and proportion of GTA lent to large business for Nigerian banks
was not accessible. Of all the explanatory variables used, this study can only
access bank GTA, bank equity to GTA ratio, Herfindahl index for local market,
and bank’s share of market deposits. As a result, this study is not able to
deploy the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) approach. However,
aggregate data on bank performance before and after consolidation is used,
with appropriate substitute tools which measure the same effects as
proposed by Berger et al. (1998). Figure 4.3 presents the modified Berger et
al. (1998) framework, deployed for the analysis in this study.
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Figure 4.3: Modified Berger et al. (1998) Framework used for
Analysis in this Study
Source: Author Generated (Adapted from Berger et al. 1998)
“The Static effect” is analysed by calculating the concentration ratio,
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, analysing capital adequacy ratios, spreads in
interest rates and changes in aggregate bank credit to the private sector of
Nigerian banks. While the “The Restructuring effect”, “The Direct effect” and
“The External effect” will be examined using coded data from semi structured
interviews with senior bank managers. Each set of hypotheses is considered
separately and its evaluation developed from a modified version of the
Berger et al. (1998) framework.
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To further determine the validity of the modified Berger et al. (1998)
framework for decision making and understanding the health of the banking
industry in terms of credit availability, corroborative telephone interviews are
conducted with a senior manager in the CBN and the respected independent
financial analyst (section 7.4). The next section examines the methods used
for analysis in this study.
4.6 Analysis of Secondary Data
This section highlights the method used by Berger et al. (1998) to test the
static effect, and then goes to present the modified approach deployed in this
study to test for the static effect in the case of the Nigerian banking industry.
4.6.1 Measurement of the Static Effect (Berger et al. 1998)
SE= PPFit - GTAA . PAit - GTAB PBit,
GTAA+B GTAA+B i = 1, 2, 3
In measuring the static effect (SE), Berger et al. (1998) considered the
simple example of bank A with an asset of $600 million merging with bank B
with an asset of $400 million. They assumed that organisational size equals
bank size, hence the pro-forma bank size (PPFit) has bank and organisational
size of $1 billion: financial ratios, past M&A and market M&A activity numbers
that are weighted averages of the year-end t-1 figures for A (weight =0.6)
and B (weight =0.4); and competitive position, organisational complexity,
and environmental variables that depict the consolidated institution.
Static Effect= PPFit - 0.6 PAit - 0.4 PBit i=1, 2, 3
These values are substituted to yield the proportion of assets predicted to be
invested in loans to borrower size category i during year t for the pro-forma
bank. To measure the static effect, Berger et al. (1998) substitute the
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weighted average of the predicted values of proportions of GTA that banks
would lend to borrower category i during year t if they had not been merged.
4.6.2 Measurement of the Static Effect (Modified Approach used in
this study)
Concentration ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, capital adequacy ratios,
interest rate spread and total credit to GDP are deployed to test the static
effect of banking consolidation on credit availability by combining the balance
sheets of Nigerian banks. Through the combined characteristics of all banks
in the Nigerian banking industry, these tools test the pre and post
consolidation figures to establish what differences have occurred between
this time period. These tools are appropriate for testing the effects of
increased bank size on organisational complexity, local market share or
concentration, effects of combining financial ratios, and other conditioning
variables of the consolidating parties, and thus maintains the same key focus
by testing similar parameters as the tools (OLS) utilised by Berger et al.
(1998) for examining the static effect of consolidation.
The time period under review is 2001-2009, this encompass the 18 months
transitional window and a trajectory of 3 years before the consolidation
announcement. It is important to NOTE that for some data sets and years,
data were not available in audited form from the CBN at the time of this
analysis, and as a result such data was not included to avoid issues of
validity (for example: audited data was only available from 2001-2007 for
the calculation of concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index). The
following sections examine the tools used for analysis in more detail.
4.6.3 Size of Nigerian Banks
The relative small size of Nigerian banks was one of the main causes of bank
failure between 1994-2003 (Gunu 2009). Imala (2005) and Gunu (2009)
note that the average capital base of Nigerian banks is US$ 10 million, which
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is very low compared to banks in other developing countries like Malaysia
where the capital base of the smallest bank is US$ 526 million. Similarly,
Imala (2005 p. 28) states that “the aggregate capitalisation of the Nigerian
banking system at N311 billion (US$2.4 billion) is grossly low in relation to
the size of the Nigerian economy and in relation to the capital base of
US$688 billion for a single banking group in France and US$541 billion for a
bank in Germany”. These large capital bases were achieved in France and
Germany in 1998 through consolidating banking institutions (Imala 2005).
Hesse (2007) argues that the intention of the CBN decree on July, 6, 2004
that banks had to increase their minimum capital requirements from N2
billion to N25 billion (US$190 million), was to increase the average size of
bank via mergers and acquisitions. CBN (2005) suggests that consolidation
has resulted in fewer but bigger banks with a large capital base. One of the
objectives of this study is to test and analyse if banking consolidation in
Nigeria has actually increased the size of assets, deposits, and loans
extended in the top 10 banks. This study will analyse these propositions, with
the help of the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H0 (CR): There is no difference in the size of assets, deposits, and extended
loans of Top10 Nigerian banks as a result of the consolidation.
H1 (CR): The size of assets, deposits and extended loans of top 10 banks has
changed as a result of banking consolidation.
In order to test these hypotheses, concentration ratio will be applied.
Concentration ratio measures the total output produced in an industry by a
given number of firms in the industry. Usually concentration ratios are used
to show the extent of market control of the largest firms in the industry and
to illustrate the degree to which an industry is oligopolistic (Lu et al. 2007).
The concentration ration is computed as follows:
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The CRj is the concentration ratio for the variable X (for example assets) for
the largest J banks to the whole industry, where n is the total number of the
banks. In order to estimate the concentration ratio of top 10 and remaining
banks based on banks assets, the sum of the market share of the largest
banks in the respective market is calculated by the ratio of the individual
bank’s total assets to the sum of all banks total assets; total assets thereby
proxy overall bank activity. This methodology will be repeated to test for CR
in deposits and extended loans in the case of Nigeria. A higher concentration
ratio implies that the market is dominated by few but large banks.
Tirole (1988) notes that concentration measures in general ignore other
important factors determining market power, such as costs of entry and
asymmetries in costs or demand. Kwoka (1985) suggests that concentration
ratios may focus on more limited information only about leading firms. These
concerns are addressed by using various tools to analyse quantitative data
(i.e. explicit coding, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and capital adequacy ratio),
and conducting face-to-face interviews which are integrated in this study to
compare findings from quantitative data.
Chang et al. (2008) claim that proposals of decomposition according to
income sources and according to groups or sub-populations contribute to
making the concentration ratio a more modern instrument of analysis. In
support of this view, Giorgi (1993) notes that concentration ratios are
effective for the estimation of grouped data which makes particular reference
to interval estimates between the upper and lower bounds. Furthermore,
Amel and Liang (1990) deploy concentration rations to examine the
dynamics of market concentration in the United States’ banking industry
between 1966-1986, similarly Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Mamatzakis et al.
(2005) apply concentration ratios to test for banking concentration in the
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western (1988-1998) and south eastern (1998-2002) European regions
respectively. This shows that concentration ratio is considered an appropriate
tool for examining changes in size, and thus justifies its use for analysing the
changes in size of Nigerian banks as a result of consolidation.
Field (2005) states that in the social sciences, statistical models are effective
where the focus is in discovering something about a phenomenon that we
assume actually exists, and seek to explain it by collecting data from the real
world. Thus, data collected is used to draw conclusions about what is being
studied. In this study, the hypotheses above will also be tested using
Independent-Samples T-Test and Mann-Whitney Test. The Independent
Sample T-Test is calculated as follows:
observed difference expected difference
between sample _ between population means
t = means (when null hypothesis is true)
estimate of the standard error of the difference between
two sample means
The Independent-Samples T-Test procedure compares means for two groups
of cases, using variables such as sample size, mean, standard deviation and
standard error of the mean. Secondly, it tests for equality of variances, and
both pooled-variances and separate-variances T-Tests for equality of means.
Ideally, subjects are randomly assigned to two groups, so that any difference
in response is due to the treatment and not other factors (Pallant 2007).
While the Mann-Whitney Test relies on scores in different groups being
ranked from lowest to highest. It tests whether one variable tends to have
values higher than the other. One form of the test statistic is an estimate of
the probability that one variable is less than the other (Pallant 2007). For
both tests this study assigns a 5% level of significance.
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The Independent-Samples T-Test and Mann-Whitney Test explained above,
are statistical models which represent the kind of data collected (secondary
data of performance from the Nigerian banking industry before and after
consolidation). Based on the calculation methods presented in this section,
these models can be said to be a good fit for the kind of data being examined
and therefore will be as accurate as possible, so that there is confidence that
the predictions made are also accurate (Field 2005).
4.6.4 Competition in the Nigerian Banking Industry
Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2007) state that banking competition impacts on
economic development, as a higher degree of competition is expected to
provide welfare gains by reducing cost inefficiencies, lowering monopoly
rents, favouring the reduction of loan rates thereby accelerating investment
and growth. They further opine that these expected gains are a major issue
for developing countries in which bank credit represents the largest source of
external finance for companies. Imala (2005) argues that in many emerging
markets, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil and Korea,
consolidation has also become prominent, as banks strive to become more
competitive and resilient to shocks as well as reposition their operations to
cope with the challenges of the increasingly globalised banking systems. In
support of this view, Ajayi (2005) notes that consolidation in emerging
markets is predicated upon the need for reorientation and repositioning of an
existing status quo in order to attain an effective and efficient state. One of
the objectives of this study is to examine the nature of competition in the
Nigerian banking industry before, during and after the consolidation. This
study will analyse these propositions, with the help of the following null and
alternative hypotheses:
H0 (HHI): There has been no change in competition amongst Nigerian banks,
between 2001-2007.
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H1 (HHI): There is more competition amongst Nigerian banks, between 2001-
2007.
In order to test these hypotheses, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index will be
applied. HHI makes use of information on every firm in an industry, and
measures the size of firms in relation to the industry and an indicator of the
amount of competition among them (Lu et al. 2007). The HHI is computed as
follows:



n
i
MSiHHI
1
2)(
Where: i –an individual bank; n –number of individual banks in the banking
market; MSi –market share of an individual bank. HHI is calculated by
squaring the market share of each bank competing in the market and then
summing the resulting numbers. The result is proportional to the average
market share and, it can range from 0 to 1, moving from a number of very
small firms to a single monopolistic producer. Increases in the HHI generally
indicate a decrease in competition and an increase of market power, whereas
decreases indicate the opposite. For the purpose of this study, HHI is
calculated for banks total assets, deposits and extended loans in Nigeria
between 2001-2007.
Hannan (1997) notes that the HHI implicitly gives equal weight to the roles
of market share inequalities and the number of competitors. Hannan’s (1997)
empirical results suggest that the HHI underestimates the importance of the
number of competitors in the market. Similarly, Rhoades (1995) claims that
large inequalities of shares among firms in a market plays an exceedingly
important role in the dominance of leading firms, at times independent of
measures of concentration such as the HHI. This weakness is addressed by
examining the Concentration Ratio of Nigerian banks (section 4.6.1), which
shows the extent of market control of typically the top 10 banks in the
Industry (Lu et al. 2007).
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Despite these criticisms, Lijesen (2004) argues that an appealing feature of
the HHI is its ease of interpretation. The usefulness of HHI for testing
competition is reflected in the studies of Yuan (2006), Yildirim and
Philippatos (2007) and Lijesen (2004). Yuan (2006) deployed HHI to assess
the competitiveness of the banking industry in China during 1996-2000,
while Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) examined the competitive conditions in
the banking industries of eleven Latin American countries for the period
1993-2000 using HHI.
4.6.5 Bank Capital Regulation in Nigeria
Singer (2004) asserts that capital provides banks with a cushion against
losses that result from borrower default or changes in asset prices. Thus,
adequate capital ratios are necessary for stability and provide an incentive
for bank managers to lend. Soludo (2006) highlighted that as at 6 July 2004
the minimum capital requirement for banks in Nigeria was N1.0 billion or
US$7.53 million for existing banks and N2.0 billion or US$15.06 for new
banks, and compared with the RM2.0 billion or US$526.4million in Malaysia.
Imala (2005) argued that negative capital adequacy ratios of some banks in
Nigeria, completely eroded shareholders’ funds caused by operational losses,
over-dependence on public sector deposits, and the neglect of small and
medium scale private savers caused most banks to be insolvent. Therefore,
urgent and fundamental reformatory action was necessary (Imala 2005).
Ediz et al. (1998) state that the Basel Capital Accord obliges banks to
maintain equity and quasi-equity funding equal to a risk-weighted proportion
of their asset base. The Basel Capital Accord assigns 8% as a generally
acceptable capital adequacy ratio and a risk rate of 50% to residential
mortgages (Hsu et al. 2007). One of the objectives of this study is to
examine the capital adequacy ratio of Nigeria banks before, during and after
consolidation. This study will analyse these propositions, with the help of the
following null and alternative hypotheses:
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H0 (CAR): There is no change in the capital adequacy ratios of banks in
Nigeria as a result of consolidation.
H1 (CAR): The capital adequacy ratios of banks in Nigeria have changed as a
result of the consolidation.
In order to test these hypotheses, aggregate capital adequacy ratios from
Nigerian banks between 2002-2008 will be compared. This involves
measuring two types of capital: tier one capital, which can absorb losses
without necessitating a bank to cease trading, and tier two capital, which can
absorb losses in the event of a winding-up thus provides a lesser degree of
protection to depositors (Hsu et al. 2007). The capital adequacy ratio is
computed as follows:
CAR= Tier One Capital + Tier Two Capital
Risk Weighted Assets
Tier one capital is the sum of core capital elements (i.e. surplus, capital
stock, qualifying non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock and minority
interest in the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries, undivided profits)
less other intangible assets and goodwill. Tier two is made up of secondary
bank capital that includes items such as subordinate term debt and general
loss reserves (Ediz et al. 1998). Risk-weighted assets are calculated by
assigning each asset and off-balance-sheet item to one of four broad risk
categories. These risk categories are 0 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, and
100 percent. Riskier assets are placed in the higher percentage categories
(Ediz et al. 1998). For the purpose of this study, representative tables will be
used to help ascertain what changes have occurred in the aggregate capital
adequacy ratios of Nigerian banks between 2002-2008.
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Barrios and Blanco (2003) argue that examining the capital adequacy ratios
of banks is significant, because it takes the regulatory community into
protecting the health of the entire system rather than just individual banks.
This countercyclical capital buffer heralds a step change in the way national
banking regulators interact and is the first concrete example of macro
prudential regulation that seeks to moderate the economic cycle.
Furthermore, Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) emphasis the importance of
examining capital adequacy ratios when analysing the performance of
banking industries, as this capital buffer even though designed to protect
banks; is likely to raise the price of credit. Therefore, this justifies the
inclusion of capital adequacy ratios of Nigerian banks as a unit of analysis in
this study.
The hypotheses above will also be tested using Independent-Samples T-Test
and Mann-Whitney Test. These tests were described in section 4.6.1.
4.6.6 Credit Availability in the Nigerian Banking Industry
Soludo (2004) identified the problem of low domestic savings and high bank
lending rates in the Nigerian banking system, had reduced access to
relatively cheap and stable funds that could provide a reliable source of credit
to the productive sector at affordable rates of interest. He further stated that
the current structure of the Nigerian banking system has promoted
tendencies towards a sticky behaviour of deposit rates, such that, while
banks’ lending rates remain high most deposit rates especially those on
savings are low and negative.
CBN (2005 p. 9) notes that one of the goals of consolidating the Nigerian
banking industry include: “driving down cost structures of banks, improving
banks’ efficiency and encouraging competition with the goals of lowering
interest rates and providing cheap credit to the economy”. Therefore, one of
the objectives of this study is to test if banking consolidation in Nigeria has
actually reduced the spread between deposit and lending rates. Traditionally,
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the level of efficient in banking is determined by the spread between deposit
and lending rates, with higher spreads a sign of low efficiency and lower
spreads a sign of high efficiency. This study will analyse these propositions
with the help of the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H0 (IRS): There is no difference in the average spread between deposit and
lending rates from 2002-2009 in the Nigerian banking industry.
H1 (IRS): There has been a significant change in the spread between deposit
and lending rates from 2002-2009 in the Nigerian banking industry.
In order to test these hypotheses, deposit rates will be subtracted from
lending rates to analyse the spread between interest rates. A chart
highlighting the spread between deposits and lending rates in Nigeria will be
used to help ascertain what changes have occurred in the period under
review.
Using data from the European banking markets (1989-1990), Ruthenberg
and Elias (1996) deployed interest rate spreads to examine estimated cost
and operating efficiencies resulting from the creation of a single European
banking market. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) in their study of US
interbank activities, use interest rate spreads to ascertain the level of
efficiency of monetary policy. The methods used by these authors to test for
efficiency, indicates that interest rate spread is an appropriate tool for
investigating banking efficiency.
The hypotheses above will also be tested using Independent-Samples T-Test
and Mann-Whitney Test. These tests were described in section 4.6.1.
Ezeoha (2007) also maintained that the CBN’s requirement for increased
bank capitalisation was to create a diversified, strong and reliable banking
sector, ensure the safety of depositors’ money and reposition banks to play
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active developmental roles in the local economy. Providing credit to finance
investment and consumption is a major function of the banking system
(Imala 2005). One of the objectives of this study is to test if banking
consolidation in Nigeria has actually increased the flow of credit to the private
sector. This study will analyse these propositions with the help of the
following null and alternative hypotheses:
H0 (TC2GDP): There is no difference in the flow of credit to the private
sector, as a result of the Nigerian banking consolidation.
H1 (TC2GDP): The flow of credit to the private sector has increased, as a
result of the Nigerian banking consolidation.
In order to test these hypotheses, the growth in total credit figures to GDP
(Gross Domestic Product) from the Nigerian banking system to the private
sector between 2001-2008 will be compared. A representative table and
chart will be used to help ascertain what changes have occurred in the period
under review.
Hamilton (1999) and Ervin et al. (2003) state that the principal shortcomings
of GDP as a tool for measuring economic change is its inability to correlate
with changes in national well-being. They note that these shortcomings
include: the failure to account for the way in which increases in output are
distributed within the community; the failure to account for the contribution
of household work; the incorrect counting of defensive expenditure; and the
failure to account for changes in the value of stocks of both built capital and
natural capital. The main focus of this study however, is on the productive
capacity (credit availability) of Nigerian banks resulting from consolidation
and not the national well-being in Nigeria.
According to Gil et al. (2007), economic size is normally measured in terms
of GDP, and is an effective tool for measuring the productivity of industries
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within an economy. GDP figures provide constructs, appropriate for
measuring multiple and different dimensions of progress in an economy
(Natoli and Zuhair 2010). Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) examined the
empirical relationship between long-run growth and financial development,
using the ratio between bank credit to the private sector and GDP in Latin
America between 1960-1985. The work Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) also
justifies the use of GDP in measuring credit availability to the private sector
in Nigeria.
4.7 Analysis of Primary Data
This section highlights methods used to analyse primary data collected.
Themes and codes are assigned to interview questions in order to examine
the context, content, process, and forces influencing banking consolidation in
Nigeria. Secondly, methods used by Berger et al. (1998) to test the
restructuring effect, the direct effect, and the external effect are presented
along side the modified approach deployed in this study to test for these
same effects in the case of the Nigerian banking industry.
4.7.1 Measurement of the Restructuring Effect (Berger et al. 1998)
Berger et al. (1998) estimate the changes in size, condition, and competitive
position that are expected to occur over time after the M&A, and then plug
these changes into the MEM to obtain the predicted effects of these changes
on bank lending. In order to measure the restructuring effect, the regressed
change in the log of GTA on a list of independent variables which include:
BANK AND ORG SIZE, BANK AND ORG FINANCIAL, BANK AND ORG COMP
POSITION, ORG COMPLEXITY, PAST M&A, MARKET PAST M&A, TIME,
ENVIRONMENT, CURRENT M&A, and MARKET CURRENT M&A are determined
(Berger et al. 1998).
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4.7.2 Measurement of the Restructuring Effect (Modified Approach
used in this study)
Themes and codes are assigned to interview questions in order to examine
the restructuring effect of banking consolidation on credit availability.
Questions, themes and codes are designed to analyse changes in lending
that follow from the decision to restructure banks in terms of their size and
financial characteristics (Q12; Table 6.19). This modified approach maintains
the same key focus and tests similar parameters as the tools utilised in the
original Berger et al’s. (1998) framework, thus it provides an appropriate
method for examining the restructuring effect.
4.7.3 Measurement of the Direct Effect (Berger et al. 1998)
This is calculated from the parameters of the MEM, using as a starting point
the simulated changes in the right-hand side variables from the static effect,
secular change, and restructuring effects. That is, it is the effect of ‘turning
on’ the PAST M&A variables to include the effect of the current M&A being
analysed by putting ones in the PAST M&A vector the appropriate number of
years back. Thus, the dynamic direct effect of a merger of equals three years
after it occurred is taken from the predicted value of the MEM (Berger et al.
1998).
4.7.4 Measurement of the Direct Effect (Modified Approach used in
this study)
Themes and codes are assigned to interview questions in order to examine
the direct effect of banking consolidation on credit availability. Questions,
themes and codes are designed to analyse the changes in lending
propensities that are directly attributed to the static aggregation of banking
assets (Q13; Table 6.20). This modified approach maintains the same key
focus and tests similar parameters as the tools utilised in the original Berger
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et al’s. (1998) framework, thus it provides an appropriate method for
examining the direct effect.
4.7.5 Measurement of the External Effect (Berger et al. 1998)
To measure the external effect, Berger et al. (1998) use the MARKET PAST
M&A variables, which to this point have been treated as control variables. For
every bank, they measure the external effect as the impact on their lending
of M&As in their local markets over the past 3 years. The external effect is
incorporated by setting the MARKET PAST M&A variables to their actual
values. The estimate of the external effect equals the difference between the
predicted value of the MEM when the variables are set to their actual values
and the predicted value when these variables are set to zero. Berger et al.
(1998) note that the external effect is likely to be less accurately measured
than the other effects, and so should be looked upon primarily as a
qualitative measure of how other banks in the market tend to react to M&As.
4.7.6 Measurement of the External Effect (Modified Approach used in
this study)
Themes and codes are assigned to interview questions in order to examine
the external effect of banking consolidation on credit availability. Questions,
themes and codes are designed to analyse the dynamic response of other
lenders in the same local market to banking consolidation (Q14; Table 6.21).
This modified approach maintains the same key focus and tests similar
parameters as the tools utilised in the original Berger et al’s. (1998)
framework, thus it provides an appropriate method for examining the
external effect.
4.7.7 Managerial Motivation for Banking Consolidation and the
Effects of Changes on Credit Availability
Ajayi (2005) and Kwan (2004) argue that banking consolidation in Nigeria
was motivated by economics of scale and scope, potentials for risk
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diversification as well as bank management personal incentives. Soludo
(2007) stated that the Nigerian financial system was characterised by
structural and operational weaknesses and that their catalytic role in
promoting private sector led growth could be further enhanced through a
pragmatic reform. One of the objectives of this study is to examine the
change management practices of managers in the Nigerian banking industry,
and to highlight the effects of these changes on the availability of credit. In
order to test this, coded data from semi structured interviews will be applied.
Furthermore, a critical review of approaches to coding is examined in this
section prior to deciding on the most appropriate method to deploy for this
investigation.
Codes are tags or labels for allocating units of meaning to the descriptive or
inferential information compiled during a study (Basit 2003). It involves
subdividing the data as well as assigning categories (Dey 1993). Basit (2003)
states that codes usually are attached to chunks of varying-size words,
phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a
specific setting. The role of coding is described by Seidel and Kelle (1995) as
noticing relevant phenomena; collecting examples of those phenomena; and
analysing those phenomena in order to find differences, commonalities,
structures and patterns. Thus, coding helps researchers to communicate and
connect with data, to compare across data, to ask questions, and to generate
theory grounded in the data through a comprehension of the emerging
phenomena.
Sapsford and Jupp (1996) note that the first strategy in coding is to sort the
elements according to themes or topics central to the objectives of the
research or the research questions, setting aside those that seemed to have
no bearing on the topic. This process will continue until some main categories
of each variable are identified. The researcher then proceeds to construct a
coding frame (Appendix 5). The coding frame is important as it is drawn up
for transforming the data into codes and for identifying the location of all the
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variables. It always includes three pieces of information for each variable,
these are: (i) A reference back to the source data, (ii) A list which comprises
the codes and their associated symbols, and (iii) An identification of the
column location of variables (Sapsford and Jupp 1996).
Considering the range of priorities and the need to integrate explicit coding
and analytic procedures, this study adopts the constant comparative method
of joint coding developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Glaser and Strauss
(1967) state that the constant comparative method combines an analytic
procedure of constant comparison, an explicit coding procedure, and a style
of theory development. They outline four stages described below:
(i) Comparing incidents applicable to each category: The
process starts by the researcher coding each incident in the data
into as many categories as possible or as data emerge that fit
into an existing category. The defining rule here is to compare
codes in categories with previous incidents in the same and
different groups. This constant comparison of the incidents very
soon starts to generate theoretical properties of the category.
Thus, the researcher starts thinking in terms of the full range of
types of the category, its dimensions, the conditions under
which it is pronounced or minimized, its major consequences, its
relationship to other categories, and its order properties (Glaser
and Strauss 1967).
(ii) Integrating categories and their properties: As coding
continues, the constant comparative units change from
comparison of incidents with incidents to comparison of
incidents with properties of the category that resulted from
initial comparison of incidents. The diverse properties
themselves then start to become integrated, creating patterns
of integration in the data itself (for example in Table 5.1).
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Therefore, theory develops as theoretical sense is made of
different categories and their properties which have become
integrated through constant comparisons (Glaser and Strauss
1967).
(iii) Delimiting the theory: As theory develops, the constant
comparative method begins to curb what started as a seemingly
overwhelming mass of qualitative data. This occurs at two
levels; the theory and the categories. First, the theory solidifies,
as modification became fewer and fewer and the process of
integration progressed. The inter and intra category analysis
takes this process to its conclusion as the task becomes one of
accounting for expectations and building these into the
propositions, which were both close to the data and generalised
to all cases. The two major requirements for theory, parsimony
of variables and formulating wide scope of applicability are
achieved (Glaser and Strauss 1967).
(iv) Writing theory: Coded data and theory are written in form of
three case studies, which represent three categories of Nigerian
banks. Theoretical concepts form the basis on which relevant
themes in the case studies are examined. Thus themes and
codes are generated using theoretical underpinning and
emergent issues in the case studies (for example in Table 5.3).
These case studies provide the content, which become major
themes in the theory presented in this study.
However, Dey (1993) argues that categories cannot be created in isolation,
as categories involve decisions about how to organize the data in ways which
are useful for analysis, and also take account of how these categories will fit
into the wider analytic context. Therefore, this study’s provisional list of
categories and codes for examining the research questions are generated
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from the three broad lenses framework identified in figure 3.3 and the Berger
et al. (1998) framework discussed in section 3.6. Thus, these categories and
pre-codes are aligned with the research context to reflect appropriate
external and internal realities, from the narrative in the interviews.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter examined the methodologies and methods used to test various
questions and hypotheses identified in this study. These methodologies and
methods are built around Pettigrew’s (1988) three broad lenses and the
credit analysis approach adapted from Berger et al. (1998). The aim is to
develop a framework which highlights a range of parameters that help
characterise how change was managed in the Nigerian banking industry and
to evaluate the effects of banking consolidation on credit availability.
The theoretical perspectives reviewed in this chapter indicate that the mixed
methodology is best suited to examine the complex phenomena of banking
consolidation in Nigeria. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), McConney et al.
(2002), Yauch and Steudel (2003), Bryman (2006), Greene (2008), Vitale et
al. (2008) believe the mixed methodology is sought when practical demands
of contexts call for both generality and particularity, defensible patterns of
recurring regularity as well as insight into variation, results that convey
magnitude and dimensionality as well as results that portray contextual
stories about lived experiences. Table 4.4 shows how these concepts are
addressed in the context of this study.
Table 4.4: Concepts for Mixed Methods Approach
Concepts for the Mixed Methods
Approach
Context in this Research
Both generality and particularity In this study, a review of the
performance of all banks in the Nigerian
banking industry is required. For greater
insight, the activities of different
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categories and individual banks are
further examined.
Defensible patterns of recurring
regularity as well as insight into variation
To understand the phenomenon of
banking consolidation in Nigeria,
quantitative methods are deployed to
unravel patterns of recurring regularity
and variation. Qualitative methods are
then used to provide contextual insight
to these recurring regularities and
variation.
Results that convey magnitude and
dimensionality
In this study, results of industry wide
bank performance is required, the
different categories and individual banks
provide dimensionality to findings.
Results that portray contextual stories
about lived experiences
Contextual stories (findings) of the lived
experiences of senior bank managers
involved in implementing consolidation,
is key to understanding the process of
banking consolidation in Nigeria.
Source: Author Generated (Adapted from Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998;
McConney et al. 2002; Yauch and Steudel 2003; Bryman 2006; Greene
2008; Vitale et al. 2008)
Therefore this study deploys the qualitative and quantitative research
approach to review change management practices of senior managers in
consolidating banks and the effects of these actions on credit availability to
the private sector. For the purpose of this study, secondary data were first
collected and analysed. Preliminary findings from secondary sources were
then used to inform the collection of primary data (i.e. semi-structured face-
to-face interviews). The interpretation and synthesis of primary and
secondary data are presented in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. These
chapters are later integrated in chapter 7.
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Change Management Practices in Nigerian
Banks
5.0 Introduction
The previous chapter highlighted the methodologies used in different stages
of this research to test and explore the phenomena of banking consolidation
in Nigeria. The objective of this chapter is to present results and use these
results to analyse change management practices of managers in the Nigerian
banking industry through a range of change management frameworks. The
essence here is to establish why, what and how change was achieved by
managers in the Nigerian banking industry as a result of the consolidation.
In answering these questions, Pettigrew’s (1988) three broad lenses of
“Context”, “Content” and “Process”, are used to present the findings arising
from the series of in-depth interviews. The focus for this analysis is to set the
argument to address these three aspects of change as it applies to the
Nigerian banking industry. To achieve a detailed and robust analysis
McKinsey’s 7-S framework proposed by Peters and Waterman (1982),
Kotter’s (1998) eight guidelines for implementing successful change and
Lewin’s (1951) force field analysis are deployed.
Therefore this chapter is organised to analyse why the CBN (Central Bank of
Nigeria) consolidated the Nigerian banking industry, what aspects of banking
practices were transformed, how this was achieved and highlight lessons
learnt. Themes from the interviews are applied to critically examine the
response and options available to Nigerian banks as a result of the CBN’s
consolidation drive. Secondly, this study explores interventions used by
individual banks to meet these new requirements. Finally, key steps used by
banks to implement consolidation are identified and benchmarked.
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5.1 Evaluation Framework
Pettigrew’s (1988) framework utilised for analysis in this study was discussed
in detail in chapter 3. Sample selection and questions asked focused mainly
on organisations and individuals who were directly involved in the
consolidation process, and could provide insight to the various aspects of the
evaluation framework.
Eleven Nigerian banks and a respected financial analyst agreed to participate
in the process of data collection and fourteen face-to-face interviews were
conducted (sample transcript Appendix 4). These respondents were
personnel directly involved with the change management process in response
to the banking consolidation for their organisations. The mode of data
collection for all respondents was face-to-face in-depth semi-structured
interviews, also all respondents agreed to participate in a telephone interview
if further clarification was required. The rationale for adopting face-to-face
interviews was discussed in section 4.4.
In this chapter issues covered during the interviews include: (i) the initial
response of banks to the CBN’s consolidation drive, (ii) the options available
to banks to meet this new requirement, (iii) how individual banks met the
new requirements, (iv) key steps used and the sequence in which they were
implemented, (v) positive factors that influenced the change process, and
(vi) challenges or negative factors that worked against the change process
(see Table 4.1). Codes for data analysis (Appendix 5) are developed from the
review of literature and themes generated in interviews conducted. Where
there is a blank box in a table, it means there was no response in that
category from the sample set. The next section presents findings and
analysis of data obtained through face-to-face in-depth interviews with
fourteen personnel.
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5.2 Context and Response of Nigerian Banks to CBN’s Consolidation
Drive
The CBN provided a window of 18 months for all banks to consolidate and
increase their minimum capital base to N25 billion, from N2 billion. The
varied response of banks to this trigger is examined in this section. As senior
managers who perceive their banks as having the capacity to raise capital to
meet the new requirements might be receptive, while banks with less
capacity are more likely to be resistant. Banks could also be receptive
because of proactive management teams, with the ability to critically analyse
the Nigerian and global business environment and place their banks in a
position to better take advantage of opportunities. The degree of acceptance
or resistance is not captured, as this research focuses on the approach of
Nigerian banks to consolidation. Table 5.1 presents the response of Nigerian
banks to the CBN’s consolidation drive.
Table 5.1: Bank Response to CBN’s Consolidation Drive
(Q1: What was the initial response of your bank, to the Central Bank of
Nigeria’s consolidation drive?)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership Banks
Common Interest
Banks
1.1 Receptive (SA1:M1) (SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
(CI1:M1) (CI5:M1)
(CI6:M1)
1.2 Resistance (CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI7:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI4:M1)
1.3 Other Issues
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
Table 5.1 shows that all stand alone banks (bank categories are highlighted
in Table 2.5) were receptive to the CBN’s consolidation drive. Lewis and Stein
(1997) claim that Nigeria’s financial system was in a barely contained state
of collapse, it appears that stand alone banks put measures in place to
increase capital. To examine this, a senior manager from a stand alone bank
(SA1:M1) states the bank’s response to the CBN’s consolidation drive:
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“Guaranty Trust Bank had decided on its strategy in response to
its environment prior to the CBN’s announcement….so we had
taken a decision that we need to do some level of expansion,
which required expanding our shareholding and capital. So prior
to CBN coming out with their requirement for going to N25
billion, we had decided on taking additional capital……the way it
came out…..it seemed as if we had foreknowledge about what
the CBN wanted to do, but unfortunately we didn’t”.
This indicates that Guaranty Trust Bank had put measures in place to
increase its capital base prior to the CBN’s directive. Although, this measure
was informed by the bank’s strategic direction, which required some level of
expansion. The increased capacity to raise capital amongst other things,
explains why the bank was receptive to consolidation. Standard Chartered
Bank was also receptive to consolidation, as its foreign group encouraged by
the prospects of investing in Nigeria put in $140 million to meet CBN’s
requirement (Atafori 2007). Table 5.1 shows that some banks were receptive
in the common interest category. These banks namely: Diamond Bank,
United Bank of Africa and First Bank of Nigeria opted to merge or acquire
other banks. For example a senior manager (CI6:M1) in First Bank of Nigeria
states that:
“As at July 2004 with share capital in excess of N47 billion, First
Bank was the biggest bank in the Nigerian banking industry. We
were happy with CBN’s planned changes in the banking industry
and as a result received several invites from other banks to
merge and in some cases acquire them. This presented the bank
with an opportunity to grow its size and gain market share”.
Even though these banks fall into the common interest category as a result
of being involved in mergers or acquisitions, they had the capacity to stand
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on their own. Aside from their capacity to raise capital, evidence from the
interviews suggests that receptive banks also see consolidation as an
opportunity to expand in terms of size and market share. Primarily, such
expansions are based on the economies of scope common to all banks by
taking deposits on one hand and making loans on the other. It is not
surprising that managers of consolidating banks would expect to assert more
influence, as the activities of fewer bigger banks (reduction of banks from 89
to 24) are more likely to have a higher systemic impact on the economy. This
issue will be examined in the financial analysis and discussion chapters
(chapters 6 and 7). The higher systemic risk of fewer bigger banks also
necessitates the CBN to expand its regulator capacity to effectively monitor
the activities of these banks.
Seven respondents in Table 5.1 from common ownership and common
interest banks were resistant to consolidation. These banks might have been
resistant because of low capacity to raise capital or do not believe in the
perceived benefits of consolidation. A senior manager (CI4:M1) from one of
the resistant banks explains the bank’s position on consolidation:
“In First Intercity Bank, we believed the CBN’s N25 billion
consolidation requirement would be a very difficult task,
because we were coming from a capital base of just under N2
billion. So within our team we had a discussion and agreed it
was too big a challenge, and we thought that CBN was going to
reduce the requirement. Or at best create three strata of banks,
in which some banks can grow their capital base to N5 billion,
some to N10 billion and the big ones to N25 billion”.
The respected financial analyst (P1:M1) further states that:
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“Resistant banks had struggled to achieve the previous increase
of bank capital base to N2 billion, and as a result they felt that
the task of raising N25 billion was also most impossible”.
Evidence from the interviews show that First Intercity Bank was resistant
because of its relatively low capital base and limited capacity to meet the
N25 billion capital requirement for consolidation. Managers in this bank
suggested the creation of three strata of banks, to accommodate banks with
low capacity to raise capital. The response here can be likened to the denial
and grieving cycle presented by Kubler-Ross (1969), in which the initial
reaction to new reality is one of denial or that it cannot be true. These strata
were discredited by the insistence of the CBN that all banks meet the N25
billion capital requirement (CBN 2006). Ajasa et al. (2007) note that
resistant banks were characterised by low capital base and came together in
a bid to raise the mandated N25 billion by the end of December 2005. The
reason presented here for resisting consolidation does not query the benefits
of these reforms. Rather resistance was more or less an indication of ill
preparedness on the part of managers. This suggests that there might have
been agreement in the banking industry as per the perceived benefits of
consolidation. Soludo (2004 p. 1) claimed that consolidation will create “a
diversified, strong and reliable banking sector which will ensure the safety of
depositors money, play active developmental roles in the Nigerian economy,
and be competent and competitive players in the African regional and global
financial system”.
Interestingly, no respondent mentioned politics as a determinant of their
response to consolidation. It is observed that managers agreed the politics
(in the context of legitimate policy making role of the CBN) of reform was
given, and did not see politics as an excuse. Pettigrew (1988) argues that it
is impossible to explain the changing policies of companies without reference
to the contexts in which they occurred. Findings in this section suggest that
there were varying responses from Nigerian banks, with respect to
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consolidation. Receptive banks were generally better equipped in terms of
capacity to raise capital to meet the new recapitalisation requirement, while
resistant banks were characterised by low capacity to raise capital.
5.3 Options Available to Consolidating Banks
Even though Nigerian banks responded differently to the CBN’s consolidation
drive, available options to meet these new requirements remained a major
challenge. The CBN’s guidelines for consolidation stated that the only legal
modes of consolidation allowed are going solo, mergers and outright
acquisition/takeover. It further stated that mere group arrangements were
not acceptable for meeting the N25 billion capital base (CBN 2006; Ezeoha
2007). Individual banks were expected to shore up their capital through the
injection of fresh funds where applicable, but most importantly encouraged
to examine and adopt from the range of options allowed for consolidation.
The operating licence of banks who could not recapitalise to N25 billion by
adopting any of these options was withdrawn. These measures are consistent
with policy instruments in Malaysia and Indonesia, where Bank Negara
Malaysia and the Indonesian Banking Regulation Agency deployed mergers
and acquisitions as legal modes for consolidation. Table 5.2 is expanded to
show the different tactics adopted by banks to meet the CBN’s capital base
requirement.
Table 5.2: Options Adopted by Banks to meet new CBN Requirements
(Q2: What options did you have as a bank to meet the new requirements?)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership Banks
Common
Interests Banks
2.1 Public
Offer/
Recapitalisation
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2) (CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI4:M1) (CI5:M1)
(CI6:M1) (CI7:M1)
2.2 Private
Placement
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
2.3 Merger (CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI4:M1)
(CI5:M1) (CI7:M1)
2.4 (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
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Acquisition (CI6:M1)
2.5 Go Solo (SA1:M1) (SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
2.6 Partner
with Strategic
Investors
(CI2:M1)
2.7 Group
Injection of
Funds
(SA2:M1)
2.8 Other
Issues
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
Apart from Standard Chartered Bank whose group injected funds into its
Nigerian operations to meet the recapitalisation requirement, Table 5.2
shows that most consolidating banks (10) increased their capital base
through public offers. In addition to public offerings Bank PHB raised capital
through private placement (longer-term fixed rate debt), while First City
Monument Bank deployed funds from strategic investors (namely:
International Finance Corporation and Sabre Capital) to increase its capital
base. No Nigerian bank as at July 2004 had the N25 billion capital base
requirement for consolidation, as the CBN’s bank capital base requirement
prior to consolidation was N2 billion. The increase of capital base through
public offers, private placement, strategic investors, and group injection of
funds created two strata of Nigerian banks. The first strata of banks raised
enough capital to meet the N25 billion requirement and as a result could go
solo, merge or acquire. The second strata of banks were unable to meet the
N25 billion requirement, thus these banks had to merge or be acquired, to
survive.
Hill and Brown (2007), and Lin et al. (2006) note that strategic and cultural
fit are two determining dimensions when bringing institutions together.
Pettigrew (1998) argues that the interplay of culture in organisations helps
explain how changes are perceived and implemented. Hence, the possibility
of finding strategic and cultural fit could influence options available to
individual banks across categories. In response to a question on options
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available to consolidating banks, a senior manager (SA1:M1) from a stand
alone bank states that:
“The other aspect with raising additional capital as required by
the CBN was whether we could take on additional or rather
merge with some banks……this is something we debated, talked
about, something we analysed and we found out that for us we
had a certain culture which we didn’t want to dilute. So it was
difficult for us to begin to find banks that were very compatible
with us. We talked to a number of banks, we looked at the
books of a number of banks, but we then realised it was better
we went it alone and that’s why we decided it was going to be
Guaranty Trust Bank and that’s the way we have gone”.
Another senior manager (SA2:M1) from a stand alone bank confirms that
strategic and cultural considerations were a major determinant of the
decision making process:
“In deliberating how to meet the CBN’s new requirements, we
realised that culture and processes were critical and was going
to be a major problem. We did not want to get into an
acquisition that will take 4 or 5 years to get out of. Therefore
there was a question mark on this approach, and as a result we
adopted an organic growth model”.
Evidence from the interviews shows that stand alone banks though in the
first strata, did not merge or acquire any bank because of the difficulty of
finding strategic or cultural fit. It is evident for example: that cultural
integration is the major reason why mergers or acquisitions were not the
preferred options for Guaranty Trust Bank. However, it is expected that
issues of cultural integration are more evident in categories of banks with
two or more entities and less in the stand alone category because they did
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not have to merge. Another conflict for stand alone banks could be their
ability to sustain this model and continue to grow organically, given the
rapidly changing business environment in which market opportunities are
created by new technology or national deregulation or economics of
globalisation. Managers in these banks will have to evaluate their ability to
compete globally with the existing model, against the gains of mergers or
acquisitions.
Other banks in the first strata were involved in mergers or acquisitions.
These banks might have identified either strategic or cultural fit or both. A
senior manager (CI1:M1) from Diamond Bank claimed that:
“After its public offer and raising the required capital, Diamond
Bank acquired Lion Bank because we wanted to spread out to
northern Nigeria. We wanted a bank that had a lot of presence
in the north and Lion Bank met this requirement. This
acquisition had a strategic advantage, because Diamond Bank
was seen as an eastern Nigerian bank before now and had to
acquire a northern based bank to help expand its banking
services across Nigeria. The other reason for acquiring Lion
Bank was its strategic focus and expertise in retail banking, as
we (Diamond Bank) have always been strong in retail banking”.
Also a senior manager (CI6:M1) from First Bank notes that:
“In deciding to merge or acquire, we evaluated several banks
based on criteria set by our management team. In doing this we
looked at culture, seamless integration, branch network and
credit portfolios. For example: the FBN Merchant Bank culture
was easily integrated into that of First Bank, because we had
similar values”.
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The respondent from Diamond Bank suggests that Lion Bank was acquired
because it would help the bank achieve its objective of expanding across
Nigeria, while both banks were strategically aligned based on their focus on
retail banking. Also managers from First Bank indicate that culture and the
ability to strategically integrate processes, branch networks and credit
portfolios were key in deciding to merge or acquire. This indicates that
strategic and cultural considerations were significant for senior managers in
decisions to merge or acquire banks. These considerations as precursors are
consistent with the views of Hill and Brown (2007), and Lin et al. (2006) that
strategic and cultural fit are determining dimensions in bringing institutions
together.
Experience from the analysis above has shown the importance of achieving
strategic and cultural fit in mergers or acquisitions (section 3.4). However,
banks in the second strata also came together to survive the 18 months
window provided by CBN for consolidation, because these banks could not
raise the N25 billion capital base requirement on their own. Having survived
the consolidation process through mergers or acquisitions, respondents claim
that managers in these banks developed processes to better integrate their
people and structures for effective controls. A senior manager (CI3:M2) from
one of the merging banks stated that:
“First of all, at the top level there was a spirit of give and take,
Platinum bank took the Managing Director’s position, while
Habib bank took the Chairman’s position. There was also
equitable distribution of powers down the line”.
Evidence from the interviews suggests that the size of merging entities was a
major determinant of power distribution, and by extension what cultures and
systems were adopted. This is consistent with Moeller et al (2002 p. 3), who
argue that “managers of large firms might be more prone to hubris, perhaps
because they are more important socially, have succeeded in growing the
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firm, or simply face fewer obstacles in making acquisitions because their firm
has more resources”. Also noteworthy, is the emphasis on effective
distribution of management positions and incentives as a significant factor in
the mergers and acquisitions process for banks in the common interest
category. Most managers interviewed in this category were concerned with
power distribution in the new entity. This pattern is observed and indicates
that there is more power play in this category than in the stand alone and
common ownership categories. The difference in emphasis across different
categories may be as a result of the emergence of new management
structures in the common interest category. Thus managers are more
inclined to protect their areas of influence.
In summary, most banks increased their capital base through public offering,
to achieve the CBN’s N25 billion capital base requirement. Some banks after
raising capital had the capacity to go solo, while others who did not meet this
requirement opted for mergers or acquisitions to survive. These activities
were also influenced by the structures, cultures and political context within
these banks. The next section discusses the interventions of consolidating
banks.
5.4 Content of Change in Consolidating Banks
Although factors such as capacity to raise capital, size and market share
influenced individual banks, this section examines the content of change in
Nigerian banks. Evidence from the interviews is used to provide an insight to
the operational and cultural interventions utilised by senior managers across
categories of consolidating banks.
Abdullahi (2007) reports that the 25 banks that survived the Herculean task
of raising their capital base to a minimum N25 billion from N2 billion, re-
crafted their strategy matrix to appear more customer-centric. Nwoji (2006)
notes that older generation banks devised means of retaining customers’
loyalty, while newer generation banks deployed cutting edge technology and
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services to woo young mobile high net-worth individuals. This is consistent
with the claim of a senior manager (SA1:M2) in Guaranty Trust Bank that:
“The new generation big banks have introduced cutting edge
technology, with better responsive management style”.
In support of this view, the respected financial analyst (P1:M1) notes that:
“New big banks have provided more dynamic leadership in the
banking industry, and as a result these banks have developed a
varied range of innovative lending products”.
This indicates that the development of new strategies was a common feature
amongst consolidating banks. Business goals and objectives in line with
CBN’s recommendations were tailored to better address customer needs. The
focus on customers across categories of consolidating banks is as a result of
the renewed drive to generate deposits. This is necessary as the N25 billion
capital base created an environment where banks could no longer compete
on size, but instead through services. The situation is similar in Malaysia, as
Bank Negara Malaysia (2003) states that domestic banking institutions tried
to understand the drivers of performance and aimed to meet consumer
demands in an effective and efficient manner.
5.4.1 Operational Interventions
Faulkner (2002) argues that strategic choice typically includes not only the
establishment of structural forms but also the manipulation of the process of
choice itself, in which economic and “administrative exigencies” are weighed
by actors concerned against the opportunities to operate a structure of their
own. Before consolidation, the Nigerian banking industry was characterised
by relatively small sized banks with very limited ownership base. The
increase of bank’s capital base to N25 billion from N2 billion meant that
banks became bigger with more diverse ownership (through public offers,
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private placement, strategic investors and group injection of funds). This is
consistent with the view of Amao and Amaeshi (2008) that shareholding in
Nigeria has grown from a few thousands in the early 70s to an estimated 10
million by 2005. The effect of this on bank structure is explained by a senior
manager (SA1:M2) who notes that:
“As a result of the consolidation, we had to change our
organisational structure. The organogram was tweaked with to
accommodate growth. So we had new groups and divisions. We
had the existing groups, for example: shared services increasing
in number, so we were prepared for growth and for size”.
This shows that changes were made to the structure of banks post
consolidation, as centralised structures were no longer effective given the
bigger size of banks. Although processes remained centralised, the interviews
imply that some groups and divisions were decentralised to accommodate
growth and entrench effective control mechanisms. This is significant as
decentralisation allows managers to develop their skills in various lines of
business and monitor actual versus predicted performance when banks
expand to new geographical areas or introduce new products or services.
Secondly, the emphasis on control mechanisms is consistent with the
findings of Petersen and Rajan (1995), Berger and Udell (1995), Cole (1998)
and Elsas and Krahnen (1998). They argue that the high risk nature of
banking emphasises the importance of banks developing relationships with
its customers, particularly for credit terms such as loans, interest rates and
collateral requirements, and these relationships are difficult to establish in a
centralised organisational structure. This is not surprising because the
fundamentals of banking require some level of detail, and more so when
banks increase in size as was the case in the Nigerian banking industry.
Jacobs (2010) notes that mergers have failed because of the failure to
effectively integrate two or more bank operating systems as the case may
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be. Evidence from the interviews reveals varying emphasis on systems
across categories of consolidating banks. Managers from stand alone banks
mentioned systems in relation to upgrades, to accommodate increased size
of the bank. For example a senior manager (SA1:M1) from a stand alone
bank claimed that:
“We looked to reinforce and upgrade our systems to
accommodate the increased size of the bank”.
The emphasis above on system upgrade in the stand alone category is
because these banks did not have to integrate their systems and operational
activities with order entities. Thus, the focus here was more on scaling up
existing systems and improving process to accommodate the increased size
of banks. This also provides an opportunity for stand alone banks to better
knit their management and systems more closely together. Findings are
however different for common ownership and common interest banks.
Managers from these categories of banks identified operational integration as
a key step used. For example: a senior manager (CI3:M2) states that:
“Committees were set up to look at the operational manuals of
the two entities and the idea was to harmonise them to achieve
best fit”.
It appears that managers in common ownership and common interest banks
identified harmonisation as a key step, because these categories of banks
were involved in one form of merger or acquisition. It is observed that when
acquisition was the preferred option banks in these categories basically
adopted the acquiring bank processes. For example: the Gross Total Assets
of Diamond Bank in 2005 was N125,675 billion as compared to N14,824
billion for Lion Bank in the same year (Appendix 6). The relative size of
Diamond Bank over Lion Bank which it acquired made it more likely that the
acquiring bank processes and culture will dominate the enlarged group. The
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incentive for managers who emphasise the need for effective systems
integration is the higher chances of success in combining different entities.
Also important is the argument commonly made for mergers based on
economies of scope, and the assertion that related lines of business create
opportunities for one another through shared resources if under the same
ownership. It would be interesting to see whether banks in these categories
are able to take advantage of opportunities presented by their unions, to
produce results, further research is required to examine this (section 8.6).
There is acknowledgement from respondents that effective integration of
systems was key to successful mergers or acquisitions and this is consistent
with the views of Jacobs (2010), that mergers fail because of the failure to
effectively integrate operations.
Despite the incentives of harmonisation identified above, senior managers
interviewed across categories of consolidating banks highlighted the need to
effectively manage human capital. Respondents, particularly from common
ownership and common interest banks suggest that managing human capital
was a major determinant of the merger or acquisition negotiation process.
Peters and Waterman (1982) claim that the composition of human capital
has to do with selecting (from existing staff), recruiting, motivating, rewards,
and education. They note that the need to effectively manage these elements
is required in a change situation. This is consistent with the views of a senior
manager (SA1:M2) who states that:
“With size come opportunities, staff were encouraged and
motivated to aspire to fill higher roles in the bank.....All of a
sudden the bank was growing rapidly, so we also had to bring in
a lot of middle level hires”.
This view is supported by another senior manager (CO1:M1) who notes that:
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“There was also a committee on human capital which comprises
of the human resources managers of the various merging
banks. We had to look at the staffing, the staff complements,
and the people, because when you are merging entities you
want to determine the fitness of some individuals to be in the
combined entity”.
This indicates that staffing through motivation of existing staff to occupy
higher roles, training and recruitment was of high priority to senior
managers. It is not surprising that there seems to be agreement as to the
importance of human capital across consolidating banks, because despite
differences in context and format, staff of organisations have traditionally
been the focus of programmes to bring about change (Guskey 1985). Thus,
reforms are more likely to be successful if the right people are recruited, with
appropriate reward and educational support.
Also in relation to human capital is the availability of skill to effectively
implement changes necessitated by the consolidation. From an organisational
perspective, this is vital to drive performance and take advantage of
opportunities. Anderson (1982) claims that skills developed through various
learning mechanisms are structured around variable use and reference to
goal structures. A senior manager (CI1:M1) supports this view and states
that:
“I must say that Diamond bank realised the effects of CBN’s
changes on its loan size, capital base and assets quite early, and
they sought for the required skills and human capital to staff
their risk management units and improve the process. To
achieve this they headhunted capable hands”.
Another senior manager (SA2:M1) claims that:
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“If for instance before consolidation we were dealing with a
wholesale loan book of $50 million, we would need a particular
type of manager to manage the risk portfolio. If after
consolidation we planned to increase our wholesale book to $50
billion, we would require a different set of managers”.
Evidence from the interviews show that consolidating banks enhanced
managerial skills due to increased loan size, and also to plug competency
gaps resulting from the scale and complexity of the business. This implies
that managers are aware of the need for skilled human capital in the effort to
transform their organisations. Secondly, banks were now expected to create
higher levels of risk assets and more robust control mechanisms. The
statement presented above suggests that most banks did not have
employees with the requisite skill to create such assets. These banks also
seemed to experience some difficulty in filling positions and this highlights
the shortage of skill in the Nigerian banking industry. It is not surprising that
the banking industry lacked the requisite skill, because it had not properly
played its intermediation role (Soludo 2007) and as a result there was no
enabling environment to develop such skill. However, if banks are to create
higher levels of risk assets as expected by the CBN, they will have to put
measures in place to develop, attract and retain skilled employees.
5.4.2 Cultural Interventions
The CBN’s consolidation drive necessitated changes in the approach to
banking in Nigeria. Management in consolidating banks put measures in
place to effectively take advantage of opportunities in their business
environment. Naturally some of these changes could positively or negatively
impact on employees and work processes. For example a senior bank
manager from a stand alone bank (SA1:M2) notes that:
“Our strategic retreat before the consolidation, prepared and
positioned us for growth and size….so we were at the right place
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doing the right thing. Of course our management style
encouraged staff to embrace change, and as a result the
average staff of this bank is very well motivated”.
Contrary to the views above, a senior manager from a common ownership
bank (CO2:M1) states the effects of management changes on employees:
“They say old habits die hard. Sometimes when you want to
bring new ideas and changes, some staff who are used to the
old ways of doing things, would say look this is what we have
been doing before. But you see, we can’t continue to do
business that way. In fact the group MD made it clear that we
just have to change our processes and systems to remain
competitive. Let me draw you back, even those who tried to
resist change were enlightened, some were even
threatened….look if you don’t want to change, if you don’t want
to toe along the line you chip out”.
Banks in the stand alone category were generally better prepared for
consolidation, and this explains the motivation of their staff. However,
employees in the common ownership bank above were not motivated,
because management was not anticipative of changes in its business
environment. This lack of preparedness is noticed amongst resistant banks
(For example: Intercontinental Bank Plc, Unity Bank Plc, First City Monument
Bank Plc), as employees in these banks did not clearly understand what they
would gain in the new business environment. Thus, the “what is in this for
me” question was left unanswered. This finding suggests that little or no
effort was made to address some specific concerns of employees with respect
to changes being implemented. This is probably because of the amount of
time (18 months) allocated to banks to complete the consolidation process.
Managers naturally would respond to requirements differently depending on
how they perceive the threat in relation to their organisations. Goleman
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(2000) argues that style springs from different components of emotional
intelligence. He further states that the styles taken individually appear to
have a direct and unique impact on the working atmosphere of a company,
division, or team, and in turn its performance. In relation to Nigerian banks,
this can be interpreted to mean that individual manager’s response to
perceived threat directly impact on the performance of their work force.
According to Dunphy and Stace (1988) managerial style would vary
depending on the scale and pace of change. They suggest that more directive
and coercive change management strategies would be used in volatile
business environments, while collaborative and consultative strategies apply
in more stable environments. The latter was the case in resistant banks and
would help explain why employees were not motivated. To deal with this
conflict, managers must create an effective feedback process in their
organisations that allows for employee participation in the design and
implementation of change programs.
Peters and Waterman (1982) and Williamson (1986) argue that more often
than not shared values determine what people do in organisations.
Respondents claimed that organisational values influenced how their banks
evolved. Strongly evident in categories of banks with common ownership and
common interests was the harmonisation of values. To affirm this, a senior
manager (CI3:M2) stated that:
“There were good things about Platinum Bank, and good things
about Habib Bank. To a great extent we tried to adopt the best
from both Banks. For example the dress code of Platinum was
very English, coming together we relaxed it especially on
Fridays. Before the union there was no question of maintaining
beards, but now you can. So we created an environment that
did not exert on staff and this is one of the many reasons why
people want to work for Bank PHB”.
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In support of the view above a senior manger (CI5:M1) notes that:
“We adopted what was better, the integration teams basically
looked at what was best. As a bank we implemented best plus”.
Evidence from the interviews suggests that best practice from merging
entities were adopted in the new entity. As can be seen above, managers in
Bank PHB were able to harmonise some aspects of the dress code of both
merging banks, to create an enabling environment post-consolidation. This
suggests that managers were keen to facilitate values perceived to have a
positive impact on their work force and thus avoid problems that do not need
to arise. This is significant as transformation will be more successful if these
values impact positively on employees and could become organisational
strengths if properly channelled.
The findings discussed in this section, are consistent with Peters and
Waterman (1982). Peters and Waterman (1982) identify strategy, structure,
systems, staff, style, shared values and skills as guidelines which
organisations must pay attention to if they must succeed in implementing
change programs. However, resistant banks were characterised by poorly
motivated staff, as ill prepared management teams did not effectively
address specific concerns of employees. Nigerian banks also experienced a
shortage of skilled human capital, because there had not been an enabling
environment to develop required skills. The next section highlights key steps
used to implement change in consolidating banks.
5.5 Process of Change in Consolidating Banks
Across categories of consolidating banks in Nigeria, a number of
interventions were instrumental in administering organisational change in
line with the CBN’s requirements. However, specific priorities, peculiarities
and sequence might be similar or different depending on the context of
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individual banks. The CBN’s 18 months window provided for all banks to
recapitalise to N25 billion or lose their banking licence created a unique sense
of urgency. Though banks responded differently to this trigger, managers
were able to create a sense of urgency in their banks through a number of
activities. This includes the use of various communication tools to educate
employees of the change vision. For example a senior manager (SA1:M2)
claimed that:
“There were meetings at various levels, we then appointed
change champions. Each branch had a change champion who
was like the mouth piece of management in the branch and who
would communicate the intent of management to staff. There
were staff sessions or branch meeting sessions....there had
always been that, but those sessions were then adopted to
communicate the impending change”.
Another senior manager (CO1:M1) confirms the use of communication:
“Some aspects of the consolidation process required
communication. Also Executive Directors were sent to other
banks we were merging with, to superintend things and inform
employees of expected changes”.
The use of communication is further confirmed by another senior manager
(CI6:M1) who states that:
“After the CBN’s announcement on banking consolidation, we
had an investor’s forum in which all stakeholders and key
customers of the merging banks were invited. In the forum, we
discussed the goals of the new entity, and the future direction of
the bank. Staff were also delegated to drive these new
objectives”.
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Evidence from the interviews indicates that change champions were deployed
as a medium of communication to employees in some banks. The use of
communication as a tool to raise the urgency levels is observed across
categories of consolidating banks. This is probably because urgency levels
had to rise for managers to get the needed cooperation from employees. This
is significant as the status quo (which entails losing the bank’s licence) was
totally unacceptable for these banks, and required managers to convince
employees to see business as usual, as more dangerous. This is also
consistent with Kotter (1998), Dunphy and Stace (1993) who argue that it is
difficult to convince key individuals to spend time necessary to create and
communicate a change vision if urgency is low. Table 5.3 provides a
summary of the key steps used to implement consolidation.
Table 5.3: Key steps used by Banks to implement consolidation
NB: This only shows the steps and not the sequence
(Q3: What were the key steps used, and in what sequence were they
implemented.)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership Banks
Common Interest
Banks
3.1 Regulatory
Requirements/
Due Diligence
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
(CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI4:M1) (CI5:M1)
(CI6:M1) (CI7:M1)
3.2 Training (SA2:M1) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI4:M1) (CI6:M1)
(CI7:M1)
3.3
Communicating
to Employees/
Customers/
General Public
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
(CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI6:M1)
(CI7:M1)
3.4 Structural
Change
(SA1:M2) (CO1:M1) (CI3:M2) (CI5:M1)
3.5 Change
Champions
(SA1:M2) (CO1:M1) (CI7:M1)
3.6 Action
Research
(SA1:M1) (SA2:M1) (CI4:M1) (CI7:M1)
3.7Cultural
Integration/
(CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
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Acculturation (CI4:M1) (CI5:M1)
(CI6:M1) (CI7:M1)
3.8 Operational
Integration/
Technology
Infrastructure
(CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI4:M1) (CI5:M1)
(CI6:M1) (CI7:M1)
3.9 Strategic
Objectives/
Vision/Business
Plan
(SA1:M1) (SA2:M1)
(SA2:M1)
(CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI4:M1)
(CI5:M1) (CI6:M1)
(CI7:M1)
3.10 Guiding
Coalition/
Integration
Teams
(CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI2:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI4:M1)
(CI5:M1) (CI6:M1)
(CI7:M1)
3.11
Management
Incentives/
Staffing
(SA1:M2) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI4:M1) (CI5:M1)
(CI6:M1) (CI7:M1)
3.12
Re-branding
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI4:M1) (CI7:M1)
3.13 Leadership
Style
(CI3:M2) (CI7:M1)
3.14 Other
Issues
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
Findings from the interviews indicate that some banks developed guiding
coalitions to manage the implementation of changes necessitated by the
consolidation. Interestingly, the focus of guiding teams was different across
categories of banks. Common ownership and common interest banks were
keen to integrate their people and processes and as a result established
powerful integration teams, this was however not necessary in stand alone
banks. This finding is further corroborated by senior managers in Bank PHB
(CI3:M1; CI3:M2). A key factor responsible for this is the fact that common
ownership and common interest banks were involved in mergers or
acquisitions and will naturally want to align their people and operations. This
explains why all nine respondents in Table 5.3 who identified integration
teams as a key step used were from common ownership and common
interest banks. The composition and structures of these teams are not
discussed, as this study does not have access to such data. Nevertheless, the
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approach adopted by managers in these categories is positive, because of
the pace of change and the number and nature of decisions being made.
The situation is different in the stand alone category, as banks did not opt to
merge or acquire. Findings in Table 5.3 do not indicate that stand alone
banks focused on powerful guiding coalitions. This might be because these
banks basically maintained their existing hierarchy and changes were not
major transformational programs as is the case in other categories, even
though the CBN provided an 18 month window for all banks to recapitalise.
This will hold true if there is a consensus amongst senior managers that the
measures being implemented are in the best interest of the bank. It is
expected that a high sense of urgency creates an environment for managers
to access opportunities and threats for their banks, and provide the
necessary power structures to implement changes necessitated by this task.
This suggests that Kotter’s (1998) framework might not have been applied in
its strict sense, giving the starting point of stand alone banks (changes not
as significant as in common ownership and common interest banks). This
situation is explained in the “change contextual features” of the Kaleidoscope
(Balogun and Hope-Hailey 2004), which refers to aspects of organisational
culture, competences and current situation being considered before selecting
a change approach. Hence, Kotter (1998), Kliem (1996), Want (1995) and
Kanter et al. (1992) fail to adequately emphasise that the focus on powerful
coalitions may not always be necessary if changes are carried out in the
context of existing organisational hierarchy, power structures and
commitment from senior management.
Table 5.3 also shows that twelve managers identified strategic objectives,
vision and business plan as key elements used in implementing change.
Taking into consideration the CBN’s requirements, all categories of
consolidating banks developed vision statements and put strategies in place
to meet them. The concern here is if this vision is clear enough to help align
employees and coordinate their actions in an effective way. In response to a
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question on the bank’s vision and objectives, a senior manager (CI1:M1)
notes that:
“A lot has changed as a result of the consolidation, and our
systems were quite different from that of Lion Bank. I will agree
that staff of Lion Bank are a bit slow and still have difficulties
aligning with the new vision of the bank”.
In support of this view a senior manager (CO1:M1) claimed that:
“Even though our merger was achieved by bringing banks from
the same banking group together, more could be done to align
our people with the new vision”.
It is evident from the interview above, that the change vision did not
effectively align people in some banks. This suggests a lack of clarity of the
vision and strategy for change, and indicates that more was needed to be
done across categories of consolidating banks to coordinate people’s actions.
Kotter (1998) argues that the task of communicating the change vision
generates dozens of questions, and the guiding coalition’s ability to
effectively capture and answer these questions for employees, makes the
communication of change vision a challenging exercise. Studies conducted by
Farmer et al. (1998) suggest that the manager who flattens the
communication hierarchy is more likely to achieve shared vision. Adopting a
flat communication hierarchy which focuses on answering employee
questions could well improve the possibility of achieving shared vision. The
emotional work of letting go of the status quo is difficult, but the ability to
communicate vision effectively to broader constituencies will go along way in
getting people on board.
Although Table 5.3 emphasises the use of training in enhancing employee
participation. Another important factor in aligning people is the ability to test
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the vision against realities on the ground. This will help trigger necessary
adjustments to the strategy, retain support of management and sustain
momentum for the change process. Detailed analysis of the interviews does
not reveal any deliberate actions by managers across consolidating banks to
test their vision against realities on ground. For example the successful
public offering achieved by some Nigerian banks (Banks in the first strata) is
an indication of a favourable public perception of these organisations.
However, there is no evidence to show that deliberate action was taken by
managers to take advantage of these wins. This is particularly essential,
because it will generally encourage employees to see the change vision as
achievable.
The merger between Stanbic Bank Nigeria Limited (a member of The
Standard Bank Group of South Africa Limited) and IBTC Bank Plc, in which
Standard Bank had in August 2007 secured 50.1% shareholding of IBTC
Chartered (Standard Bank 2008) shows that some banks have consolidated
on gains to produce more change. Closer examination reveals that where
banks had established guiding coalitions, many continued to implement
multiple change projects. Confirming this, a senior manager (CI7:M1) stated
that:
“It’s still on-going, if you observed we are re-branding. First
Inland bank is now known as FinBank. A lot of things have
changed and there was a process taken in which we took
brand people, we once again took consultants and we went
through a process of communicating what was about to
happen to our people. Letting everybody know that there is
need for a change, this is what the consultants are saying, this
is the perception of the public to the newly consolidated bank
and we don’t want to remain there. This is where we want to
go. So there was a period of creating awareness, we
nominated those we call brand ambassadors, people who
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would drive the process in various locations. So it came in bits,
for the past 2 to 3 years we have been taking it in bits. So far
so good I think it’s working well”.
The implementation of multiple change projects after consolidation, is also
confirmed by the respected financial analyst (P1:M1) who notes that:
“Even after achieving the requirements for consolidation, most
banks continued to develop and implement projects aimed at
aligning their people and improving the competitiveness of the
organisation”.
The trend highlighted above implies that consolidating banks did not declare
victory after meeting the CBN’s December 2005 deadline. It is observed from
the interviews that all categories of banks embarked on projects aimed at
improving corporate governance, credit processing, cultural integration,
systems upgrade and so on. This is encouraging and necessary as major
transformations require guiding coalitions to keep urgency levels high and
stay the course in order to accomplish objectives. However, it is relatively
early to judge processes in place to consolidate gains because consolidation
was completed 4 years ago and major transformations could go on for years.
The ability of managers in most banks to keep urgency at a level necessary
to accomplish objectives can only be established over time.
One other incentive available to senior managers, is their ability to relate
benefits to altered action. Thus employees can connect changes in their
actions to successes in the work place or business environment, and as a
result are more willing to continue on that path. Luecke (2003 p. 44) notes
that “it is critical that employees be as concerned with institutionalizing the
“journey” as with implementing the process itself”. Table 5.3 shows that ten
managers from common ownership and common interest banks highlighted
cultural integration and acculturation as an important process in
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consolidation. More detailed examination indicates that some banks made
significant efforts to alter people’s action in the first phases of the
transformation. A senior manager (CI5:M1) also states that:
“As a result of the merger, we had several cultures. We adopted
what was best. The integration teams basically looked at what
was good and what was on ground. The idea was that: a new
bank, this is the business objectives, this is how fast we want to
move, and this is where we want to be. So if you need to
recommend new things recommend them”.
This is a positive observation. However, evidence from the interviews
suggests that managers have not been very successful in anchoring new
approaches in the culture. This is illustrated by the response of a senior
manager (CI1:M1) who notes that:
“You know bringing two banks together, you have to harmonise
different work cultures. Lion Bank has a way that they normally
do their processes, in fact they were seen as a bit slow in their
approach to the market. For instance their marketing is not as
aggressive, so the staff that were taken over had to be taught
to move (laughs). Even up till now, I can tell you that it’s still a
bit easy to identify former Lion Bank staff, they are a bit
reserved”.
Even though the common ownership and common interest banks prioritised
harmonisation of people and systems. Evidence from the interviews suggests
that these banks experienced difficulty in institutionalising preferred cultures
and systems. A detailed analysis of the interviews does not show any effort
by managers in these banks to effectively highlight benefits or explain the
connection of new actions to performance improvements (if any), and this is
the most likely reason for the lack of institutionalisation identified above.
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However, the context for stand alone banks was different, as they focused on
scaling up while maintaining existing cultures and systems. This made
institutionalisation a little easier for this category of banks. There is also the
possibility across consolidating banks that expected gains might not have
manifested, as this analysis was conducted 4 years after the banking
consolidation, and more time could be needed to ascertain or confirm
expected gains. Even at this, changing old cultures or processes and
institutionalising new ones are difficult to achieve. Thus, a deliberate effort
by managers to highlight gains resulting from alterations in action becomes
even more important in transformational activities. Based on the analysis
presented in this section, Table 5.4 provides an overview of Kotter’s (1998)
eight-stage framework for change across categories of consolidating banks in
Nigeria. Terms used in the Table include: “LOW” (means the element has
little application in that category), “MEDIUM” (means the element applies
that category but not to a high degree) and “HIGH” (means the element is
significant in that category).
Table 5.4: Kotter’s (1998) Eight-stage framework for change across
categories of consolidating banks in Nigeria (July 2004-July 2009)
Stages Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership
Banks
Common
Interest Banks
Establishing a
Sense of
Urgency
HIGH/Appointed
change champions
HIGH/Appointed
change champions
HIGH/Appointed
change champions
Creating the
Guiding
Coalition
LOW/Maintained
existing structures
HIGH/Appointed
Integration Teams
HIGH/Appointed
Integration Teams
Developing a
Vision and
Strategy
HIGH/Identified
strategic objectives
and business plans
HIGH/Identified
strategic
objectives and
business plans
HIGH/Identified
strategic
objectives and
business plans
Communicating
the Change
Vision
LOW/Vision and
Strategy for change
not clear
LOW/Vision and
Strategy for
change not clear
LOW/Vision and
Strategy for
change not clear
Empowering
Employees for
MEDIUM/Maintained
existing power
HIGH/Developed
new power
HIGH/Developed
new power
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Broad-Based
Action
structures structure structure
Generating
Short-Term Wins
LOW/No deliberate
efforts to highlight
short term wins
LOW/No deliberate
efforts to highlight
short term wins
LOW/No deliberate
efforts to highlight
short term wins
Consolidating
Gains and
Producing More
Change
MEDIUM/Reorganised
existing structures to
accommodate
increase in size as a
result of
consolidation
HIGH/Guiding
coalitions
implemented
multiple change
projects after
consolidation
HIGH/Guiding
coalitions
implemented
multiple change
projects after
consolidation
Anchoring New
Approaches in
the Culture
HIGH/Limited
changes to culture
and systems, some
reform to existing
culture
LOW/Difficulty in
institutionalising
preferred culture
and systems in
mergers
LOW/Difficulty in
institutionalising
preferred culture
and systems in
mergers
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
In this study, Kotter’s (1998) eight guidelines are used as an analytical
framework to evaluate planned change in Nigerian banks, even as some
degree of iteration could occur within the proposed guidelines. Table 5.4
shows an application of Kotter’s (1998) eight guidelines in analysing the
process of consolidation in Nigerian banks. The analysis suggests a lack of
clarity of vision and strategy for change in some banks. There are also
indications that managers have not effectively highlighted wins, even though
some banks have consolidated on gains to produce more change. It is
expected that gains could help convince employees to institutionalise altered
action. A major determinant will be management’s interpretation of its
business environment and how it responds to varying forces for and against
change. In the next section positive factors for and negative factors against
banking consolidation in the case of Nigeria are discussed.
5.6 Forces For and Against Banking Consolidation in Nigeria
This section deploys Lewin’s (1951) force field analysis to examine the nature
and relative magnitude of forces acting upon consolidation in the Nigerian
banking industry. Paton and McCalman (2000) note that the force field
analysis is a positioning tool and assists in answering questions such as:
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what forces are at play and what is their likely magnitude? The essence is to
determine who is for change and who is against. It is expected that
managers would better manage the change process if they can identify what
forces are for change and against it. Table 5.5 summarises the response of
managers (from successful banks) on forces for consolidation in the Nigerian
banking industry.
Table 5.5: Positive Factors for Bank Change Process
(Q4: From my understanding of implementing change, there could be
positive factors that drive the change process. What positive factors
influenced the change process for your bank?)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership
Banks
Common Interest
Banks
4.1 Skilled
staff/Training
(CI6:M1)
4.2 Information
Technology
Infrastructure
4.3 Corporate
Governance
4.4 Strong Brand (SA1:M2) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1)
4.5 Successful
Public
Offering/Strong
Capital Base
(SA1:M2) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI4:M1)
(CI7:M1) (CI6:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI5:M1)
4.6 Motivated
Staff/Opportunitie
s for Growth
(SA1:M2) (CI2:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI5:M1)
4.7 Well
Established
Processes
(CO1:M1) (CI1:M1)
4.8 Effective
Communication
(SA2:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI2:M1)
4.9 Management’s
Commitment
(SA1:M2) (CO1:M1) (CI2:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI6:M1) (CI1:M1)
(CI7:M1) (CI5:M1)
4.10 Clear
Performance
Measurement
parameters
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI4:M1) (CI7:M1)
4.11 Strategic
Objectives/Vision/
Business Plan
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2) (CI2:M1) (CI5:M1)
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4.12 Acculturation (CI3:M2) (CI6:M1)
4.13
Unsatisfactory
Status Quo
(SA2:M1) (CO2:M1)
4.14 Strong
Regulatory Will of
the CBN
(SA1:M2) (CI7:M1) (CI1:M1)
(CI2:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI4:M1) (CI6:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI5:M1)
4.15 Other Issues
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
The result in Table 5.5 shows that respondents across categories of
consolidating banks identified successful public offering, management’s
commitment and strong regulatory will by CBN as the most prominent
positive factors and enablers for consolidation. Clearly the successful public
offering in which Nigerian banks raised over N350 billion from the capital
market and $652 million from foreign direct investment, leading to a total
capitalisation of almost N1 trillion compared to less than N300 billion pre
2004 (CBN 2006) is positive. This also indicates that the Nigerian public
favourably perceive the banking industry and by extension its business
environment (Soludo 2006). Soludo’s (2006) view is supported by the
respected financial analyst (P1:M1) who states that:
“Banks were able to raise funds from the public, because people
believed in the reform carried out by the CBN and the expected
benefits of this reform for the Nigerian economy”.
Ultimately, the perceived benefits of banking consolidation made it possible
for some banks to meet the CBN’s regulation of N25 billion minimum capital
base, amongst other requirements for consolidation.
It is not surprising that as many as eight respondents in Table 5.5 identified
management’s commitment as a positive factor and an enabler, because this
is required if banks are to emerge successfully from the rigorous processes
necessitated by the consolidation. Management teams might also be
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influenced by the expected benefits of consolidation or the consequence of
not meeting CBN’s requirements (loss of bank’s licence). Although these
factors might vary from bank to bank, the imperative to consolidate had a
compelling effect on management. Finally, managers highlighted the CBN’s
strong regulatory as a positive factor. This implies that managers believed in
the regulator and its ability to see the process through. This is significant, as
it will help to sustain stability and build confidence within and outside the
banking industry. Table 5.6 summarises the response of managers (from
successful banks) on negative forces against consolidation in Nigeria.
Table 5.6: Negative factors against Bank Change process
(Q5: People naturally tend to resist changing old patterns. What sort of
challenges did you face while trying to implement these changes in your
bank?)
Codes Stand Alone
Banks
Common
Ownership Banks
Common
Interest Banks
5.1 Difficulty of
Finding Compatible
Strategic Partners
(CI3:M2) (CI7:M1)
5.2 Filling
Positions/Cultural
Issues
(SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
(CO1:M1)
(CO2:M1)
(CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI4:M1) (CI5:M1)
(CI7:M1)
5.3 Weak Control
Mechanisms as a
result of bigger size
(SA1:M2)
5.4 Stability of
Government/Political
Process
(SA2:M1)
5.5 Management
Incentives/
Job loses
(CO1:M1)
(CO2:M1)
(CI2:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI4:M1) (CI6:M1)
5.6 Other Issues
Source; Author Generated (From interview data)
Table 5.6 highlights cultural integration and management incentives as the
most powerful forces working against banking consolidation in Nigeria. It
shows that managers across categories of consolidating banks experienced
difficulty in bringing different cultures together. This implies that the
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acculturation efforts by managers did not have the right impact on
employees. It is also possible that employees are still not able to link altered
actions to benefits in their work place or business environment. Secondly,
people traditionally protect their domain and will do any thing possible to
resist perceived threats. Thus managers try to protect their streams of
influence in uncertain conditions; this is illustrated in Table 5.6 where only
senior managers from common ownership and common interest banks
identified management incentives as a negative factor. There are still
significant changes being carried out in these banks and this is why 4 years
after consolidation, management incentive and job losses are recurring
negative factors.
Though the most prevalent reason for banks resisting consolidation was their
low capacity to raise capital, no senior manager highlighted this as a
negative factor against consolidation. This is probably because all managers
interviewed were from banks which achieved the minimum capitalisation
requirement either by going solo, mergers or acquisitions. Therefore, their
ability to raise the minimum capital requirement might be why they do not
see this as a negative factor in the process of consolidation. Figure 5.1 shows
the force field diagram for consolidating banks in Nigeria.
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Figure 5.1: Force Field for consolidating banks in Nigeria
Source: Author Generated (from face-to-face interviews with senior
managers in Nigerian banks). Note: Size or style of arrow is not indicative of
strength of force.
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The diagram above identifies the change situation for Nigerian banks that
successfully achieved the CBN’s consolidation requirements; presumably the
barriers (negative factors) were much greater for unsuccessful banks. These
elements may or may not apply in all individual banks, as this represents an
amalgam of successful banks. This situation is examined in more detail in
section 7.2, through an analysis of the change situation in different
categories of consolidating banks. The positive and negative forces presented
here does not reflect the relative magnitude or strength of these forces, as
the researcher did not have access to directly observe these events.
To deal with these conflicts, managers must take advantage of successful
public offerings, CBN’s strong regulatory will, management’s commitment
and put processes in place for improvement were necessary. These measures
must be reassessed regularly to ensure relevance as the business
environment evolves. On the other hand, efforts should be made to mitigate
the impact of poor cultural integration and management incentives on the
bank’s performance. The next section discusses the conclusion and summary
of key findings.
5.8 Conclusion and Summary of Key Findings
This chapter presented findings arising from the series of in-depth interviews
with senior managers in the Nigerian banking industry. The analysis
examined why, what and how banking consolidation was achieved in Nigeria.
Soludo (2007) suggested the Nigerian financial system was characterised by
structural and operational weaknesses and that their catalytic role in
promoting private sector led growth could be further enhanced through a
pragmatic reform. In July 2004, the CBN provided all banks with an 18
months window to recapitalise to the tune of N25 billion.
Receptive banks were generally better equipped in terms of capacity to raise
capital to meet the new recapitalisation requirement, while resistant banks
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were characterised by low capacity to raise capital. Apart from Standard
Chartered Bank, all consolidating banks which participated in the interviews
increased their capital base through public offers. In addition to their public
offerings, Bank PHB and FCMB raised capital through private placement and
strategic investors respectively. Interestingly some banks had the capacity to
go solo after raising capital, while others who did not meet this requirement
(N25 billion capital base) opted for mergers or acquisitions. These activities
were also influenced by the structures, cultures and political context within
these banks.
Findings from the analysis of interviews with senior managers indicate that,
staff of resistant banks were not very well motivated (section 5.2). The most
evident reason for this is the ill preparedness of management and the CBN’s
18 months window for consolidation. Thus, management in these banks were
unable to effectively address specific staff concerns. The banking industry
also experienced shortage of skilled human capital, resulting from Nigerian
banks not having played an intermediation role in the economy. The analysis
of processes for consolidation suggests a lack of clarity of vision and strategy
for change. There are also indications that managers have not effectively
highlighted wins, even though some banks have consolidated on gains to
produce more change. Cultural integration and management incentives are
identified as the most prevalent negative factors against the change process.
These shortcomings could impact on bank performance matrices; however
the focus here is on the effects of these changes on credit availability to the
private sector.
This chapter concludes that most aspects of organisational change in
consolidating Nigerian banks were successful, but a lot more needs to be
done to improve cultural integration and employee motivation. The next
chapter explores the effects of banking consolidation on the availability of
credit to the private sector.
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Chapter 6: Effects of Banking Consolidation on the Credit Availability
to the Private Sector in Nigeria
6.0 Introduction
Following the critical analysis of change management practices in Nigerian
banks in chapter 5, this chapter aims to examine the effects of banking
consolidation on credit availability to the private sector. More specifically, the
static effect, the restructuring effect, the direct effect and the external effect
of consolidation on credit availability are analysed as identified in Berger et
al. (1998). This chapter will also present findings from the series of in-depth
interviews held with officials in Nigerian banks. Findings of these interviews
are then compared to the evidence from secondary data to reflect on the
impact of consolidation on credit availability.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.1 presents the evaluation
framework used and provides the sources of secondary and primary data.
Section 6.2 examines the static effect of consolidation by comparing findings
and analysis of in-depth interviews and secondary data. Section 6.3 analyses
the restructuring effect of consolidation and examines how the change in
focus due to changes in bank size may have affected credit. Section 6.4
discusses the direct effect by examining the difference between a bank’s
lending after consolidation and the lending of another institution of the same
size as the restructured bank that has not undergone a merger or
acquisition. Section 6.5 looks at the external effect of consolidation by
analysing the reactions by other lenders in the business environment to the
changes in competitive conditions resulting from the banking consolidation.
Section 6.6 summarises and concludes the findings of this chapter.
6.1 Evaluation Framework
Berger et al’s. (1998) framework tests the static effect, the restructuring
effect, the direct effect and the external effect of mergers and acquisitions in
the banking industry on credit availability. By examining other non-static
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effects of consolidation, it recognises the influence of the general and
competitive environment on credit. Thus this study adapts this framework to
analyse the effects of banking consolidation on credit availability to the
private sector in Nigeria. The framework is discussed in detail in section 3.6.
Secondary data is collected from the CBN, individual banks and online
reports on the Nigerian banking industry. The secondary data is then
analysed to inform the in-depth face-to-face interviews conducted with
participants from eleven Nigerian banks and a respected financial analyst
(section 5.1).
This chapter contains all secondary data analysis. The time period under
review is 2001-2009, this encompass the 18 months transitional window and
a trajectory of 3 years before the consolidation announcement. However, it is
important to NOTE that for some data sets and years, data was not available
in audited form from the CBN at the time of this analysis, and as a result
such data was not included to avoid issues of validity (for example: audited
data was only available from 2001-2007 for the calculation of concentration
ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index). The first section relates to the
secondary data analysis that was conducted to inform the collection of
primary data in chapter 5, this approach is used to avoid fragmentation.
Secondary data used for analysis in this chapter includes: (i) Gross Loans
and Advances, (ii) Total Deposits, (iii) Gross Total Assets (Appendix 6).
The main issues covered during the interviews include: (i) change in the size
of top 10 banks, (ii) competition in the newly consolidated banking industry,
(iii) factors affecting bank propensity to lend, (iv) deposit and lending rates
in the banking industry, (v) flow of credit to the private sector, (vi) risk
diversification, (vii) changes in lending policies, (viii) the role of other credit
providing institutions in the business environment, and (xi) perceived
challenges in credit performance in the next 18 months (Table 4.1). The next
section examines the static effect of banking consolidation in Nigeria.
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6.2 Static Effect of Banking Consolidation in Nigeria
According to Berger et al. (1998), the static effect is the change in lending
propensities which results from simply combining the balance sheets of the
participating banks into a larger institution with combined characteristics
(raw data used for analysis is contained in Appendix 6). To explore the static
effect in the case of Nigeria, this study deploys a range of analytical tools
including: (i) concentration ratio, (ii) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, (iii) capital
adequacy ratio, (iv) Interest rates spread, and (v) total credit to GDP. These
results will be analysed in the light of evidence from interviews with
managers in Nigerian banks and secondary data.
6.2.1 Concentration Ratio
Concentration ratio measures the total output produced in an industry by a
given number of firms in the industry. Usually concentration ratios are used
to show the extent of market control of the largest firms in the industry and
to illustrate the degree to which an industry is oligopolistic (Lu et al. 2007).
Concentration ratio will be used as a tool to study the impact of consolidation
on the size of big banks in Nigeria. Thus, this study tests the following null
hypothesis.
H0 (CR): There is no difference in the size of assets, deposits, and extended
loans of Top10 Nigerian banks as a result of the consolidation.
Demsetz (1973) and Gort (1969) argue that the cost advantage that gives
rise to increased concentration may be reflected in scale economies or in
downward shifts in positively sloped marginal cost curves, or it may be
reflected in better products which satisfy demand at a lower cost. They
further note that efficiencies can also occur in other ways.
The graph of concentration ratio in Nigerian banking industry shows that
there has been significant change in the size of Nigerian banks during and
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after the consolidation process. In Charts 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 assets, deposits
and extended loans in the top 10 Nigerian banks increased after
consolidation.
Chart 6.1: Nigeria Banking Concentration Ratios Based on Assets
Source: Author Generated (Data from CBN Annual Reports)
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Chart 6.2: Nigeria Banking Concentration Ratios Based on Deposits
Source: Author Generated (Data from CBN Annual Reports)
Chart 6.3: Nigeria Banking Concentration Ratios Based on Extended
Loans
Source: Author Generated (Data from CBN Annual Reports)
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The three charts (6.1-6.3) shown above present a clear trend in the size of
Nigerian banks between 2004-2007 (the horizontal line in charts shown
above represents the time before and after consolidation). It appears that
the size of the top 10 banks increased by assets, deposits and extended
loans year on year after consolidation (remaining banks are other banks not
in the top 10). In comparison to the top 10 banks, results also show that the
business share of remaining banks decreased year on year between 2004-
2007. In all three charts this decrease begins in 2004 and 2005 during the
18 months window for consolidation and is particularly significant post
consolidation in 2006 and 2007. Tables 6.1- 6.6 show statistical tests to
measure differences in mean figures for concentration ratios based on assets,
deposits and extended loans. These tests cover annual data for seven years
and are based on mean differences between each group for each year
analysed, e.g. (Mean Top 5)2002 – (Mean Rest)2002.
Means and T-Test Comparisons of Nigerian Banking Concentration
Ratios Based on Assets Before and After Consolidation
Table 6.1: Group Statistics
(N stands for 5 years before and 2 years banking consolidation)
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
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Table 6.2: Independent Samples Test
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
Means and T-Test Comparisons of Nigerian Banking Concentration
Ratios Based on Deposits Before and After Consolidation
Table 6.3: Group Statistics
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
Table 6.4: Independent Samples Test
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
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Means and T-Test Comparisons of Nigerian Banking Concentration
Ratios Based on Extended Loans Before and After Consolidation
Table 6.5: Group Statistics
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
Table 6.6: Independent Samples Test
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
The mean levels and T-Test statistics for concentration ratios based on
assets, deposits and extended loans in the Tables above, show significant
differences before and after consolidation. The mean yearly differences of top
10 banks-Rest in Tables 6.1, 6.3, and 6.5 are -14.26, -21.94, -30.13 before
and 30.65, 33.20, 16.10 after consolidation. T-Tests in Tables 6.2, 6.4 and
6.6 are significant (t=-3.044, p=0.029), (t=-5.428, p=0.003) and (t=-3.421,
p=0.019) at 5% level. The Mann-Whitney tests are also marginally significant
(u=0, p=0.053), (u=0, p=0.053) and (u=0, p=0.053) at just above the 5%
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level threshold. For both T-Test and Mann-Whiney statistical test, this study
rejects the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the size of top 10
banks as a result of the consolidation at 5% level of significance. It implies
that the consolidation has resulted in a gradual increase in the size of top
end of Nigerian banks. In order to further investigate these findings, results
from Table 6.7 are examined.
Table 6.7: Increase in Bank Size
(Q6: The concentration ratios of the Nigerian banking industry shows that,
top 10 banks have increased in size by assets, deposits and extended loans.
How has this changed your bank’s risk management and other operational
activities?)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership
Banks
Common Interest
Banks
6.1 Improved
Risk Assessment
Parameters
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
(CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI5:M1)
(CI7:M1)
6.2
Standardisation
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
(CO1:M1) (CI3:M2)
6.3 Enterprise
Risk
Management
Systems/Basel
II
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2) (CO1:M1) (CI7:M1)
6.4 Global
Reach/Assess to
International
Credit Markets
(SA1:M1) (CI2:M1)
6.5
Reassessment
of Operational
Activities/
Restructuring
(SA1:M1) (SA2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI5:M1)
6.6 Increased
Obligor Limits
(SA1:M2) (SA2:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI2:M1) (CI5:M1)
(CI7:M1)
6.7 Resize
Target Market
(SA1:M2) (SA2:M1) (CI2:M1) (CI5:M1)
6.8 Improved
Risk
Management
Expertise/
Consumer
Sector
(SA2:M1) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI5:M1)
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Expertise/
Training
6.9 Risk
Management
Tools
(CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI5:M1)
6.10 Other
Issues
(SA1:M2)
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
Mausser and Rosen (2001), Demsetz (1973) and Gort (1969) note that cost
advantages arising from increased concentration may result in downward
shifts in positively sloped marginal cost curves. Isaac (1990 p. 4) argues that
“Consolidation, particularly in-market mergers, will reduce the number of
institutions chasing marginal business and running up the cost of funds. And
it will allow substantial overhead reductions without impairing the ability of
banks to serve their customers properly”. In theory, such economies could
extend until banks reach a fairly modest size when there is no cost
advantage to further expansion (Brown and Medoff 1989). Interestingly,
Table 6.7 shows that increased bank size influenced most banks to improve
their risk management parameters, increase obligor limits, resize target
markets and improve risk management expertise amongst other things.
Typically, increased obligor limits mean that managers have a higher
proportion of capital available to lend, and as a result the capacity to resize
their target market. These opportunities might also necessitate the
reassessment of risk parameters and expertise, which should improve the
cost, quality and quantity of credit available in the short or long run.
There is considerably more activity in the stand alone and common interest
categories in Table 6.7. Evidence in section 5.2 and Table 5.4 indicates that
managers in stand alone banks were proactive and maintained existing
power structures, and as a result are able to quickly implement necessary
upgrades. While managers involved in mergers in common interest banks,
developed new power structures and tried to integrate their people and
systems as a matter of necessity. Compared to the common interest banks,
managers in common ownership banks brought people and systems together
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from banks that were owned by the same management teams, and thus able
to adopt existing practices.
Aside from the downward shift in marginal cost achievable from actions
examined above, evidence in Table 6.7 show that more managers across
categories of consolidating banks improved their risk assessment
parameters. Non-performing loans in the Nigerian banking industry increased
from N101 billion in 1999 to N187 billion in 2002, and reached a high of
N306 billion in 2004. Furthermore, non-performing loans as a proportion of
total loans and advances averaged 20.3, this ratio is considered to be very
high when compared to a ratio of between 8-10 per cent widely accepted
international standard (Otu 2005). Thus, the focus on improved risk
assessment parameters is uniquely important given the context of Nigerian
banks. To check the deterioration of bank assets, managers are required to
review their credit portfolio periodically with a view to identify any defects in
quality and reclassify them accordingly. Evidence in this section supports the
consolidation experience and could positively impact on the quality of loans
from Nigerian banks.
6.2.2 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index makes use of information on every firm in an
industry, and measures the size of firms in relation to the industry and an
indicator of the amount of competition among them (Lu et al. 2007). In
examining the nature of competition in the Nigerian banking industry, this
study will test the following null hypothesis.
H0 (HHI): There has been no change in competition amongst Nigerian banks,
between 2001-2007.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used to test the degree of competition in the
Nigerian banking industry before and after the consolidation. Lu et al. (2007)
(in the case of China’s Banking Industry) has identified benchmarks for
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standard HH Index in Table 6.8, while Table 6.9 shows Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index of Nigerian Banks:
Table 6.8: Benchmarks for Standard Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
When banking sector is in a state of
competition
HHI will be under 1
When banking sector is in a state of
decreased competition
HHI is nearer 1
Source: Lu et al. (2007)
Table 6.9: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of Nigerian Banks
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
HHI for
Assets
0.055 0.053 0.052 0.050 0.054 0.079 0.079
HHI for
Extended
Loans
0.035 0.039 0.032 0.039 0.048 0.064 0.077
HHI for
Bank
Deposits
0.057 0.057 0.046 0.050 0.056 0.086 0.080
Source: Author Generated (Data from CBN Annual Reports)
Table 6.9 reports the HH Index for banks in Nigeria based on assets, deposits
and extended loans between 2001-2007. The first row gives detail of HH
Index based on assets, and shows HH Index increased to 0.079 in 2006 and
2007 respectively. The second row presents HH Index based on extended
loans, and shows HH Index increased to 0.064 in 2006 and 0.077 in 2007
respectively. The last row highlights HH Index based on deposits, and shows
HH Index increased to 0.086 in 2006 and 0.080 in 2007 respectively.
Based on the HH Index benchmarks identified by Lu et al. (2007) and
presented in Table 6.8 the increase in values above between 2006-2007 are
insignificant, as the Nigerian banking sector appears to be in the state of
competition before and after consolidation. The HH Index values for assets,
deposits and extended loans remain well below the benchmark value of 1,
which suggests that the Nigerian banking industry witnessed a high degree of
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competition throughout the period under review. Furthermore, evidence from
the interviews presents the general perception about competition within the
professionals in the banking industry in Nigeria. For example, a senior
manager (CI1:M1) claimed that:
“Banks are now able to do business they were unable to do before.
If there were two or three banks lending to Coca Cola Plc, now
even more banks could go for Coca Cola. There is also
development of new areas like mortgages, consumer finance, credit
cards……..you see all these are areas that banks are competing to
get a niche”.
In support of the argument presented above, a senior manager (SA1:M2)
also notes that:
“There became almost a level playing field, and that is where the
competition then came, because customers all of a sudden
realised they could be choosy. Out of these 24 banks customers
were almost certain that their money was safe. As a result safety
was no longer an issue. I then go for pricing. So for customers
who were bringing deposits they were asking for ridiculous
interest rates on their deposits, so banks had to increase the
interest rates. For all of us as well, because now we had such
huge capital and didn’t know what to do with it, we then had to
lend. We were almost literally throwing money at people to say
come and borrow, and because we were almost literally throwing
money to people. They are saying guess what: I wouldn’t borrow
at a high rate because if you don’t lend me I will go to another
bank. So in my own opinion, competition became stiff after the
consolidation”.
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The reasons offered by interview respondents to explain the state of
competition are: increased capacity to raise capital, development of new
products, improved expertise, better technology, resized target markets and
ease of comparison for borrowers resulting from reduced information search
costs. Interestingly, the explanations above indicate that increased capacity
of banks was the most important factor driving competition in Nigeria. Aside
from resizing target markets, customers could now choose from a variety of
products from safe banks. Customers with good risk ratings were able to
further negotiate rates as this category of borrowers was highly sought after
by banks. Skilled staff was in high demand, as banks could afford to source
for expertise locally and globally. Superior technology was deployed by banks
to enhance capacity and service to customers; for example Standard
Chartered Bank and First City Monument Bank introduced new Personal
Instalment Loans for working professional with a turn around time of 48
hours (SCB 2010; FCMB 2010). This is impressive when compared to the
minimum 7 days generally required for loan approvals in the Nigerian
banking industry. The combination of these factors and the drive to gain
market share by newly consolidated banks led to increased competition in
the banking industry.
These claims are consistent with the data analysis presented in Table 6.9.
The calculations based on Herfindahl-Hirschman Index show that the
Nigerian banking industry remained competitive before and after
consolidation. Based on the results presented in this section, this study is
unable to reject the null hypothesis that there is no change in competition
amongst Nigerian banks between 2001-2007.
6.2.3 Capital Adequacy Ratios
Capital adequacy ratios involve measuring two types of capital: tier one
capital, which can absorb losses without necessitating a bank to cease
trading, and tier two capital, which can absorb losses in the event of a
winding-up thus provides a lesser degree of protection to depositors (Hsu et
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al. 2007). This section evaluates the capital adequacy ratios of Nigerian
banking industry and tests the following null hypothesis.
H0 (CAR): There is no change in the capital adequacy ratios of banks in
Nigeria as a result of consolidation.
Ediz et al. (1998) state that the Basel Capital Accord obliges banks to
maintain equity and quasi-equity funding equal to a risk-weighted proportion
of their asset base. This is enforced as a model for capital regulation of the
banking system by local authorities in both developed and developing
economies, and has been adopted in more than 100 countries including
Nigeria (Arua 2006). The Basel Capital Accord assigns 8 percent as a
generally acceptable capital adequacy ratio and a risk rate of 50 percent to
residential mortgages (Hsu et al. 2007). Table 6.10 reports the capital
adequacy ratios of the Nigerian banking industry between 2002-2008.
Table 6.10: Capital Adequacy Ratios for Nigerian Banking Industry
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capital
Adequacy
Ratios
18.12 17.9 14.17 17.83 22.6 20.9 21.9
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
The banking industry in Nigeria has maintained capital adequacy ratios in
double digits since 2002, which is significantly above the 8 percent Basel
Capital Accord requirement. Notably the ratio was highest in 2006 (22.6%),
the period immediately after consolidation. This shows the soundness of
Nigerian banks, while on the other hand very high capital adequacy ratios
can reflect the very conservative attitude of banks to lending. Jones (2010)
argues that banks could maintain high capital ratios to guard against
currency fluctuation (Omotoye 2006 highlights unpredictable currency
fluctuations in Nigeria) and changes in capital regulation. In general, this
provides some evidence on the ability of Nigerian banks to contain systemic
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risks and implies that the banking industry is in a healthy state. Tables 6.11
and 6.12 show statistical tests to measure difference of mean in the capital
adequacy ratios of Nigerian banks before and after consolidation.
Means and T-Test Comparisons of Capital Adequacy Ratios Before
and After Banking Consolidation in Nigeria
Table 6.11: Group Statistics
(N stands for 4 years before and 3 years after banking consolidation)
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
Table 6.12: Independent Samples Test
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
The mean levels of capital adequacy ratios in Table 6.11 show significant
increase after consolidation at 21.8000 from 17.0050. T-test in Table 6.12 is
significant (t=-4.016, p=0.010) at 1% level, while the Mann-Whitney test is
also significant (u=0, p=0.034) at 5% level. In the light of these findings this
study rejects the null hypothesis that there is no change in the capital
adequacy ratios of banks in Nigeria as a result of consolidation. Theoretically,
these high levels of capital adequacy in the Nigerian banking industry should
provide incentives for managers to lend or at least not be a hindrance. To
further examine this, Table 6.13 presents results of in-depth interviews.
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Table 6.13: Bank Propensity to Lend
(Q9: What are the key factors that affect your propensity to lend?)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership
Banks
Common Interest
Banks
9.1 Customer
Risk Analysis/
Understanding
the Business/
Return On
Investment
(SA1:M2) (SA2:M1) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI3:M2)
9.2 Adequate
Levels of Capital
adequacy
(SA1:M1) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI3:M1)
9.3 Projections
of the Business
Environment/
Market
Segments/
Analysis of
Trends
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
(CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI7:M1)
9.4 Overall
Enterprise Risk
Management/
Risk Appetite
(SA1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI5:M1)
9.5 Level of
Liquidity/Loan to
Deposit Ratio of
80%
(SA1:M1) (SA2:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI5:M1) (CI7:M1)
9.6 The Obligor
Rule
(CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
9.7 Risk
Management
Expertise
(CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
9.8 Risk
Management
Tools/Risk
Management
Infrastructure
(CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI5:M1)
9.9 Other Issues (CI3:M1)
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
It appears that capital adequacy has a high impact on lending decisions as
suggested by seven bank managers, but was not the most prominent factor.
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The results presented in Table 6.13 indicates that levels of liquidity and loan
to deposit ratio of 80% were the most prominent factors influencing
propensity to lend across categories of consolidating banks. This implies that
lending decisions are significantly influenced by the level of capital available
to banks. However, when an increasing share of deposits is sourced from the
general public, banks are forced to pay market rates for funds used in
multiperiod lending (Resti 1997). This could result in bank loans being less
feasible if market rates are unstable or if bank loans lose competitive
advantage over securities. Secondly, the regulatory requirement of 80% loan
to deposit ratio is explained by a senior manager (CI1:M1) who notes that:
“There are regulatory constraints; by regulation a Nigerian bank
is not supposed to lend more than 80% of its deposits”.
This view is corroborated by the respected financial analyst (P1:M1) who
states that:
“The 80% loan to deposit ratio is a key factor in bank lending
decisions, however the ability to attract deposits enhances bank
propensity to lend”.
These statements explain the effect of regulatory constrains on bank
propensity to lend. It is observed that the CBN expects the loan to deposit
ratio of 80% to provide banks with a safety net, while the ability to mobilise
deposits and create performing loans is influenced by bank capital adequacy
levels. Singer (2004) asserts that capital provides banks with cushion against
losses that result from borrower default or changes in asset prices. Adequate
capital ratios are necessary for stability, and this provides managers with a
favourable environment to attract deposits. This suggests a direct
relationship between capital adequacy and levels of liquidity, as deposits can
only be generated when depositors perceive banks to be stable and able to
accommodate shocks. Having found from the data analysis that there are
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better capital adequacy ratios in Nigerian banks after consolidation, the wider
implications are that adequate capital ratios have helped banks’ ability to
absorb shocks, improve their risk perception, and attract deposits. Even
though the main driver for lending activities was the level of liquidity
mobilised by banks, these findings are consistent with the views of Singer
(2004) that adequate capital ratios help attract deposits and a higher level of
deposits provides the banks with a bigger pot to divide between loans and
preserving liquidity.
In addition, projections of business environment identified by eight managers
as key in lending decisions could be out with the control of banks. As such
banks would have to contend with these factors along side liquidity levels in
their lending decisions.
6.2.4 Interest Rate Spread
CBN (2005) proclaimed that by consolidating the Nigerian banking industry
the CBN aimed to encourage competition with the goal of lowering interest
rates and providing cheap credit to the economy. According to Laeven and
Majnoni (2003), regulatory characteristics such as whether CBN imposes
liquidity requirements, whether banks are allowed to engage in non-bank
financial activities (for example: mortgages, insurance etc), and the degree
of entry into banking influence prevailing competitiveness and by extension
the level of bank lending spreads. In order to examine the effects of
consolidation on the pricing of credit in Nigeria, this study will test the
following null hypothesis.
H0 (IRS): There is no difference in the average spread between deposit and
lending rates from 2002-2009 in the Nigerian banking industry.
Chart 6.4 shows a slight reduction in spread between savings and lending
rates year on year after the consolidation.
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Chart 6.4: Deposit and Lending Rates in the Nigerian Banking
Industry
Source: Author Generated (Data from CBN Annual Reports)
Lewis and Stein (1997) note that credit expanded to the public and private
sectors in Nigeria by 110% in the mid 1990s, resulting in a sharp reduction
in spread over the same period and after. This explains why rates begin to
decrease before consolidation in 2002 and 2003, and this downward trend
continues until 2008. Even though the reduction after consolidation is very
minimal, this pattern is a possible indication that consolidation resulted in
more competition, reduced cost structures, effective regulation, and
improved efficiency. In support of this view, Gambacorta (2008) argues that
aside from regulatory requirements, bank interest rate spreads can only
reduce when competition is high or efficiency levels improve (for example:
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lower cost, reduction of bad loans) within the industry. These factors are
further examined in the interviews with senior bank managers in Table 6.16.
Tables 6.14 and 6.15 show statistical tests to measure the difference in
means in the spread between deposit and lending rates before and after
consolidation.
Means and T-Test Comparisons of Spreads Before and After Banking
Consolidation in Nigeria
Table 6. 14: Group Statistics
(N stands for 16 quarterly figures 4 years before and 4 years after banking
consolidation)
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
Table 6. 15: Independent Samples Test
Source: Author Generated Based on CBN Data
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The mean levels of spreads in Table 6.14 show significant reduction after
consolidation at 16.5150 from 18.7669. T-Test in Table 6.15 is marginally
significant (t=1.930, p=0.063) at just above the 5% level threshold, while
the more robust Mann-Whitney test shows reasonable evidence of
significance at (u=69.000, p=0.026) below the 5% level threshold. In the
light of T-Test and Mann-Whiney tests, this study rejects the null hypothesis
that there is no difference in average spread between deposit and lending
rates from 2002-2009 in the Nigerian banking industry at 5% level. Table
6.16 presents response of senior managers on the spread between deposit
and lending rates.
Table 6.16: Reduction in Spread between Deposit and Lending Rates
(Q10: My analysis shows a slight reduction in the spread between deposit
and lending rates in Nigeria. What specifically do you think has influenced
this?)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership Banks
Common Interest
Banks
10.1 CBN
Regulation
(SA1:M2) (SA2:M1) (CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI5:M1),
(CI7:M1)
10.2 Interaction
between
Demand and
Supply/
Competition
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
(CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1),
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2),
(CI5:M1)
10.3 Other
Issues
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
During the interviews, reasons provided by respondents to explain the
reduction in spread, show an almost even split. Seven senior managers in
Table 6.16 identified CBN regulation as the primary cause, while nine senior
managers claimed that interaction between demand and supply/competition
led to the reduced spread. A more detailed examination of the table
presented above indicates that the reduced spread was achieved through a
combination of CBN regulation and competition. To support this view, as
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many as five senior managers in Table 6.16 highlighted both CBN regulation
and competition as factors responsible for the reduced spread.
Following on from the analysis presented in section 6.2.2, increased
competition seems to have a direct impact on the reduction of interest rate
spread. This trend is expected to continue if policy instruments deployed by
the CBN encourage less monopolistic or oligopolistic tendencies in the
Nigerian banking industry. This further underscores the fact that CBN
regulation is an important determinant of the level of competition and by
extension the spread between deposit and lending rates, and is consistent
with Laeven and Majnoni’s (2003) claim that regulatory characteristics could
significantly influence banking spread.
6.2.5 Total Credit to GDP
This section will compare the growth in total credit figures to GDP (Gross
Domestic Product) from the Nigerian banking system to the private sector
between 2001-2008. Providing credit to finance investment and consumption
is a major function of the banking system (Imala 2005). In order to examine
the flow of credit to the private sector in Nigeria, this study will test the
following null hypothesis.
H0 (TC2GDP): There is no difference in the flow of credit to the private
sector, as a result of the Nigerian banking consolidation.
Table 6.17 and Chart 6.5 shows credit and GDP growth in Nigeria between
2001-2008.
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Table 6.17: Credit and GDP Growth in Nigeria
(in percentage)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Growth in Bank
Credit to Private
Sector
43.5 19.7 27.1 26.6 30.8 32.1 90.8 59.4
Growth in Real
GDP
4.6 3.5 10.2 6.5 6.5 6 6.5 6.4
Source: Author Generated (Data from CBN Annual Reports)
Chart 6.5: Credit and GDP Growth in Nigeria
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In the pre-consolidation period there was no significant change in credit
figures. However, the flow of bank credit increased and was notably higher
than GDP post-consolidation. This shows that the total flow of credit to the
private sector has increased after consolidation. Based on this observation,
this study rejects the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the flow of
credit to the private sector, as a result of banking consolidation in Nigeria.
Most respondents interviewed claimed that credit was more readily available
after banking consolidation. The reasons offered by respondents to explain
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this, include increased liquidity, higher obligor limits, opportunities in lending
to consumer sector, increased international visibility of Nigerian banks, public
private sector partnership, and improved macro economic environment. This
is consistent with the views of the respected financial analyst (P1:M1) who
states that:
“There is no doubt that more credit has been available to the
Nigerian economy post consolidation……..but the problem
emerges when we analyse these figures by segments to ascertain
who gets what. For example: the SME segment which the CBN
expected to form the main engine of growth in the Nigerian
economy does not seem to have attracted sufficient credit”.
In support of the argument presented above, a senior manager (CI2:M1)
also claims that:
“Yes the private sector benefited……I mean companies. The SME
segment even though part of the private sector did not benefit
much, because people were still sceptical and the regulations
did not make it worthwhile for banks to go in and lend to the
SME segment…….But the corporate and individual segments
benefited immensely”.
Evidence from the interviews suggests that, although credit flow increased
after consolidation, the SME segment did not get its fair share of credit. This
segment looked unattractive to banks because it was characterised by lack of
infrastructure (i.e. transportation, power and water), poor credit history and
weak regulatory frameworks (Balogun 2007). These findings are confirmed in
Table 6.18 and Chart 6.6 which highlights the sources of SME funding in
Nigeria and Malaysia in 2008.
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Table 6.18: Sources of SME Funding in Nigeria in 2008
Percentage of Financing from: Total Small Medium Large
Own funds/Retained earnings 70% 70% 71% 61%
Borrowed from Banks and other
financial institutions (such as Micro
finance firms, Loan sharks etc)
1% 1% 2% 2%
Purchases on credit from suppliers and
advances from customers
25% 25% 25% 35%
Borrowed from family, friends and other
informal sources
4% 4% 2% 1%
Source: World Bank (2008)
(some totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding errors)
Chart 6.6: Sources of SME Funding in Malaysia in 2008
Source: Alhabshi et al. (2009)
A total of 1% SME financing from banks and other financial institutions in
Nigeria in 2008 is especially low, compared to 65% in Malaysia over the
same period. Commercial banks and financial institutions in Nigeria prefer
lending to the retail and corporate segments, which generally have shorter
turnaround times, and can pay back debts more quickly than SMEs (Isern et
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al. 2009). Interestingly, the CBN identified improved credit to SMEs as one of
the primary objectives of consolidation. These findings clearly indicate that
the CBN and by extension Nigerian banks experienced some difficulties in
meeting this objective, because most factors such as poor credit history, lack
of infrastructure (i.e. transportation, power and water), and weak regulatory
frameworks (Balogun 2007) that make the SME segment unattractive were
not addressed in the first instance. Therefore, the SME segment may remain
globally uncompetitive and unable to attract sufficient credit unless these
factors are addressed. This finding is troubling and highlights the need to
reappraise the benefits of consolidation by policy makers in Nigeria, who
claim that the consolidation would increase credit to the SME segment.
Events in the SME segment are further examined in the subsequent sections
of this study. The next section highlights restructuring effect of consolidation
in Nigeria.
6.3 Restructuring Effect of Banking Consolidation in Nigeria
The “Restructuring effect” identifies the change in lending that follows from
decisions to restructure the institution in terms of its size, financial
characteristics, and local market competitive position (Berger et al. 1998).
Basically these effects are established by examining the change in focus as a
result of restructuring. Table 6.19 shows the significance of restructuring
effects in the case of Nigerian banks.
Table 6.19: Restructuring Effects
(Q12: What have been the most prominent effects of restructuring on your
bank’s risk diversification and lending policies?)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership Banks
Common Interest
Banks
12.1 Market
Segmentation/
Creation of
Subsidiaries
(SA1:M1) (SA2:M1) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI7:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI4:M1)
12.2 New
Markets/New
Product Offering
(SA1:M2) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI4:M1) (CI7:M1)
(CI5:M1)
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12.3
Management
Tools/Software
(CI2:M1)
12.4
International
Operations
(SA1:M2) (SA2:M1) (CI2:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI4:M1)
12.5 Other
Issues
(SA1:M1) (CI4:M1)
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
Results in Table 6.19 show that managers identified market segmentation/
creation of subsidiaries, new markets/new product offering, and international
operations as the most prominent features of restructuring in Nigerian banks.
To achieve this, they established local and international subsidiaries to
provide services to various market segments. These subsidiaries may be
associated with several generic firm-specific development and diffusion
processes in their value-creating activities. To explain this, Rugman and
Verbeke (2001) developed a framework to assess patterns of competence
building in subsidiaries and multinational enterprise. They note that;
nonlocation-bound firm-specific advantages, location-bound firm-specific
advantages, and subsidiary specific advantages are three critical types of
knowledge bundles which multi-subsidiary and multi-national enterprise
networks greatly benefits from the systemic investigation of firm-specific
advantage development and diffusion processes. The creation of specialized
new products tailored to meet the needs of these segments (both local and
international) underlines the necessity of including a complete set of
processes in new product development. Furthermore, employees acquire the
expertise required for process differentiation to enable new product
development and therefore increase process productivity (Li and Calantone
1998). For example: the opening of GTHomes Limited a local subsidiary of
Guaranty Trust Bank, which specializes in providing mortgages.
In terms of size, financial characteristics and market position, it appears that
restructuring provided banks with the capacity to further explore
opportunities in local and international markets. Respondents note that
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consolidation has improved the visibility and rating of Nigerian banks
globally. For example: in March 2007 a United Bank for Africa (UBA) office
was opened in London. UBA hoped to take advantage of opportunities in the
global financial environment. In support of this view, a senior manager
(SA2:M1) notes that:
“Now you have Nigerian banks pitching and setting up offices
or banks for that matter in the United Kingdom and United
States, because from a Nigerian perspective the corridors of
trade were basically the United Kingdom and the United States.
In recent times its moving to China, India and Dubai…….all of a
sudden we find banks that could go to those countries that did
not have embargos on foreign banks coming in. Other banks
that could not go outside Africa started expanding within
Africa”.
The respected financial analyst (P1:M1) also notes that:
“The increased size of Nigerian banks after consolidation, meant
that foreign banks and international credit instructions were
more comfortable in providing credit lines to them”.
Interestingly, global visibility and increased size made foreign banks more
comfortable in providing credit to their Nigerian counterparts, for example
the loan granted to First City Monument Bank by the International Finance
Corporation (FCMB 2010). Banks were now in a better position to attract
credit lines and compete for business on the international stage, and as a
result more banks expanded operations outside Nigeria after consolidation.
Enhanced capacity and ability to attract foreign investment (credit line) are
beneficial to the Nigerian economy (increased credit availability to the private
sector) and possibly to other economies where Nigerian banks operate.
However, funds available for loan to the Nigerian private sector could
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decrease because of short run costs of setting up international operations,
restrictions on the outflow of capital from investee nations, and possible
lending to international borrowers by Nigerian banks.
As established in section 6.2.1, consolidation resulted in the increased size of
banks by assets, deposits and extended loans. Amongst other requirements
consolidation necessitated banks to shore up their capital base from N2
billion to N25 billion, through the injection of fresh funds. The risk of bigger
banks concentrating risk assets in one segment led banks to focus on risk
diversification and product segmentation. To affirm this, a senior manager
(CI3:M1) notes that:
“One way to diversify risk is to do more than just banking; almost
every bank that consolidated has either associated companies or
subsidiaries in insurance, pension management services,
custodian services, brokerage companies, asset management,
investment arms, mortgages and so on. Of course that was
supposed to diversify the earning sources of the banks. We also
knew that we needed to be more balanced in our lending, you
couldn’t say you are playing niche and concentrate all you efforts
in one area………so there were portfolio limits using best practice
to help diversify the lending and its associated risks. If not for
that there were sectors of the economy that were in serious boom
and everybody rushed there………….but if there were not limits
and we did all our lending just on those areas…..it would have
been terrible”.
According to UBA (2010), most market segments were served through
departments within Standard Trust Bank and United Bank of Africa (now
merged as United Bank for Africa) before consolidation. However,
consolidation resulted in significant structural changes particularly in the
development of subsidiaries. The UBA group currently consists of several
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subsidiaries and associated companies which include; UBA Capital Africa,
UBA Trustees Limited, UBA Pensions Custodian Limited, UBA Asset
Management Limited, UBA Stockbrokers Limited, UBA Registrars Limited,
UBA New York, and UBA Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Limited (UBA,
2010). This trend is similar in FINBank (a merger of First Atlantic Bank,
Inland Bank, International Merchant Bank and Nigerian Universal Bank)
where subsidiaries developed after consolidation include; FINBank Security
and Asset Management, FINBank Registrar, FINBank Capital Limited,
FINBank Insurance Company Limited, FINBank Insurance Brokers Limited,
and FINBank Homes Limited (FINBank 2010). Evidence from the interviews
reveals that risk diversification measures resulted in more balanced approach
to portfolio management after consolidation. Eight managers in Table 6.19
state that the creation of subsidiaries led banks to set portfolio limits for
various market segments. For example: UBA (2010) notes that N30 billion
was set as the portfolio limit for its asset management company. The quest
to create more balanced and diversified risk assets influenced bigger banks
to further implement universal banking principles and focus on other non
core banking segments.
Even though these actions could crowd out credit that would have been
available to SMEs, it is generally expected by the CBN that the changes in
focus means credit will be available to other segments of the Nigerian
economy, which might have been previously neglected. This is further
illustrated by a senior manager (CI1:M1) who states that:
“I may say that the larger capital has helped banks including
Diamond Bank, to provide banking services in areas that were
ignored before now…….because there is an enhancement of our
single obligor limit. So we can do big ticket long term projects in
oil and telecoms, and offer products to the consumer segment for
example mortgages”.
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Diamond Bank is now able to extend credit to segments previously out of the
bank’s reach, where considerable capital and longer term funds are required.
This indicates that increased capital base as a result of consolidation provided
the bank with the capacity to enter new markets and provide customers with
a wider range of products. These include the execution of big ticket
transactions in oil and telecoms and new product offerings in the consumer
segment where improved macroeconomic environment created an emergent
middle class.
The analysis presented in this section establishes market segmentation,
resized target market and international operations as the dominant
restructuring effects in Nigeria. These changes are associated with changes
in the bank’s size, financial condition and competitive position. They also
make clear the implication for credit availability to the private sector, as
market segmentation means credit is channelled to segments previously
ignored, resized target market implies that banks can handle big ticket and
longer term lending in the corporate and consumer sectors, while
international operations creates a better environment to attract credit and
lend on the international stage.
6.4 Direct Effect of Banking Consolidation in Nigeria
Berger et al. (1998) note that the direct effect is the difference between a
bank’s lending after a merger or acquisition and the lending of another
institution of the same size, financial condition, local market competitive
position, and economic environment as the restructured bank that has not
undergone a merger and/or acquisition. To analyse the direct effect in the
case of Nigeria, this study examines the difference in lending in the newly
formed big banks from the traditional big banks. Managers from traditional
big banks and newly formed big banks were interviewed to establish the
changes in practice brought about by the newly formed big banks. Results of
in-depth interviews are shown in Table 6.20.
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Table 6.20: Direct Effects
(Q13: How would you characterise the key drivers of lending performance in
the newly consolidated banking sector?)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership Banks
Common Interest
Banks
13.1 Proactive
lending
activity/Policies
& Requirements
(SA1:M2) (SA2:M1) (CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI5:M1) (CI7:M1)
13.2 Increased
Lending
Capacity
(SA1:M1) (SA2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI5:M1)
13.3 Improved
Control
Mechanisms/
Technology
Infrastructure
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI5:M1) (CI7:M1)
(CI2:M1)
13.4 Focus on
Consumer
Segment
Lending
(SA2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI5:M1)
13.5 Increased
Application of
Corporate
Governance
Requirements
(CI1:M1) (CI3:M1)
13.6 Increased
Risk
Management
Expertise
(SA2:M1) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI3:M2) (CI5:M1)
13.7 Other
Issues
(CO2:M1)
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
Table 6.20 identifies proactive lending activity, increased lending capacity,
improved control mechanisms/technology infrastructure, focus on consumer
segment lending, and increased risk management expertise as the most
evident differences of the newly formed big banks from the traditional big
banks. Strategies of proactive responsiveness to the uncertainties at the
interface between banks and their business environment as demonstrated by
newly formed big banks, may be associated with the emergence of unique
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organisational capabilities. Thus, proactive strategies predicated on
developing organisational capabilities that can provide sustained competitive
advantage may indeed be an important emergent competitive domain to
which newly formed big banks should pay heed.
Increased capacities (larger capital) meant that new big banks were sitting
on large pools of funds. Furthermore, control mechanisms, risk management
expertise and technological infrastructure were upgraded to accommodate
changes in strategy. For example: superior risk management expertise and
technological infrastructure was deployed as Platinum-Habib Bank introduced
trade and finance business credit and e-powered Naira credit cards, both
equipped to provide diverse funding alternatives (PHB 2010). The variance
identified in lending policies is further examined through interviews with
senior managers. A senior manager (SA1:M2) interviewed states that:
“Traditionally the old big banks were conservative, they were
sometimes not as fast with responses……..and then the new big
banks are coming with cutting edge technology, with better
responsive management style……so clearly there are differences.
Whereas the old big banks will take forever to take decision in terms
of big ticket lending transactions, the new big banks are more
responsive……you have more involvement of top management. I
mean you see CEOs of new big banks closing deals, so I think that
the management style clearly influences lending”.
In support of this view, a senior manager (CO1:M1) notes that:
“The new big banks are much more bullish on risk, they are much
more robust in terms of their risk management practices. Of course
they are more efficient in terms of timing; they can start and finish a
credit transaction in a week, unlike an old big bank that might take
three months to do that…..really that’s the difference. The new big
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banks are the ones that want to go for world class talent to manage
their risk assets”.
Evidence from the interviews reveals that traditional big banks were
characterised by reactive lending strategies and required longer turn around
time on credit transactions. Respondents claimed that newly formed big
banks with increased lending capacities implemented proactive lending
strategies. According to the respected financial analyst (P1:M1), lending in
traditional big banks was characterised by crippling bureaucracy, while new
big banks focused on eliminating unnecessary processes to improve their
performance and efficiency.
The focus on lending to consumer segments and big ticket transactions by
banks identified above suggest limited benefits for the SME segment and this
generates a significant policy debate. Proactive measures of new big banks
should create efficiencies, improve customer service, drive competition, and
scale-up credit to the Nigerian economy (Gambacorta 2008). These represent
significant difference in pre and post banking consolidation in Nigeria and can
be identified as direct effects of the consolidation process.
The CBN expects traditional big banks to respond to threats posed by new
big banks and hopefully by doing this, create an environment where the
customer wins. Generally, this scenario is positive and complements gains
captured in the static effects section (section 6.2). However, only two
managers in Table 6.20 identified increased application of corporate
governance requirements as a feature in the newly consolidated banking
industry, even though Imala (2005) highlights the non-compliance with
regulatory requirements, inaccurate reporting, gross insider abuse which
resulted in huge numbers of non-performing loans in Nigerian banks pre-
consolidation (section 2.3). Amao and Amaeshi (2008) argue that improved
corporate governance would give shareholders the ability to hold
management to account, and as a result encourage prudent practices. The
240
Nigerian banking industry may still be characterised by weak corporate
governance, which could have grave consequences for the quality of loans
produced by banks with adverse effects on systemic stability.
6.5 External Effect of Banking Consolidation in Nigeria
According to Berger et al. (1998) the external effect captures the reactions
by other lenders in the local market to the changes in the competitive
conditions created by banking mergers and acquisitions. Kurfi (2008) argues
that the mobilisation of savings at the local level has been an important
credit delivery channel in developing economies. A typical example is the
model of micro credit developed by Yunus (2007), in which the Grameen
Bank specialises in extending credit to the poorest of the poor who are not
able to obtain loans from traditional banks. In the case of Nigeria the
external effect of consolidation is established by examining the impact of
Micro finance institutions (impact of other mutual societies is insignificant
(CBN 2008)) which operate in the same business environment, on the credit
performance of banks. Jansson (2001) notes that the task of adopting a
single definition of Micro finance is complicated, though various agencies and
ministries, recognise several different definitions of Micro finance
simultaneously. To the extent that supervisory authorities have dealt with
organisations they define as Micro finance institutions by the characteristics
of the loan, (for example the CBN (2008) stipulates that the totality of
business loans granted per individual borrower for micro finance purposes
shall not exceed N500,000, this is in contrast to traditional banks which can
approve any amount), or by the characteristics of the client (for example the
CBN (2008) considers loans for productive purposes to clients with less than
N500,000 in productive assets to be micro finance). Table 6.21 show results
of external effects from in-depth interviews with managers.
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Table 6.21: External Effects
(Q14: What do you think are the key challenges in credit performance of
your bank in the next 18 months?)
Codes Stand Alone Banks Common
Ownership Banks
Common Interest
Banks
14.1 Lack of
infrastructure
14.2 Few Micro
Finance
Institution
(SA1:M2) (SA2:M1) (CO1:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
(CI3:M1) (CI3:M2)
(CI7:M1)
14.3 Low
Capacity/Capital
(SA2:M1) (CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
14.4 High
Administrative
cost
14.5 Relaxed
Risk Assessment
Criteria for
Smaller Credit
Institutions
(SA1:M1) (SA2:M1) (CO1:M1) (CI2:M1)
14.6 Banks
Focus on Big
Ticket
Transactions/
High end of
Consumer
market
(SA1:M1) (SA1:M2)
(SA2:M1)
(CO1:M1) (CO2:M1) (CI2:M1) (CI3:M1)
(CI1:M1)
14.7 Focus on
SMEs
14.8 Higher
Cost of Funds
from Small
Credit
Institutions
(SA2:M1) (CI2:M1)
14.9
Government
Regulations/
Restrictions
(CI1:M1) (CI2:M1)
14.10
Specialisation
(CI5:M1)
14.11 Other
Issues
(CI7:M1)
Source: Author Generated (From interview data)
Eight managers in Table 6.21 claim that the existence of few Micro finance
institutions and bank focus on big ticket transactions make the reaction of
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other lenders insignificant. This suggests that the possibility of other players
(Micro finance institutions) influencing the credit performance of banks is
minimal. Investigating further, senior managers note that banks traditionally
lend to corporate institutions, and are now (after consolidation) able to take
advantage of opportunities in the consumer segment as a result of the
inefficiencies of Micro finance institutions. For example: a senior manager
(SA2:M1) said that:
“There are really not a lot of Micro finance institutions around.
Secondly these Micro finance institutions need to get capacity so
that they can lend money at a reasonable rate and increase their
scale…….the scale at which these institutions are operating is not
large enough to threaten our lending performance”.
Low capacity, high cost of funds and government restrictions highlighted
above indicates that Micro finance institutions regulated by the CBN, face
significant challenges. In support of this view, Isern et al. (2009) state that
Micro finance institutions in Nigeria have been too small to reach efficient
economies of scale. Table 6.22 highlights key indicators of Micro finance
banks.
Table 6.22: Key Indicators of Micro Finance Banks in Nigeria
Indicators 2005 2006 2007 2008
(Equity +
Deposits)/Assets
85% 85% 83% 85%
Loans/Assets 32% 30% 30% 34%
Investments/Assets 50% 53% 49% 44%
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (2008)
These findings suggest that Micro finance institutions were generally
successful at mobilizing deposits, but are less accomplished as lenders. The
low allocation of loans to assets is evident in the 2005-2008 balance sheets
and is indicative of this claim. The comparison of these figures with that of
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Nigerian banks is not required, because this section focuses on the changes
in practices of other lenders as a result of consolidation. Kurfi (2008) believes
that the Nigerian financial industry would benefit from a modification to
banking regulations to better fit the needs of Micro finance institutions, such
as replacing collateral requirements by a need to demonstrate client
creditworthiness and by simplifying reporting requirements. These
modifications would encourage entrance of private commercial banks and
finance companies, thus creating a more diverse Micro finance sector with
greater regulatory and supervisory burden.
The interviews also reveal that banks lend to the high end of the market on
better terms than Micro finance institutions, and as a result are not yet in
direct competition. Interestingly, most respondents suggest that the lower
end of the market is too risky and unstructured for banks to lend to. This is
consistent with the recommendations of Kurfi (2008) on the need for Micro
finance regulators (CBN) to encourage creditworthiness. Furthermore, this
implies that banks will continue to compete at the high end, while small
credit institutions deal with borrowers who do not meet the lending
requirements of banks. It is expected that this trend will hold true as long as
the lower end is characterised by poor credit history and lack of adequate
forms of collateral. For example: a senior manager (CI2:M1) notes that:
“The small credit institutions deal in segments we are probably
not interested in because of the risk; that’s the lower or even
lowest end of the market. Yes, the pricing at the lower end can
compensate, but they are more difficult to manage. Truly, I
don’t see small credit institutions as a direct threat”.
The comments above by a senior manager is confirmed by the respected
financial analyst (P1:M1) who states that:
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“Other small credit providing institutions deal in segments
where banks naturally do not want to do business in. For now,
banks focus on the high end and middle class regular income
earners”.
Evidence from the interviews suggests that banks might not yet be at the
point where their lending performance is greatly influenced by activities of
small credit providing institutions. However, there are clear indications that
the Nigerian economy is on a growth path (Soludo 2007). There could be
greater influence at a point near maturity when Micro finance institutions are
able to scale up in terms of capacity, competences, processes, and target
market segmentation. This is expected, as is true anywhere in the world
where there is development, aggressive competition, and pressure to
increase business (Odoko 2008).
In summary, there is a shift in focus by banks traditionally involved in
lending to corporate institutions. These banks now lend to the high end of
the consumer segment, leaving the lower end deemed too risky for Micro
finance institutions. With consolidation, banks have also increased their
lending to the high end of the consumer sector and by so doing reduced the
volume of lending business normally available to smaller credit providing
institutions. Evidence in this section suggests that the reaction of other
lenders particularly Micro finance institutions is insignificant, because of their
limited number and low capacity. The next section discusses conclusions and
presents a summary of key findings.
6.6 Conclusion and Summary of Key Findings
The analysis in this chapter presents the effects of banking consolidation on
credit availability to the private sector in Nigeria. It adapts Berger et al’s.
(1998) framework and uses in-depth-interviews and secondary data to
examine the static effect, restructuring effect, direct effect and external
effect of consolidation on the availability of credit. The static effect captures
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the balance sheets of the consolidating banks, and the restructuring and
direct effects explores two sources of change in the focus of consolidating
banks. While the external effect highlights the overall impact of consolidation
on the supply of credit (Berger et al. 1998). By examining other non-static
effects of consolidation, this model recognises the influence of the general
and competitive environment on credit. These varied evaluation techniques
present a robust framework for analysing the effects of banking
consolidation.
Concentration ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, capital adequacy ratio,
banking spread, and total credit to GDP are used to test changes in balance
sheet of consolidating banks and level of credit to the private sector. These
static effects show that consolidation has resulted in a general increase in the
size of Nigerian banks. Hamel and Prahalad (1994) note that financial
services firms, traditionally vie for leadership in a set of more or less
common competence areas (for example: Investment management, Risk
management, Financial engineering etc). In the case of Nigeria, most banks
scaled up their risk management and lending activities, which enables and
supports the increased credit to the private sector and a reduction in spread
between deposit and lending rates. However, findings indicate that the SME
segment did not benefit much because of unfavourable lending conditions in
Nigeria. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index values and interviews with
managers show that the banking industry remained competitive before and
after consolidation.
Interestingly, market segmentation, resized target market and international
operations are the most dominant restructuring effects of consolidation in
Nigeria. These factors also have implications for credit availability, as market
segmentation means credit is channelled to segments previously ignored,
resized target market indicates that banks can handle big ticket and longer
term lending in the corporate and consumer segments (growing middle class
as a result of improved macroeconomic environment), while international
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operations creates a better environment to attract credit and lending on the
international stage.
The banking industry was also directly influenced by the emergence of new
big banks, which were characterised by proactive lending strategies and
improved operational activities. It is expected that the proactive measures of
new big banks would create efficiencies, improve customer service, drive
competition and scale-up credit to the Nigerian economy. These represent
significant difference in pre and post banking consolidation in Nigeria and can
be identified as direct effects of the consolidation process.
The external effects of consolidation suggest that the reaction of other
lenders particularly Micro finance institutions is currently insignificant,
because of their limited number and low capacity.
Following on from the analysis in this chapter and the CBN’s expectations of
increased credit to the SME segment after consolidation, this study finds lack
of credit to the SME segment and corporate governance (limited reference to
improved corporate governance by senior managers interviewed) as the most
critical issues in the Nigerian banking industry. The SME segment is
characterised by poor credit history, lack of infrastructure (i.e.
transportation, power and water), and weak regulation (Balogun 2007), and
these conditions make it unprofitable for banks to lend to this segment.
Secondly, poor corporate governance affects the quality of loans granted by
banks, and might lead to huge numbers of non-performing loans or possibly
reduced lending by risk averse managers due to inefficient processes. This
also raises question about the regulatory capabilities of the CBN and the
possibility of a narrowly defined reform agenda.
The modified Berger et al. (1998) framework deployed as a guide for the
analysis in this chapter, is less data intensive and provides an alternative
approach with which to test the effects of banking consolidation on credit
247
availability. The next chapter discusses and corroborates these findings in the
light of financial theory and feedback from a senior manager in the CBN and
a respected financial analyst.
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Chapter 7: Discussion of Findings in the Light of Financial Theory
7.0 Introduction
Following the critical analysis of change management practices in chapter 5
and the effects of consolidation on credit availability to the private sector in
chapter 6, the discussion in this chapter examines the findings in chapters 5
and 6 in relation to the Central Bank of Nigeria’s objectives. Hence, this
chapter explains the consequences of these findings and explores how they
interact with other aspects of the Nigerian economy to support or hinder the
achievement of the expected benefits of banking consolidation.
The CBN’s consolidation drive and the subsequent increase of bank minimum
capital base to N25 billion, necessitated significant structural and operational
changes in the Nigerian banking industry. In a bid to achieve the required
N25 billion, three categories of banks emerged, these are: Stand Alone
banks, Common Ownership banks and Common Interest banks. The key
focus of this chapter is to understand how the varying degrees of structural
and operational reforms implemented by policymakers and bank managers
promote the availability of credit to the private sector in Nigeria. Thus, a
model derived from the literature for incorporating institutional variables into
financial sector reforms in developing economies is deployed.
The structural and operational changes identified in banks also directly or
indirectly impact on the concentration ratios, Herfindahal-Hirschman Index,
capital adequacy ratios, interest rate spread and total credit to GDP in the
Nigerian economy. The analysis of these variables provides valuable
indicators and is linked to the CBN’s overall objective of growing the
economy through increased credit to the private sector. Therefore further
discussion on the effects of these indicators is presented in this chapter.
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7.1 Evaluation Framework
The framework utilised in this chapter is a synthesis of the literature
reviewed in detail in chapter 3, and follows on from the analysis presented in
chapters 5 and 6. Therefore, a conceptual framework for incorporating
institutional variables into financial sector reforms in developing economies is
developed by combining the frameworks of Pettigrew (1988), Peters and
Waterman (1982), Kotter (1998) and Lewin (1951). The combined impact of
these frameworks provides an instrument for integrating all stakeholders in
the implementation of banking consolidation in Nigeria. This conceptual
framework is applied to the three categories of banks in Nigeria, to
determine how structural and operational changes implemented by policy
makers and bank managers (in their bid to meet the CBN’s required N25
billion) directly or indirectly impact on key indicators in the Nigerian
economy. Secondly, the framework highlights the varying performance of
banks in the newly consolidated banking industry.
7.2 Categories of Consolidating Banks
The CBN’s reform agenda had 13 objectives which are highlighted in chapter
2. However the primary research questions of this study focus on two of
these objectives: (i) Requirement that the minimum capitalisation for banks
should be N25 billion with full compliance before end-December 2005, and
(ii) Consolidation of the banking institutions through mergers and
acquisitions. The focus on these two objectives is justified because the CBN
particularly expected increased capital requirements of N25 billion and its
effects on bank structure to stimulate growth in the Nigerian economy (CBN
2005). In support of this view Soludo (2004 p. 1) claimed that consolidation
will create “a diversified, strong and reliable banking sector which will ensure
the safety of depositors money, play active developmental roles in the
Nigerian economy, and be competent and competitive players in the African
regional and global financial system”. Thus, one of the primary objectives of
this study is to critically appraise the effectiveness of key policy instruments
250
and support mechanisms on performance, competition and availability of
credit to the private sector in Nigeria.
Imala (2005) also notes that as at July 2004 the average capital base of
Nigerian banks was US$ 10 million, which was very low compared to banks in
other developing countries like Malaysia where the capital base of the
smallest bank was US$ 526 million. The aggregate capitalisation of the
Nigerian banking system at N311 billion (US$2.4 billion) was low in relation
to the size of the Nigerian economy. In line with the objectives and
arguments above, Nigerian banks raised funds from the capital market and
engaged in mergers or acquisitions, as no bank could meet the CBN’s
minimum capital requirement as at July 2004. These activities simultaneously
led to the reduction in the number of banks from 89 to 24 (Table 2.3), and
the emergence of three categories of banks.
Insights from the Malaysian and Indonesian experience and the review of
literature in chapter 2, show that consolidation reduced the number of banks
and stabilised the banking industry. Typically these countries increased bank
minimum capital requirements, and provided the enabling environment for
mergers and acquisitions. The CBN’s objectives and approach to
consolidation highlighted above, reflects the traditional methods deployed in
emerging markets to resolve issues of fragmented banking industries. Three
categories of Nigerian banks are discussed in the next section.
7.2.1 Stand Alone Banks
Stand Alone banks either through group injection of funds or raising funds
from the capital market, had the capacity to go solo by providing the CBN’s
N25 billion minimum capital requirement. The selection of sample size is
highlighted in section 4.4.1. For the purpose of this study, senior bank
managers from Guaranty Trust Bank and Standard Chartered Bank which fall
into the stand alone category participated in the interviews. Based on the
findings in chapters 5 and 6, this section explores how the transformation of
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banking practices in the stand alone category impacts on key indicators in
the Nigerian economy. Figure 7.1 combines the frameworks of Pettigrew
(1988), Peters and Waterman (1982), Kotter (1998) and Lewin (1951) and
presents a snap shot of all the factors acting upon the transformation of
banking practices in the stand alone category.
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Figure 7.1: Conceptual Framework for Incorporating Institutional
variables into Financial Reforms/Snap shot of Stand Alone Banks
Source: Conceptual Synthesis from Pettigrew (1988), Peters and Waterman
(1982), Kotter (1998), Lewin (1951) and Interviews with Bank Managers.
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Figure 7.1 shows that stand alone banks in Nigeria embarked on numerous
changes in response to the CBN’s consolidation drive. The 18 months window
to consolidate and increase minimum capital to N25 billion was the most
significant context outer driver for change, while the context inner
necessitated banks to embark on some expansion and development of
processes for raising additional capital prior to the CBN’s directive. The
different options available to banks taking additional capital and legal modes
for consolidation are discussed in section 5.3.
Furthermore, this category of banks implemented universal banking
principles, decentralised groups and divisions, re-enforced and upgraded
systems, and enhanced managerial skills due to increased loan size. The
content of change was encouraged through collaboration and employee
support, as stand alone banks did not have to merge or acquire any bank.
Thus, the change process was characterised by the maintenance of existing
power structures and limited changes to culture and systems. The force field
analysis indicates that these banks had strong brands and were successful in
their quest to raise additional capital, even though they experienced
difficulties in filling positions amidst weak control mechanisms. Subsequent
sections in this chapter discuss the implications of these actions in more
detail.
7.2.2 Common Ownership Banks
Common Ownership banks are a group of banks with central ownership,
these banks came together to meet the CBN’s N25 billion minimum capital
requirement after raising funds from the capital market. The selection of
sample size is highlighted in section 4.4.1. For the purpose of this study,
senior bank managers from AfriBank and Intercontinental Bank which fall
into the common ownership category participated in the interviews. Based on
the findings in chapters 5 and 6, this section explores how the transformation
of banking practices in the common ownership category impacts on key
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indicators in the Nigerian economy. Figure 7.2 combines the frameworks of
Pettigrew (1988), Peters and Waterman (1982), Kotter (1998) and Lewin
(1951) and presents a snap shot of all the factors acting upon the
transformation of banking practices in the common ownership category.
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Figure 7.2: Conceptual Framework for Incorporating Institutional
variables into Financial Reforms/Snap shot of Common Ownership
Banks
Source: Conceptual Synthesis from Pettigrew (1988), Peters and Waterman
(1982), Kotter (1998), Lewin (1951) and Interviews with Bank Managers.
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Figure 7.2 shows that common ownership banks in Nigeria embarked on
numerous changes in response to the CBN’s consolidation drive. The 18
months window to consolidate and increase minimum capital to N25 billion
was the most significant context outer driver for change, while the context
inner confirms that no measures were put in place to raise additional capital
or change organisational structures to accommodate growth prior to the
CBN’s directive. The different options available to banks taking additional
capital and legal modes for consolidation are discussed in section 5.3.
Common ownership banks were therefore required to merge with other
banks owned by the same banking group, implement universal banking
principles, decentralised groups and divisions, upgrade and harmonise
systems, and enhanced managerial skills due to increased loan size. The
content of change was more directive and coercive as the need to harmonise
values from merging banks and establish best practice necessitated this
approach. Consequently, the change process was characterised by the
development of new power structures, the implementation of multiple change
projects and major changes to culture and systems. The force field analysis
indicates that these banks had strong brands and were successful in their
quest to raise additional capital, even though they experienced difficulties in
filling positions amidst a struggle for management incentives and job loses.
Subsequent sections in this chapter discuss the implications of these actions
in more detail.
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7.2.3 Common Interest Banks
Common Interest banks are a group of banks with different ownership
structures, after raising funds from the capital market, these banks came
together primarily to meet the CBN’s N25 billion minimum capital
requirement. The selection of sample size is highlighted in section 4.4.1. For
the purpose of this study, senior bank managers from Diamond Bank, First
City Monument Bank, First Bank of Nigeria, First Inland Bank, Platinum-Habib
Bank, and United Bank for Africa which fall into the common interest
category participated in the interviews. Based on the findings in chapters 5
and 6, this section explores how the transformation of banking practices in
the common interest category impacts on key indicators in the Nigerian
economy. Figure 7.3 combines the frameworks of Pettigrew (1988), Peters
and Waterman (1982), Kotter (1998) and Lewin (1951) and presents a snap
shot of all the factors acting upon the transformation of banking practices in
the common interest category.
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Figure 7.3: Conceptual Framework for Incorporating Institutional
variables into Financial Reforms/Snap shot of Common Interest
Banks
Source: Conceptual Synthesis from Pettigrew (1988), Peters and Waterman
(1982), Kotter (1998), Lewin (1951) and Interviews with Bank Managers.
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Figure 7.3 shows that common interest banks in Nigeria embarked on
numerous changes in response to the CBN’s consolidation drive. The 18
months window to consolidate and increase minimum capital to N25 billion
was the most significant context outer driver for change, while the context
inner confirms that no measures were put in place to raise additional capital
or change organisational structures to accommodate growth prior to the
CBN’s directive. The different options available to banks taking additional
capital and legal modes for consolidation are discussed in section 5.3.
Common interest banks were therefore required to merge or acquire other
banks (if strategic and cultural fit is established), implement universal
banking principles, decentralised groups and divisions, upgrade and
harmonise systems, and enhanced managerial skills due to increased loan
size. The content of change was more directive and coercive as the need to
harmonise values from merging banks and establish best practice
necessitated this approach. Consequently, the change process was
characterised by the development of new power structures, the
implementation of multiple change projects and major changes to cultures
and systems. The force field analysis indicates that these banks had strong
brands and were successful in their quest to raise additional capital.
However, they experienced difficulties in finding strategic partners and filling
positions amidst a struggle for management incentives and job loses.
Subsequent sections in this chapter discuss the implications of these actions
in more detail.
7.2.4 Discussion of Similarities and Differences between Categories
of Consolidation Banks
Increased Minimum Capital Base
Managers across categories of consolidating banks focused their strategies to
take advantage of economies of scale and scope, increase efficiency savings
and reduce risk through improved risk management. As new capital
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requirements (N25 billion) and the reduction in the number of banks from 89
to 24 through mergers and acquisitions created bigger banks. This reduction
also led to the emergence of three categories of banks, these are: stand
alone banks, common ownership banks and common interest banks.
Hallowell (1999) argues that consolidators primarily create value through
financing and operational economies. Value is created through financing
when a larger firm is able to access debt at a lower cost, and with fewer
restrictive covenants than can a small firm. While in operations, value is
created through sharing overheads, purchasing economies, use of improved
operating and information systems technologies, superior management
talent, sharing best practices and common branding (Hallowell 1999).
Harrison (1997) notes that operational economies exist when unit increases
in the capacity of the organisation lead to more than proportional increase in
output or decrease in unit costs of service provision. Table 7.1 shows how
the numerous changes by banks discussed in this section impact on the
Nigerian economy.
Table 7.1 Impact of Bank Reforms on the Nigerian Economy
Reforms in
Nigerian Banks
Tool Used to Measure Impact Impact on the Nigerian
Economy
Increased
Minimum Capital
Base
Concentration Ratios Decrease in Monopolistic
Activities (Section 6.2.1)
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Decrease in Monopolistic
Activities (Section 6.2.2)
Capital Adequacy Ratios Stability in Banking
(Section 6.2.3)
Spread in Interest Rates Efficient Allocation of
Credit (Section 6.2.4)
Total Credit to GDP Increased Credit Allocation
to Private Sector
(Section 6.2.5)
Economies of
Scale and Scope
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Decrease in Monopolistic
Activities (Section 6.2.2)
Spread in Interest Rates Efficient Allocation of
Credit (Section 6.2.4)
Total Credit to GDP Increased Credit Allocation
to Private Sector
(Section 6.2.5)
Universal Banking Concentration Ratios Decrease in Monopolistic
Activities (Section 6.2.1)
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Decrease in Monopolistic
Activities (Section 6.2.2)
Spread in Interest Rates Efficient Allocation of
Credit (Section 6.2.4)
Total Credit to GDP Increased Credit Allocation
to Private Sector
(Section 6.2.5)
Increased Market
Share
Concentration Ratios Decrease in Monopolistic
Activities (Section 6.2.1)
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Decrease in Monopolistic
Activities (Section 6.2.2)
Spread in Interest Rates Efficient Allocation of
Credit (Section 6.2.4)
Total Credit to GDP Increased Credit Allocation
to Private Sector
(Section 6.2.5)
Source: Author Generated
Economies of Scale and Scope
Phillips et al. (1998), Harrison (1997), and Bennett (1993) claim that
economies of scale and scope can only be achieved through a critical
threshold of volume, which depends on the interaction of fixed costs with
variable costs across the geographical market of potential demand, which in
turn depends on the level of market penetration. Alternatively, it may be the
case that once a threshold to achieve a critical mass is crossed, the benefits
of further operational economies of scale are small or negative if the
customer perceives the organisation to be too large, too remote, or too
generalised to provide specific needs (Bratton et al. 2003). In this situation,
Jin et al. (2006) note that banks would experience diseconomies of scale as
quantity discounts make little sense when greater coordination costs in
ensuring consistency of standards of service across a widespread network of
branches exists. The arguments presented by Phillips et al. (1998), Harrison
(1997), Bennett (1993) and Bratton et al. (2003) highlight the potential for
resource misallocation in the Nigerian banking industry. Thus, the evolving
structure (after consolidation) of the banking industry will depend on what
categories of banks remain profitable over time. Primarily, profitability will be
determined by the extent that operational economies and cost reductions can
be achieved as Nigerian banks expand their operations. Successful extensive
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cost reductions and increased market share as a result of resized target
markets by consolidated banks, suggests that large diversified banks will
potentially be more profitable than smaller specialised ones.
Universal Banking
Findings in Figure 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 indicate that universal banking was an
important aspect of consolidation. In universal banking, Calomiris (1995)
notes that large banks operate extensive networks of branches, provide
many different services, hold several claims on firms (including equity and
debt), and participate directly in the corporate governance of firms that rely
on the banks for funding or as insurance underwriters. The CBN provided the
enabling regulatory environment and encouraged banks to further implement
universal banking principles by focusing on non-core banking segments
(Soludo 2004). In most cases senior managers implemented universal
banking through subsidiaries with the aim of diversifying risk and earnings.
Paraphrasing a senior manager (CI3:M1); one way to diversify risk is to do
more than just banking; almost every bank that consolidated has either
associated companies or subsidiaries in insurance, pension management
services, custodian services, brokerage companies, asset management,
investment arms, mortgages and so on.
Roe (1990), and Petersen and Rajan (1994) believe that universal banking
can better finance economic growth because it facilitates the financing and
monitoring of small firms and eases their access to the capital markets. In
principle, Roe (1990) states that universal banks can exploit economies of
scope in the provision of financial services by providing these services more
efficiently together. Fama (1985), Sharpe (1990) and Diamond (1991) claim
that, by combining firms in the universal banking environment, banks can
provide their client firms with loans, other diverse financial services, and
private information about competitors on the basis of continuing
relationships. For example: UBA Plc (United Bank for Africa) consists of
several companies currently providing among themselves, a wide range of
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financial services solutions to its diverse clients (UBA 2010). This information
advantage allows banks to help their client firms by mitigating the
information asymmetry problem, by monitoring corporate decisions, and by
reducing the cost of financial distress. However, universal banking has often
been associated with several concerns, particularly involving the universal
bank’s influence on financial stability, systemic risk, economic development,
development of other financial institutions, concentration of political and
economic power, consumer choice, and potential conflicts of interest
(Benston 1994). Francke and Hudson (1984) point out that universal banks
might also consider themselves to be too big to be allowed to fail. Expecting
government bailouts, they might take excessive risk and thus create a moral-
hazard problem as is the case with Lloyds Banking Group and The Royal Bank
of Scotland in the United Kingdom.
In Indonesia, Hall (2005) adopts the Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997)
(FMP) model and an American-style option model to calculate the authorities’
liabilities arising from the provision of depositor protection in form of deposit
insurance. The study shows that the cost of bankruptcy was significantly
higher post universal banking; this is discussed in detail in section 2.2.3. The
establishment of universal banking in Nigeria as a result of consolidation
could extend the government’s safety nets far too broadly, with adverse
consequences for the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). For
example: universal banking could lead banks to stretch their activities and
resources more thinly and increase the possibilities of things going wrong.
This implies that, risk diversification resulting from universal banking could
have multiple effects, with significant implications on bank supervision by the
CBN or credit guarantees by the NDIC. Lins and Servaes (1999) note that
cross-subsidisation between departments of the bank can increase the risk of
the bank and disbenefit depositors. For example: a universal bank might give
bank loans at favourable rates to third-party investors in the understanding
that they will buy securities in the initial public offering (hereafter IPO). In
the universal banking environment, Nigerian banks can more easily benefit
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from misallocating funds, but go on to pass loses to the NDIC. This also
shows that the incentive to control moral hazard is low, if banks have some
control rights in firms where they have equity positions.
Increased Market Share
Soludo (2007) claims that the benefits of consolidation include growth in
assets, deposits, credit, profitability and network of branches in Nigerian
banks. As can be seen in Figure 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, these changes in size also
provided banks with the capacity to grow market share in the local, regional
and international markets (section 6.3). Minhas and Jacobs (1996) note that
financial institutions typically compete in broad markets with numerous
customers that may be geographically dispersed, and seeking a variety of
different service benefits. Young (1999) argues that banks are increasingly
developing marketing strategies that target specific segments which provides
the bank with the greatest opportunity for success. Prospects for sustained
growth will depend on the ability of Nigerian banks to identify opportunities
for differentiation and low cost advantages in new markets. To achieve this,
an understanding of bank features and its influence on the client decision
making process will be key.
Therefore, Nigerian banks will have to tailor their products to meet the
specific needs of customers in new geographic markets. Market tenure can
also help banks increase their market share, as banks have a higher
possibility of increasing market share and profitability if they stay longer in a
particular market (Berger and Dick 2007).
In summary, the economies of scale and scope, implementation of universal
banking, and increased market share were significant effects of the N25
billion minimum capital base requirement in Nigerian banks. These effects
also directly impact on the stability of the banking industry, the efficient
allocation of credit, and the availability of credit in the Nigerian economy.
Primarily, profitability will be determined by the extent that operational
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economies, resized markets and cost reductions are achieved as banks
expand their operations. Combining firms through universal banking could
provide advantages that allow banks to help their client by mitigating the
information asymmetry problem, even though universal banks may consider
themselves too big to fail. Sustained growth will depend on the ability of
Nigerian banks to identify opportunities for differentiation and low cost
advantages in new markets. The next section discusses the consequence of
changes in consolidating banks for the Nigerian economy.
7.3 Consequence of Changes in Consolidating Banks on Credit
Availability to the Private Sector in Nigeria
Rojas-Suarez (2001) argues that the appropriate indicators of credit
performance evolve over time as markets develop, and that given large
differences among emerging markets, a single set of indicators will not fit all
economies. Guidotti (1995), Chiuri et al. (2001), Gregorio and Rojas-Suarez
(2001), Black and Strahan (2002), and Beck et al. (2004) note that market
concentration, competition, stability, efficiency, and direct measurements of
credit availability are effective indicators of credit performance in emerging
market economies. Thus, this study deploys these indicators to discuss the
effects of banking consolidation on credit availability to the private sector in
Nigeria. The discussion in this section is informed by the analysis and
findings presented in chapter 6, on changes in concentration ratios,
Herfindahal-Hirschman Index, capital adequacy ratios, interest rate spread,
and total credit to GDP as a result of consolidation.
7.3.1 Concentration in the Banking Industry
Banking concentration shows how banks in the industry constitute the
content of market structure (Lu et al. 2007). Imala (2005 p. 28) states that
“the aggregate capitalisation of the Nigerian banking system at N311 billion
(US$2.4 billion) is low in relation to the size of the Nigerian economy and in
relation to the capital base of US$688 billion for a single banking group in
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France and US$541 billion for a bank in Germany”. Beck et al. (2000)
observe that in the long-run an expansion of financial services will generate
demand, and therefore lead to an enlargement of the intermediating sector.
The assumption here is that bigger banks and established financial markets
are essential for economic growth and development, even though this is
dependent on the right economic model and the effective use of regulatory
and institutional frameworks. It is based on this fundamental belief of the
causal relationship between financial markets and economic growth that the
CBN deployed consolidation in 2004-2006.
However, there are conflicting views on the relationship between banking
concentration and economic growth. One of these views suggest that
concentrated banking systems with fewer banks are less prone to financial
crisis than banking systems with many banks and low concentration (Chang
et al. 2008). Chang et al. (2008) argue that the higher market power of
banks as a result of concentration, would lead to higher profits that would
somehow serve as protection against adverse shocks and thus increase the
franchise value of the bank. In support of this view, Yeyati and Micco (2007)
note that mergers seem to have been pro-competitive in general, as a
merger between firms serving overlapping or identical markets reduce
competition and increases efficiency by eliminating duplication of activities.
Naturally, efficiency is achieved in this case by eliminating the duplication of
activities within the firm for example; the harmonisation of systems and
processes in the common ownership and common interest category of banks
in Nigeria. It is important to note that these successes can only be achieved
if bank market concentration effectively adjusts to short-run and long-run
equilibrium levels. Secondly, regulatory checks and balances (such as
interest rate cap) will have to be deployed effectively to prevent excess rent
taking. As the expected gains of concentration on credit availability to the
private sector identified above, depends on the pace with which banks and
regulatory authorities can embark on numerous adjustments in the economic
cycle.
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Contrary to the views above, Caminal and Matutes (2002) maintain that a
monopolistic bank (possible in totalitarian states) has more incentives to
monitor its clients than a bank with less market power, thus decreasing the
credit rationing of loans. Hughes and Mester (1998) conclude that few
relatively large banks are more likely to display a “too big to fail” problem by
which large banks increase their risk exposure anticipating the unwillingness
of the regulator to let the bank fail in the event of insolvency problems.
Typically, these issues can be resolved if early warning signals prompt action,
which might mitigate systemic problems if acted upon. The recent global
financial crisis confirms that the ability of regulators to detect and act on
warning signals is crucial.
The findings and analysis in section 6.2.1 show an increase in the size of the
top 10 banks by assets, deposits and extended loans year on year after
consolidation. The distribution of bank size (see Chart 6.1, 6.2, 6.3) indicates
that the CBN achieved its objective of expanding the financial market by
creating bigger banks. Expansion of financial services encouraged banks to
increase their intermediation role in the economy, thus making more credit
available to the private sector with significant impact on economic growth.
However, it is important to note that economic growth will ultimately depend
on the demand for loans, entrepreneurial flair and suitable projects for the
banks to back. In addition, fewer bigger banks are now better able to deal
with the problem of information asymmetry in the Nigerian banking industry,
and prevent situations where customers who default on loans simply go to
another bank (Nakamura 1993). Furthermore, the CBN establish a Credit
Bureau and mandated banks to integrate a “Know Your Customer document”
(KYC) into all loan approvals (CBN 2008). The failure of the Financial System
Stability (FSS) framework discussed in chapter 2, to adequately address the
problem of asymmetric information facing Indonesian banks highlights the
difficulties of credit profiling in emerging economies. Higher bank exposures
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create incentives to improve their risk management systems, and as a result
reduce the number of non-performing loans in the Nigerian economy.
7.3.2 Competition in the Banking Industry
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used in chapter 6, to test hypothetical
positions on the state of competition in the Nigerian banking industry before
and after consolidation. Based on the HH Index benchmarks identified by Lu
et al. (2007), the Nigerian banking industry remained competitive between
2001-2007. Furthermore, evidence from the interviews suggests a perception
of increased competition as a result of consolidation. For example: a senior
manager (SA1:M2) claims that consolidation created an almost level playing
field which increased competition. Emem-Akpan (2007) notes that Nigerian
banks are struggling to outdo each other in the area of branches, as a bank
that had about 64 branches nationwide before the consolidation exercise now
has about 178. This focus on bricks and mortar could change if information
technology infrastructure improves or gets to a point of maturity.
At the macroeconomic level, banks perform a vital economic function in
channelling funds from savers to investors (Goddard and Wilson 2009). Bank
Negara Malaysia (2003) notes that in consolidating the Malaysian banking
industry, priority was accorded to strengthening drivers of performance to
provide high quality service at competitive prices. The right level of
competition improves efficiency, drives innovation and influences the pricing
and quality of products available to consumers. Thus, the perceived reality
above, of increased competition in the Nigerian banking industry is a positive
phenomenon. The CBN’s induced competition and its effects on bank
behaviour, cost structures and efficiency provides incentives for managers to
be prudent in the allocation of investment resources, risk management
systems, IT applications, accounting standards, skills and credit with overall
benefits on banking intermediation. This scenario presents the customer with
a host of bank products and credit facilities to choose from. Such healthy
rivalries (so long as it does not spill over into illegal or unethical activities)
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amongst banks ultimately benefits consumers and by extension the Nigerian
economy, as banks provide financial means to facilitate production in other
industries. This is in line with the argument by Yildirim and Philippatos
(2007) that increased competition can also stimulate economic growth by
raising the availability of credit and financial services to businesses and
households.
Mamatzakis et al. (2005) and, Hughes and Mester (1998) note that
competition could negatively impact on stability if banks take excessive risks
or reduce incentives for prudent risk taking behaviour. The CBN’s ability to
manage these concerns directly impacts on the soundness and stability of the
financial sector in Nigeria. Tolerance levels on infractions, statutory returns,
accountability, corporate governance, transparency, realignment of
incentives away from rent-seeking and an established credit bureau influence
the delivery of efficient financial intermediation. Unfortunately, evidence from
the interviews in section 6.4 show limited efforts on the part of Nigerian
banks to improve corporate governance, inaccurate reporting, and gross
insider abuse which resulted in huge numbers of non-performing insider
related credits pre-consolidation.
The comparative advantage of relationship lending is another potential
concern when competition is induced by consolidation. Black and Strahan
(2002) point out that relationship lending involves long-term relationships
that generate valuable information about borrower quality. They note that
small banks are better than large banks at relationship lending which
depends on soft information. While in contrast large banks specialize in
transaction lending to more mature firms that depend on hard data where
less discretion is involved. Thus, the mechanisms at play in a consolidated
banking environment could reduce credit availability to small firms and new
businesses, and create issues of credit not reaching the SME segment of the
Nigerian economy. This view is consistent with the response of a senior
manager (CI2:M1) to a question on credit availability to small firms:
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“The small credit institutions deal in segments we are probably
not interested in because of the risk; that’s the lower or even
lowest end of the market. Yes, the pricing at the lower end can
compensate, but they are more difficult to manage”.
However, Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that competition may raise the
rewards to activities that allow lenders to differentiate themselves from other
lenders, thereby raising the incentive to invest in relationships. For example;
Standard Chartered Bank and First City Monument Bank developed
unsecured lending products for staff of organisations to access loans without
the requirement of a collateral (SCB 2010; FCMB 2010). Large banks may
also be lower cost lenders than smaller banks, because of their superior
ability to diversify credit risks across borrowers and as a result reduce the
cost of lending to risky borrowers (Diamond 1984). Cost can be further
reduced in large banks by investing in semi-automated processes and
systems for managing credit facilities (i.e. through exception reporting),
Table 6.7 shows that managers from the three categories of consolidating
banks in Nigeria invested in standardisation (i.e. semi-automated processes)
for credit analysis and approvals. The prevailing environment in the Nigerian
banking industry of increased competition force prices closer to marginal
costs, and helps the credit supply conditions to all borrowers in the economy.
7.3.3 Stability in the Banking Industry
Providing buffers for bank risk exposures seem to be the most appropriate
approach to maintaining stability in the banking industry. In the last decade,
pressures from regulatory authorities require banks to have appropriate
capital adequacy ratios to enhance stability in financial systems. This is
precipitated by the high financial leveraging and high risk nature of banking.
International banking losses and bankruptcies have also become more
frequent. For example; in 1995, Japan’s largest credit union The Credit Union
of Mu Jin, went out of business and the second largest local bank, Hyogo
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Bank, closed and liquidated its assets (Lin et al. 2005), and also the recent
fall in 2008 of Lehman Brothers.
Adequate capital requirements can reduce moral hazard by forcing bank
shareholders to absorb a larger part of the losses, thereby reducing incidents
of excessive risk taking and the value of the deposit insurance put option
(Rime 2001; Keeley and Furlong 1990). In consolidating the Malaysian and
Indonesian banking industry, financing arrangements such as target levels of
recapitalization, types of instruments, and terms and conditions were guided
by the principle of minimizing government’s contribution. The international
consensual knowledge of these systemic risks on bank lending led to the
creation of the Basel Capital Accord. This is enforced as a model for capital
regulation of the banking system by local authorities in both developed and
developing economies, and has been adopted in more than 100 countries
including Nigeria (Arua 2006).
Ediz et al. (1998) state that the Basel Capital Accord obliges banks to
maintain equity and quasi-equity funding equal to a risk-weighted proportion
of their asset base. The Basel Capital Accord assigns 8% as a generally
acceptable capital adequacy ratio and a risk rate of 50% to residential
mortgages (Hsu et al. 2007). In the case of Nigeria, the CBN (2005) notes
that in 2005, the required minimum capital adequacy ratio for banks was
raised from 8% to 10%. Findings in Table 6.10 show that the banking
industry in Nigeria maintained double digits capital adequacy ratios between
2002-2008, which is significantly above the 8% Basel Capital Accord
requirement. On the other hand, managers stressed that levels of liquidity
and the CBN’s stipulated loan to deposit ratio of 80% were the most
prominent factors influencing propensity to lend across categories of
consolidating banks. For instance: a senior manager (CI1:M1) states that by
regulation a Nigerian bank is not supposed to lend more than 80% of its
deposits and these constraints either boosts or reduces a bank’s ability to
lend. This implies that bank managers could be encouraged to lend if their
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banks are considerably below the 80% loan to deposit ratio threshold, while
this could also be a constraint if bank lending figures are nearer the
threshold.
Even though most managers claim their lending decisions are primarily
influenced by available levels of liquidity, this study notes that there is a
direct relationship between capital adequacy and levels of liquidity in banks.
The increased capital adequacy ratios in Nigerian banks, means that banks
are better able to attract depositors because they are perceived to be stable
and can absorb shocks. In support of this view, Lindquist (2004) states that
a poorly capitalised bank runs the risk of losing market confidence and
reputation. In Nigeria, the 13 banks which did not meet the CBN’s minimum
capital requirement lost their operating licence and were liquidated (CBN
2005). Thus, excess capital acts as an insurance against costs that may
occur due to an unexpected fall in the capital ratio and difficulties in raising
new capital. Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) believe that when bank liabilities
are not totally insured, depositors demand higher returns to compensate for
higher risk. Furthermore, they note that bank shareholders may have
incentives to add to bank capital to reduce bank risk and therefore the cost
of deposits. Secondly, the positive influence of higher capital buffers such as
stability and market power encourage foreign banks and credit providing
institutions to provide credit lines to Nigerian banks. For example: strategic
investors such as International Finance Corporation and Sabre Capital
deployed funds and credit lines to First City Monument Bank as a result of
consolidation (FCMB 2010). These causal relationships between capital
adequacy, deposits, and credit shows that the CBN’s increase of bank capital
adequacy ratios positively influence the availability of credit to the private
sector.
Yet other authors challenge the idea that capital requirements can stabilise
the banking system and enhance the availability of credit. Hsu et al. (2007)
argue that the 8% capital adequacy ratio requirement is a major problem,
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because this figure was assigned without any empirical evidence to support
its accuracy. They opine that in computing the capital adequacy ratio,
banking institutions may be over-capitalised according to the regulatory
regime but under-capitalised according to the market. Kim and Santomero
(1988), and Rochet (1992) find that if capital is relatively expensive, the
forced reduction in leverage diminishes the bank’s expected returns and as a
result, bank owners may choose a higher point on the efficiency frontier with
a higher return and higher risk. Fortunately, these situations can be
addressed by making special provisions to raise the ratio in specific cases.
The higher capital ratios (section 6.2.3) of Nigerian banks after consolidation
did not negatively affect their ability to provide loan able funds to the private
sector.
The current events in the global financial system shows that the capital
requirements of Basel II do not adequately reflect bank risk taking, these
inadequacies in banking supervision informs the proposals for Basel III.
Appropriate risk based capital standards can eliminate the adverse effects of
capital requirements and reduce the incidence of moral hazards. The instance
of double digit capital adequacy ratios in Nigeria is a positive sign and
indicates that these ratios are reflective of bank risk exposures, even though
higher safety margins could lower bank profit.
7.3.4 Efficiency in the Banking Industry
At the macroeconomic level, bank efficiency represents a socially optimal
target, since it reduces the costs of financial intermediation, driving down the
drainage of real resources due to the transfer of funds from savers to
producers. Consequently, central banks are interested in operating practices
and market equilibrium that grant the maximum productive efficiency (Resti
1997). Traditionally, the level of efficiency in banking is determined by the
spread between deposit and lending rates, with higher margins a sign of low
efficiency and lower margins a sign of high efficiency.
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Chart 6.4 shows a slight reduction in spread (margins) between deposit and
lending rates year on year after banking consolidation in Nigeria.
Interestingly, senior managers are almost evenly split between interactions
of demand and supply, and government regulation as the reasons for the
reduction in spread (see Table 6.16). This clearly implies that lower margins
between deposit and lending rates in Nigeria were achieved through the
combination of demand and supply and CBN regulation which aimed to cap
interest rates. Ultimately, this result is positive as lower margins mean that
bank cost structures are at optimal levels, customers have greater incentives
to save and credit is available to investors at cheaper rates.
The concentration ratios in the Nigerian banking industry after consolidation
can have two possible impacts on efficiency. First a class of models claim that
more concentrated banking industries will behave oligopolistically; while
another class of models stress that concentration is due to more efficient
banks taking over less efficient counterparts. This means that in the first
case; lower competition should result in higher spreads, while in the second
case; a decrease in marginal costs due to increased efficiency should reduce
spread (Gambacorta 2008).
The high level of competition identified in section 7.3.2 significantly influence
efficiency levels in the Nigerian banking industry for a number of reasons.
First, managers have higher incentives to manage the bank more efficiently
because their capacity to establish price above marginal cost and generate
sufficient profits is diminished as a result of competitive pressures from other
banks. Secondly, managers are not able to pursue objectives such as market
power or higher wages at the expense of efficiency (Maudos and Guevara
2007). Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) found that higher contestability is part
due to recent advances in technology, which has resulted in an overall
increase in competition. Evidence from the interviews in Table 6.7 shows that
nine managers identified improved risk assessment parameters as a
significant effect of consolidation. This implies that with the increased size of
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Nigerian banks, they can afford to make considerable investment to upgrade
their information technology infrastructure and risk management systems.
Thus, efficiency is achieved as Nigerian banks can now not discriminate on
price, this leads to a natural adjustment of interest rates to an intermediate
value. By so doing, the banks move to equilibrium interest rates and create a
chain reaction on price as other banks adjust.
It has also been argued that an unregulated and aggressively competitive
banking system would have tendencies to overproduce non-performing loans
(as is the case in Nigeria pre-consolidation), and increase the degree of
interest rate uncertainty. Therefore, there is a public policy rationale for the
imposition of regulations on bank activities in the form of reserve
requirements, portfolio investment restrictions and deposit contract
constraints, to help attain money supply objectives (Laeven and Majnoni
2003; Saunders and Yourougou 1990), even though non-market forces could
seek to influence regulatory bodies and interests that drive these issues
(Amaeshi and Adi 2007). The CBN provided an interest rate agreement for a
uniform interest rate structure among banks, in which a window stipulating
the minimum deposit rates and maximum lending rates was clearly spelt out.
The window provided between the deposit and lending rates is sufficient for
banks to cover marginal costs and make profit. The slight reduction in
spread, confirms that the combination of demand and supply and the CBN’s
interest rate controls were effective. This implies that efficiency levels in the
Nigerian banking industry have improved after consolidation.
7.3.5 Direct Measurements of Credit Availability
According to Palley (1995), traditional models relate the demand for money
to the level of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), where GDP serves as the scale
variable determining the transactions demand for money balances. The
predetermined component of financial development is strongly associated
with real per capita GDP growth and improvements in the efficiency with
which economies employ physical capital (King and Levine 1993; Rajan and
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Zingales 1998). Thus, there is a correlation between the total credit to GDP
and the impact of credit on growth in the Nigerian economy (Rousseau and
Wachtel 2002).
The findings and analysis in section 6.2.5 shows that banking consolidation
resulted in increased flow of bank credit to the private sector and this was
notably higher than GDP. This means that consolidation influenced banks to
increase their level of intermediation, and as a result more credit is available
to the private sector with overall implications for the productive arm of the
Nigerian economy. This is in line with the CBN’s objective of stimulating
growth in the economy through increased credit to the private sector. The
focus on private rather than public sector as a benchmark is the influence of
political considerations in the allocation of government credit, which may not
reflect optimal allocation of resources. The data is consistent with the view of
King and Levine (1993) that banking intermediation stimulates economic
growth by improving the efficiency with which economies use capital.
Beck et al. (2000) believe that banks alter the path of growth by affecting
the allocation of capital. Banks choose which firms to lend to through various
parameters that ensure optimal resource allocation (the most efficient
allocation of resources). This is evident in the views of a senior manager
(CI2:M1) in section 6.2.5, who claims that the SME segment in Nigeria did
not attract sufficient credit, because it lacked the primary determinants of
bank performance such as profitability and efficiency. Beck et al. (2000)
believe that regulation, technology, credit profile, and infrastructure are
fundamental channels which connect financial intermediation to economic
growth. Firms in the SME segment who do not meet the requirements for
banks loans, are more likely to fall back on internally generated funds or
supplier financing in the form of trade credit as a means of funding growth.
In emerging economies like Nigeria’s, financial development matter
disproportionately more for firms that cannot make use of trade credit
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financing, while firms with access to trade credit financing face fewer
difficulties (Rajan and Zingales 1998).
In summary, the growth in total credit to GDP after consolidation shows that
the CBN achieved its objective of growing the Nigerian economy through
increased credit to the private sector. Even though, the SME segment
characterised by weak regulatory frameworks, poor credit history and lack of
infrastructure (Balogun 2007) presented difficulties for formal lenders. Access
to credit in the SME segment is disproportionate, as firms with supplier trade
credit financing face fewer difficulties. This finding highlights the SME value
chain as a significant concern for policy makers, sections 8.3.2 and 8.6
present the contribution to practice for policy makers and policy
recommendations.
7.4 Corroboration of Modified Berger et al. (1998) Framework used in
this Study
The modified Berger et al. (1998) framework used in this study (section 4.5),
is less data intensive and examines the Nigerian banking industry in
aggregate. Primarily, this conceptual framework aims to analyse the effects
of banking consolidation on credit availability to the private sector. Thus, this
section seeks to determine the validity of the modified framework for
decision making and understanding the health of the banking industry (in
terms of credit availability) by interviewing a senior manager in the CBN and
the respected financial analyst.
In response to a question on how the CBN would evaluate the performance of
policy instruments used to consolidate banks and its effects on credit
availability to the private sector. The senior manager (CBN1:M1) from the
CBN notes that:
“The total credit to GDP would be a good measure of credit
availability in the banking industry. The CBN would also expect
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interest rates to fall, resulting from healthy competition in the
banking industry. These figures help inform our policy response to
consolidation and credit provision. The thinking in the CBN after
consolidation, was that credit supply had improved but a lot more
needed to be done to generate demand”.
The response above indicates that the CBN would naturally measure total
credit to GDP as a benchmark for improved credit availability in the economy.
Secondly, the policy maker identified the spread between deposits and
lending rates as an important indicator of credit allocation and competition in
the banking industry. These elements inform the CBN’s policy response and
are key aspects of the modified Berger et al. (1998) framework deployed in
this study. Furthermore, the CBN’s thinking confirms the position of the study
that the demand for credit was inadequate.
This study’s findings were also discussed with the respected financial analyst,
with the aim of validating its practical implications from an independent
observer perspective. The respected financial analyst (P1:M1) claims that:
“Nigerian banks are now more stable, they are bigger and can do
longer term transactions. I think this is a positive sign for growth
in the economy, as I would expect better returns when business
people hold money for longer periods. The inability of the SME
segment to attract credit, remains a major problem. I would
agree with your conclusions that that the Nigerian authorities
must improve infrastructure, education etc to help stimulate
growth in the economy”.
The feedback from the respected financial analyst supports the findings of
this study and reconfirms the need for joined up thinking between the CBN
and government, as the SME segment remained unprofitable to banks. The
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financial analyst also believes that increased bank capital (supply side) on its
own, would not deliver the required level of growth expected in the economy.
These positive corroborative responses are appealing, and indicate that the
modified Berger et al. (1998) framework used in this study is an effective
approach for examining the effects of banking consolidation on credit
availability in developing economies.
7.5 Conclusion and Summary of Discussion
The discussion in this chapter highlights the research findings in relation to
existing literature, and explains the consequences of banking consolidation
on credit availability to the private sector in Nigeria. Changes in the three
categories of consolidating banks namely: Stand alone banks, Common
ownership banks, and Common interest banks include an increase in their
minimum capital base to N25 billion, economies of scale and scope, universal
banking, and increased market share. For banks, taking on additional capital
is necessary to meet the CBN’s N25 billion requirement. The economies of
scale and scope help banks achieve cost and efficiency sayings. Through
universal banking risk and earnings are diversified, while increased bank size
provide banks with the capacity to grow market share. These changes also
significantly impact on market concentration, competition, stability,
efficiency, and total credit to GDP in the Nigerian economy.
Findings in section 6.2.1 indicate that the Nigerian banking industry is more
concentrated after consolidation. These bigger banks positively impact on the
economy through numerous measures such as: their increased
intermediation role thus making more credit available to the private sector,
reduction of information asymmetry, improved risk management systems,
and higher efficiency saving by eliminating the duplication of activities.
Contrary to expectations that more concentrated industries encourage
oligopolistic tendencies which negatively impact on competition, the Nigerian
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banking industry witnessed high levels of competition in the period under
review. This level of competition affects bank behaviour, cost structures, and
efficiency and provides incentives for managers to be prudent in the
allocation of investment resources, risk management systems, IT
applications, accounting standards, skills and credit with overall benefits on
banking intermediation. Such healthy rivalries amongst banks ultimately
benefit consumers and by extension the Nigerian economy, as banks provide
financial means to facilitate production in other industries.
Most managers claim their lending decisions are primarily influenced by
available levels of liquidity. However, there is a direct link between capital
adequacy and levels of liquidity in banks. Nigerian banks maintained double
digit capital adequacy ratios before and after consolidation, which is
significantly above the 8% Basel Capital Accord requirement. This means
that banks are better able to attract depositors because they are perceived to
be stable and can absorb shocks. In support of this view, Lindquist (2004)
notes that a poorly capitalised bank runs the risk of losing market confidence
and reputation. The down side to this could be the use of funds to strengthen
balance sheets and capital ratios instead of lending; there is no evidence in
this study to suggest Nigerian banks engaged in this type of practices.
The minimal reduction in spread between deposit and lending rates is a
positive result. As lower margins mean that bank cost structures are at
optimal levels, customers have greater incentives to save and credit is
available to investors at cheaper rates. Interestingly, senior managers are
almost evenly split between interactions of demand and supply, and
government regulation as the reasons for the reduction in spread. This
implies that the CBN achieved lower margins between deposit and lending
rates through the combination of various instruments.
The focus of this study is on the supply side and not the demand side of
credit, and some of the analysis indicates that banks are still unwilling to
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lend to the SME segment, even though firms with supplier trade credit
financing face fewer difficulties. The SME segment did not attract sufficient
credit because it lacked the primary determinants of bank performance such
as profitability and efficiency. These highlights the need for authorities to
address broader policy issues such as infrastructure development, education,
foreign direct investment, regulation etc, which could impact positively on
the demand for credit and stimulate the SME value chain. The next chapter
summarises the findings of this study and draws conclusions relating to the
original research questions.
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Chapter 8: Summary of Findings and Conclusions
8.0 Introduction
This chapter summarises key findings, presents conclusions and offers
recommendations based on the research presented in previous chapters. The
appointment as CBN governor of Professor Charles Soludo in 2004, the
subsequent increase of bank minimum capital requirement to N25 billion and
the 18 months window for consolidation mark a turning point in the Nigerian
banking industry. The period under review (2004-2006) is characterised by
significant structural and operational changes with outcomes expected to
positively impact on the Nigerian economy. Primarily, this study examines
change management practices of managers implementing banking
consolidation in Nigeria and highlights the effects of these changes on credit
availability to the private sector. Therefore, answers to the following research
questions were sought: (i) To critically examine what gaps exist in the
change management literature as it relates to organisational change in
banking, (ii) To highlight how change was managed in Nigerian banks and
benchmark these practices with aspects of the change management
literature, and (iii) To investigate the extent to which banking consolidation
improved the availability of credit to the private sector.
This chapter is divided into seven sections; Section 8.1 summarises the
research aim, objectives and achievements. Section 8.2 presents the
research findings. Section 8.3 reviews the contribution to knowledge and
practice. Section 8.4 highlights limitations of the study. Section 8.5 identifies
opportunities for further research. Section 8.6 considers a series of policy
and managerial recommendations based on the findings of this study.
Section 8.7 concludes this chapter with a critical reflection on the doctoral
research.
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8.1 Summary of Research Aim, Objectives and Achievements
The performance of policy instruments in developing economies is dependent
on effective implementation and management of processes. The purpose of
this study is to further advance knowledge in change management by
highlighting challenges faced by managers implementing change in
developing economies. This study seeks to make an original contribution to
knowledge and practice, through the lessons learnt from the consolidation of
the Nigerian banking industry in 2004-2006. In other to achieve this, Table
8.1 shows the research objectives and how this study has achieved them.
Table 8.1: Research Objectives and Achievements
Research Objectives Research Achievements
To empirically explore the use of banking
consolidation in Malaysia and Indonesia
and highlight lessons for Nigeria.
Chapter 2 provides a detailed analysis of
financial sector reform in Malaysia and
Indonesia. A critical review of events in
these countries presents lessons for
authorities implementing banking
consolidation in Nigeria and other
emerging economies.
To identify internal and external change
drivers, by undertaking an exploratory
critical evaluation of events leading up to
the consolidation of the Nigerian banking
industry in 2004-2006.
Section 2.3.1 presents drivers of banking
consolidation in Nigeria and highlights
significant events necessitating the CBN
to embark on financial sector reform.
To critically explore the change
management literature in order to
identify conceptual models and
frameworks, to help understand the
nature of change in the Nigerian banking
industry.
A critical evaluation of the change
management literature is presented in
Chapter 3.
To understand the nature of strategic
change in the Nigerian financial industry,
by examining change management
practices of senior bank managers
involved in the reduction of the number
of banks from 89 to 24.
In chapter 5, the analysis of interviews
with managers directly involved in
banking consolidation, highlights the
change management practices of senior
bank managers and helps establish the
nature of strategic change in the Nigerian
financial industry.
To critically appraise the effectiveness of The analysis of secondary data and
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key policy instruments and support
mechanisms on performance,
competition and availability of credit to
the private sector in Nigeria.
interviews with managers in chapter 6,
identifies the effects of banking
consolidation on credit availability to the
private sector in Nigeria.
To develop a framework for incorporating
institutional variables (e.g. shared
values, structures, systems etc) into
financial sector reforms in developing
economies, based on the review of
change management literature and
evidence from this study.
Sections 7.2.1, 7.2.2, and 7.2.3 show the
conceptual framework developed for
incorporating institutional variables into
financial sector reforms in developing
economies.
To contribute to professional practice
through a review of public policy and
managerial recommendations in order to
address identified barriers and
opportunities for industry participants.
Section 8.3 provides a series of policy
and managerial recommendations based
on the findings of this study.
Furthermore, section 8.4 presents the
contribution to knowledge and practice
for bank managers and policy makers.
Source: Author Generated
Table 8.1 reflects the focus of this study on two out of thirteen objectives
presented by the CBN for consolidation. These are: (i) Requirement that the
minimum capitalisation for banks should be N25 billion with full compliance
before end-December 2005, and (ii) Consolidation of the banking institutions
through mergers and acquisitions. This is justified because the CBN
particularly expected increased capital requirements of N25 billion and its
effects on bank structure to stimulate growth in the Nigerian economy
(Soludo 2004; CBN 2008).
The mixed method research approach is deployed to address the research
questions and examine the performance of policy instruments. Secondary
data was accessed through the CBN and in-depth semi-structured interviews
conducted with managers directly involved in implementing banking
consolidation in Nigeria. The overall aim of this study is achieved, as change
management practices of senior bank managers were examined and the
effects of these practices on credit availability to the private sector
established.
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8.2 Research Findings
Parallels and lessons are drawn from the Malaysian and Indonesian
experience for mangers implementing banking consolidation in Nigeria. These
parallels include; the reduction in the number of banks through mergers and
acquisitions, the increase of minimum capital base for the emergent banks or
banking groups, the focus on efficiency and competition, and the
implementation of stringent supervisory and regulatory reforms. It is also
expected by authorities in these countries, that capital injection will address
the problem of weak capitalisation, and liquidity from the new investment
into the banking industry will induce interest rates to fall, improve overall
liquidity in the system and increase lending to the private sector. Table 8.2
highlights lessons learnt from the Malaysian and Indonesian experience and
its implications for authorities in Nigeria.
Table 8.2: Lessons Learnt from the Malaysian and Indonesian
Experience and Actions taken by Nigerian Authorities in response to
these Lessons.
Lessons Learnt from the Malaysian
and Indonesian Experience
Actions by Authorities in Nigeria
The provision of Institutional and legal
framework for restructuring and
allocation of qualified human resources.
(i) The National Economic Empowerment
and Development Strategy (NEEDS)
prepared in 2003. (ii) CBN/BOFIA Act
Amendment Bill improved the autonomy
of the CBN in its monetary policy
decisions.
Standard requirements for selecting
between sound banks that need no public
support, banks that are viable but need
public support and those that should exit
the system.
Minimum capitalisation for banks is set at
N25 billion. This requirement is high
(increased from N2 billion to N25 billion)
and aimed to exit all weak banks from
the Nigerian banking industry.
Provision of methods for dealing with
troubled banks and treatment of existing
and new shareholder. i.e. liquidation,
mergers and acquisitions, nationalisation,
use of bridge banks.
(i) CBN/NDIC adopts the bank resolution
option known as Purchase and
Assumption. (ii) NDIC to liquidate closed
banks.
Financing arrangements should include;
target level of recapitalisation, types of
(i) Target Level; N25 billion. (ii) Types of
Instruments; Public offers, Private
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instruments, terms and conditions, and
guided by the principle of minimizing
government‘s contribution.
Placement, Strategic Investors and
Group Injection of Funds.
Prompt creation of agencies to manage
the restructuring programme and
problem assets. For example, the
creation of Danamodal Nasional Berhad
(Recapitalisation Company) and
Danaharta Nasional Berhad (an asset
management company) to handle the
Malaysian crisis immensely aided the
implementation and success of the
banking sector reform.
Establishment of an asset management
company for distress resolution.
Provision of an appropriate timeframe for
the different steps in operational and
bank restructuring.
18 months window for all banks to meet
the N25 billion minimum capital
requirement.
Exit strategy from government ownership
of banks and blanket guarantee.
Sale of government stake in banks,
reduction of public sector funds in banks,
quick exit from blanket guarantee and
payment of depositors.
Effective and transparent information
campaign, to ensure public confidence
and credibility.
Use of various communication channels
to inform all stake holders. For example;
presentations to key industry actors by
CBN governor.
Source: Author Generated
Table 8.2 indicates that authorities in Nigeria deployed an unassisted
resolution approach in restructuring the banking industry. This approach
necessitated troubled banks to internally make required changes or merge
with another financially healthy bank (George 1994; Pangestu and Habir
2002; Batunanggar 2003; Honohan and Klingebiel 2003; Hoggarth et al.
2004; Lindgren et al. 1999; Mishkin 2001). Based on the National Economic
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), the CBN’s framework for
consolidation stipulated the new minimum capital base requirement (N25
billion) and legal mode (going solo or merger or outright acquisition) for
achieving this, but allowed individual banks to decide on preferred options.
Overall, the lessons from Malaysia and Indonesia shows that government
intervention either through blanket guarantees or an asset management
company for distress resolution be minimal and on temporary bases. Thus,
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managers are encouraged to identify effective performance measures that
support government’s economic recovery policies.
This study found that much of the change management literature reviewed
presents three broad themes, these are: Triggers for change, Readiness for
change, and Implementing change. Therefore, a broad framework in which
the change process can focus on content-outer context but still bring
process-inner context into the picture is required (section 3.2; figure 3.3).
This weakness is addressed by integrating Lewin’s (1951) force field analysis
with the framework proposed by Pettigrew (1988). This conceptual
framework presents a reflective evaluation of the situation in the Nigerian
banking industry and deploys a varied range of models to analyse the actions
of managers. The principal elements of this conceptual framework ensure
that managers do not see change as a completely linear process, but a
process more reflective of external and internal pressures.
In the case of Nigeria, evidence from this research in section 5.2 shows that
there was varied response to the CBN’s consolidation drive. Receptive banks
were generally better equipped in terms of capacity to raise capital to meet
the new re-capitalisation requirement, while resistant banks were
characterised by low capacity to raise capital. Extracts of the interview with a
senior manager (CI4:M1) from First Intercity Bank (section 5.2) confirms
that the most evident reason for this, is the ill preparedness of management
and the CBN’s 18 months window for consolidation. Thus, management in
these banks were unable to effectively address specific staff concerns. The
banking industry also experienced shortage of skilled human capital, as
Nigerian banks had not sufficiently played an intermediation role in the
economy (Soludo 2004). The analysis of processes for consolidation suggests
a lack of clarity of vision and strategy for change. There are also indications
that managers have not been proactive in highlighting wins, even though
some banks have consolidated on gains to produce more change. Cultural
integration and management incentives are identified as the most prevalent
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negative factors against the change process, even though most aspects of
organisational change in Nigerian banks were successful.
This study also adapts the Berger et al. (1998) framework to test the effects
of consolidation on credit availability to the private sector. Static effects such
as concentration ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, capital adequacy ratio,
interest rate spread, and total credit to GDP show a general increase in the
size of Nigerian banks. Interestingly, market segmentation, resized target
market and international operations are the most dominant restructuring
effects of consolidation in Nigeria. These factors have implications for credit
availability, as market segmentation means credit is channelled to segments
previously ignored, resized target market indicates that banks can handle big
ticket and longer term lending in the corporate and consumer sectors, while
international operations creates a better environment to attract credit and
lending on the international stage.
The banking industry is also directly influenced by the emergence of new big
banks, characterised by proactive lending strategies and improved
operational activities. The proactive measures of new big banks: create
efficiencies, improve customer service, drive competition and scale-up credit
to the Nigerian economy. The external effects of consolidation suggest that
the reaction of other lenders particularly micro finance institutions is
currently insignificant, because of their current limited number and low
capacity.
Overall, the increase in growth of total credit to GDP indicates that the CBN
achieved it’s objective of growing the Nigerian economy through banking
consolidation. However, the SME segment did not attract sufficient credit
because it lacked the primary determinants of bank performance, such as
profitability and efficiency. Therefore, there is the need to explore other
delivery channels for providing credit to SMEs who do not readily meet the
requirements of big banks. Findings in section 6.5 indicate that micro finance
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institutions are more suited to lend to the SME segment, and can play a vital
role in addressing issues of credit availability in the Nigerian economy.
8.3 Policy and Managerial Recommendations
Policy and managerial recommendations provided in this section, aim to
address some of the impediments to economic growth in Nigeria. The
usefulness of these recommendations to other developing economies is
dependent on perceived similarities in terms of economic, social
development, infrastructure, and fundamentally whether these
recommendations are appropriate for the needs of the country in question
(Casey and Dostal 2008). These recommendations follow from the findings
and lessons learnt in this study:
 For Bank Managers: Resistant banks were generally taken by
surprise as the CBN implemented pre-emptive measures to address
systemic problems in the Nigerian banking industry. The ill
preparedness on the part of senior bank managers negatively
impacted on staff motivation and management style. The conceptual
framework developed in this study for incorporating institutional
variables into financial sector reforms; provide bank managers with a
tool for examining the interplay of factors acting upon the business
environment, and to assess required changes. This conceptual
framework can also be utilised as a mitigating tool, if effectively
deployed and signals picked-up are acted upon.
 For the CBN: Despite the availability of more credit to the private
sector post consolidation, evidence in sections 6.2.5 and 6.5 shows
that the SME segment in Nigeria remained unattractive to banks.
Senior bank managers note that existing regulations did not make
lending to the SME segment worthwhile. This imbalance in the supply
of credit could be changed through a renewed government focus on
micro financing, as micro finance firms are better placed to deal in the
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SME segment which Nigeria banks find too risky. Under such
programs, the CBN could further enhance internal controls, corporate
governance, regulator/supervisory requirements, insurance schemes
and other capacity developing mechanisms in micro finance firms. The
use of such policy instruments would improve their ability to mobilise
deposits and reduce the existence of a huge un-served market in
Nigeria. Secondly, there is a need to address the weak capital base
(N20 million for operation in a specific local government area and N1
billion for operation in a specific state) of existing micro finance firms
in Nigeria, as this will enhance their capacity to adequately provide a
cushion for the risk of lending to micro entrepreneurs (in the SME
segment) without collateral.
 For the CBN and the Nigerian Government: Even though the focus
of this study is on the supply side of credit, the recommendation above
indicates that the SME segment (demand side of credit) remains
unattractive because of the poor state of infrastructure in Nigeria
(Balogun 2007). This translates to higher cost of production, as
transfer pricing to the end user make products from Nigeria globally
uncompetitive. As a result of globalisation, other developed and
developing economies with better infrastructure can continue to
provide products and services at a more competitive rate than local
Nigerian business. The wider implication is the need for joined up
thinking between CBN and government (policy makers) to develop
infrastructure, create support policies, improve education etc, which
would help drive growth in the economy, provide good projects for
funding, and reduce the cost of production for local business. The
areas that require urgent attention include: hard infrastructure
(transportation, power and water), soft infrastructure (human capital,
legal and institutional frameworks), security of lives and property, land
use act (law governing the allocation of land in Nigeria), and rule of
law.
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8.4 Contribution of Doctoral Research
This study contributes to the understanding of change management practices
by developing a conceptual framework for incorporating institutional
variables into financial sector reform in developing economies. The findings
and analysis presented, adds value by highlighting issues of organisational
change faced by managers implementing banking consolidation in Nigeria.
Initial findings demonstrate the difficulties of implementing organisational
change and complex forces acting upon the change process. The CBN’s 18
months window for consolidation and increase of minimum capital base to
N25 billion created a unique sense of urgency. The CBN provided managers
with a varied range of options, as the legal mode for consolidation was going
solo, mergers or outright acquisition, while additional capital could be
accessed through public offers, private placement, strategic investors and
group injection of funds. By the expiration of the 18 month window in
December 2005, three categories of banks emerged and these are: banks
that could meet the new requirements on their own ‘Stand Alone Banks’,
banking groups owned by the same entity ‘Common Ownership Banks’, and
banking groups coming together for the sole purpose of meeting the new
requirements ‘Common Interest Banks’.
The study goes on to explore the wider implications of these changes for the
economy. Various tools are deployed to appraise achievements of managers,
and examine the effects of banking consolidation on credit availability to the
private sector. The approach deployed above transcends disciplinary
boundaries, by examining change management practices and its effects on
credit availability in the Nigerian banking industry.
8.4.1 Contribution to Knowledge
Planned Change in Banking Consolidation
The contribution to knowledge concerns aspects of organisational change
management and the effects of banking consolidation on credit availability.
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Novelty is achieved by applying conceptual models to the context of banking
consolidation in Nigeria. This study combines the frameworks of Pettigrew
(1988), Peters and Waterman (1982), Kotter (1998) and Lewin (1951) to
provide a snap shot of key factors acting upon the transformation of banking
practices and the imperative for change. It also aims to address the gap
identified in the change management literature, in which scholars focus on
the process and outer context link, thereby de-emphasising the explanatory
role of inner context variables, the analytical exploration of alternative
content areas for strategic change, and the forces for and against change
(section 3.2). Therefore, the integration of Lewin’s (1951) force field theory
into the three broad lenses developed by Pettigrew (1988), provides an
evaluation framework that helps address this weakness. This probe and learn
approach, encourages participation in developing knowledge of the members’
perception of change and creates innovative capabilities for organisations. It
also presents a unique expression of the combinational impact of change
management models in the context of banking consolidation in Nigeria. The
evaluation framework is trans-disciplinary and can be used to manage
change in medium-sized, mature and large multi-national organisations.
Furthermore, the CBN’s consolidation drive and 18 months window for all
banks to achieve the N25 billion requirement, created an imperative in the
banking industry. The strategic choices identified by senior bank managers
based on their situation include: going solo, merging with banks owned by
the same banking group, or merging or acquiring banks with similar
interests. Therefore, the approach to change in these banks was path
dependent, and presents the context under which the evaluation criteria
discussed above is deployed in this study.
Effects of Banking Consolidation on Credit Availability
The next stage represents the diagnostic phase, in which Berger et al’s.
(1998) framework is adapted to the context of Nigeria to examine the effects
of successes achieved by managers across categories of consolidating banks,
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on credit availability. The original Berger et al. (1998) framework deploys
data sets in the United States from the late 1970s to early 1990s, and uses
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to examine the static effect, the
restructuring effect, the direct effect and the external effect of mergers and
acquisitions on credit availability based on individual bank data. However,
these same effects are analysed in this study with less resource intensive
aggregate data. Concentration ratios, Herfindahal-Hirschman Index, capital
adequacy ratios, interest rate spread and total credit to GDP are applied to
test the static effect, while questions are designed and administered to
industry participant in order to test the restructuring effect, the direct effect
and the external effect of consolidation on credit availability (mixed methods,
rather than more quantitative approach). The modifications here maintain
the same key focus originally proposed by Berger et al. (1998), and presents
an alternative framework that can be deployed in developing economies to
examine the effects of consolidation on credit availability when only
aggregate data sets are available.
In addition, the Berger et al. (1998) framework tests the effects on credit
availability highlighted above, purely as they relate to mergers and
acquisitions. The application of this conceptual framework (modified
framework) is extended in this study, by examining these same effects on
banks that did not engage in mergers or acquisitions (Stand alone category).
This approach is essential and demonstrates a significant extension to Berger
et al’s. (1998) framework, as banks often increase their size and financial
characteristics without necessarily engaging in mergers or acquisitions.
8.4.2 Contribution to Professional Practice
The participative approach of this study enhances its potential for developing
theory that will be relevant to practice (Huxham and Vangen 2003). The
contribution to practice focuses on primary stakeholders namely; bank
managers and policy makers in the CBN and International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
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Planned Change (Bank Managers)
Given the uncertainty of business environments, the conceptual framework
developed for incorporating institutional variables into financial sector
reforms provide bank managers with a mitigating tool, if signals picked-up
are acted upon. The conceptual framework helps identify factors acting upon
organisational change and encourages managers to think broadly of how to
mitigate these factors, thus reducing the risk of failure. In order to assess
effective decisions on bank response to its changing environment, managers
have to understand the interplay of factors in the external and internal
context, content, process and forces for and against change. For a more
detailed analysis, this study adapts frameworks by Peters and Waterman
(1982), Kotter (1998) and Lewin (1951) to highlight factors acting upon
various stages of banking consolidation in Nigeria. If effectively deployed,
this framework could disrupt the narrow focus on processes and provide
managers with a more holistic approach to planned change in their business
environment. However, this framework could be less applicable or might
require substitution with more emergent or contingency approaches
depending on the change situation.
Policy Response (CBN)
The CBN’s policy stance, that fewer bigger banks are more secure and
productive could present conflicting outcomes. In the aftermath of the
liquidity crunch of 2008-09, there has been a radical shift from this point of
view whereby larger banks are considered too big to fail and hence a source
of systemic risk to the economy. To consolidate on the gains of credit
creation resulting from consolidation, the CBN has to expand its supervisory
capacity and entrench early warning signals. Particularly, the ability to
identify credit approvals that defy best practice principles and the
requirement that all bank credit is processed through the Credit Bureau in
Nigeria. The current inadequacies of the Basel II framework can be
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mitigated, if the capital adequacy ratios of Nigerian banks reflect their risk
exposures.
Furthermore, the modified Berger et al. (1998) framework deployed in this
study, allows the CBN and authorities in other developing economies to make
policy decisions on credit availability to the private sector with less resource
intensive aggregate data sets. Therefore, this modified version can help the
CBN (and authorities in developing economies) monitor and react quickly to
signals resulting from changes implemented in the banking industry to
improve the propensity to offer credit, and avoid situations where the CBN
over reacts or under reacts to these events.
Policy Response (IMF)
The experiences of Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria confirm that liberalising
the capital account is a difficult process. This process, if not well managed,
could lead to systemic disturbances in which important segments of the
financial sector are likely to be driven into insolvency. Sequencing therefore,
in liberalising capital accounts is an important tool that ensures problems in
the domestic financial systems are addressed before removing restrictions on
capital accounts, as weak or financially troubled institutions develop a crisis
situation more rapidly. Thus, stringent monetary and fiscal policies such as
the standard (one-size-fits-all) Structural Adjustment Programme
implemented by the IMF in the countries under review may not be an
effective strategy for correcting balance of payment problems in developing
economies. Monetary authorities like the IMF could develop support
programmes and lending policy conditionality in collaboration with
governments of crisis affected countries, as this will help convince the local
market that the reforms can be implemented successfully within realistic
targets and timetables highlighted in the reform programme. This ensures
that the response to economic crises is tailored to meet the specific economic
needs of troubled countries.
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8.5 Limitations of the Study and Steps Taken to Reduce their Impact
This study deploys the triangulation approach for data collection and
analysis, and uses quantitative research supported by qualitative research
techniques to examine the effects of consolidation on credit availability to the
private sector in Nigeria. The time line in which this research is conducted is
such that quantitative data on bank performance is limited to four years after
consolidation. This limitation is made explicit in order to place the findings in
context as the effects of consolidation and the global financial crisis continue
to manifest in the economy. This also suggests that there are potential areas
for further research as events evolve in the banking industry; such areas are
highlighted in section 8.6.
Furthermore, interviews were conducted to ensure a clear trail of evidence
and present plausible conclusions regarding employee perception of banking
sector reforms in Nigeria. The reduction of this data through coding could
invariably be a subjective process. Thus, there is the possibility that some
degree of bias exists in this study. In order to reduce researcher bias to the
barest minimum, the codes and themes were carefully defined, maintained
and updated as required. To maintain consistency, the transcripts were
reviewed some weeks after coding, to see if the same set of themes emerge.
This was achieved with the help of three independent researchers with no
prior connection to the study. Ideally, this could further eliminate bias and
check to confirm the replicability of this analysis.
Finally, undertaking an investigation of events in financial services raises
questions of confidentiality. The researcher had to deal with senior bank
mangers from different banks, in competition for market share in the same
banking industry. It was evident that some respondents refused to speak
when probed on issues of strategy or actions to be taken in response to
competition. These difficulties were considered when drafting interview
questions, especially as it relates to practices that highlight competitive
297
advantages of individual banks. Thus, data considered to be highly
confidential was not included in this study or available.
8.6 Recommendations for Further Research
Primarily, this study’s research questions focus on change management
practices of consolidating banks and its effects on credit availability to the
private sector. The current events in the Nigerian and global financial
industries show that further research is required in observing the impact of
consolidation and the effective use of policy instruments to maintain stability,
confidence, and provide necessary support for economic recovery. In the
case of Nigeria, further lines of enquiry link into some of the thirteen
objectives highlighted by the CBN for banking sector reforms.
The CBN dismissed the Chief Executive Officers and other top management
staff of five Nigerian banks in August 2009. The banks include:
Intercontinental Bank, Union Bank, Afribank, Oceanic Bank and FinBank.
Senior bank managers in these banks were accused of giving loans to
prominent Nigerian businessmen and companies without adhering to good
corporate governance and risk management practices, and a total of N400
billion was injected into the affected banks to avoid systemic problems in the
banking industry. This indicates that the CBN’s objective of adopting a risk
focused and rule based regulatory framework require considerable reviews.
Further research in this area could provide recommendations on how to
enhance corporate governance and risk management practices in the
Nigerian banking industry and other developing economies. For example: the
study by Amao and Amaeshi (2008) on effective corporate governance and
accountability in Nigeria, could also be built on to examine risk management
practices of banks, with the aim of recommending practical solutions to the
regulatory challenges faced by the CBN.
Furthermore, the possibility of systemic problems resulting from bank failure,
highlight the important role of financial institutions in maintaining stability in
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the economy and the need to develop contingency planning frameworks for
systemic banking distress. Basically further research in this area could focus
on increased minimum capital requirements, capital adequacy ratios
determined by bank risk exposures, and the use of such buffers to minimise
government aid to failing banks. It can be argued that excessive risk taking
is reduced in situations were banks and their shareholders are made to
absorb the cost of failing. The legislation for an asset management company
is another line of enquiry, in which non-performing loans are bought in
exchange for government bonds in a bid to make rescued lenders saleable.
Overall, the findings in this study suggest that bigger banking institutions
through consolidation positively impact on the Nigerian economy. However,
recent events in the global financial industry show that bigger banks present
higher systemic risks if they become too big to fail. There is therefore the
need to explore how policy makers can effectively deploy policy instruments
to prevent situations where banks become too big fail and provide early
warning signals against excessive risk taking.
This study claims that banking consolidation increased credit to the private
sector in Nigeria, findings and analysis in sections 6.2.5 and 6.5 indicate that
existing regulations in the SME segment did not make it worthwhile for banks
to lend. It is important to address such regulatory bottlenecks with the aim
of creating an enabling environment for the flow of credit to the SME
segment. There is a need for joined up government and private sector
thinking to address issues of credit availability in the supply and demand side
of the Nigerian economy. Such an exploratory study could explore the
increased use of micro finance institutions, venture capitalists, and business
angels as credit delivery channels, highlight some of the difficulties faced by
the SME segment in Nigeria and other developing economies, and proffer
solutions on how best to improve the business environment and access to
credit.
299
8.7 Critical Reflection on the Doctoral Research
The research process for this study has been extremely demanding and
awakening. However, my research interests developed in many unexpected
ways and continued to evolve over the last three years. I have also
developed a keen interest for management research, which should translate
into some publications in the near future. I am currently working on a journal
article (Titled: “Initial results from banking consolidation and effect on
competition in the Nigerian banking industry”) based on findings in my
chapter 6, and intend to approach the Journal of Financial Regulation and
Compliance for publication.
During the course of this study, I consider my ability to think critically, write
crisp incisive papers and evaluate complex issues, to be developmental
aspects for an individual undertaking doctoral level research. This is also
reflected in the realist philosophical approach used in this study. I learnt to
listen more often and appreciate alternative perspectives or a contradictory
explanation to any given situation, as each perspective can have validity.
This is particularly important in organisations where the co-existence of
multiple viewpoints and paradoxes are all a natural part of life and survival.
These personal developments will undoubtedly enhance my ability to perform
as a senior executive, management consultant or educator.
The findings of this study are made explicit and put in context as four years
after banking consolidation; the effects on the Nigerian economy are still
expected to evolve. Conducting such research many more years after
consolidation could provide a richer picture of it’s impact on banking
practices and credit availability to the private sector. However, this limitation
is addressed in section 8.5 and relevant areas for further research are
discussed in section 8.6 of this chapter.
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Appendix 3
Nigerian Banks which participated in the interviews, their categories
and codes
Stand-Alone Banks (SA) 1) Guaranty Trust Bank Plc (SA 1)
2) Standard Chartered Bank (SA 2)
Central Ownership Banks (CO) 3) Intercontinental Bank Plc
(CO 1)
4) AfriBank Plc (CO 2)
Common Interest Banks (CI) 5) Diamond Bank (CI 1)
6) First City Monument Bank Plc
(CI 2)
7) Bank PHB Plc (CI 3)
8) Unity Bank Plc (CI 4)
9) United Bank of Africa Plc (CI 5)
10)First Bank of Nigeria Plc (CI 6)
11)FIN Bank Plc (CI 7)
The Press (P) 12) The Punch Newspaper (P 1)
Policy Maker(CBN) 13) Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN 1)
All senior bank managers interviewed are based in Lagos, the commercial
capital of Nigeria. Thus, the researcher travelled to Lagos to conduct face-to-
face semi-structured interviews. These managers were directly involved in
implementing changes necessitated by the banking consolidation. Senior
managers were contacted weeks in advance by the researcher, through
written requests (invitation) asking for permission to interview them on their
bank’s response to the consolidation. All participants were guaranteed
anonymity and non-inclusion of commercially sensitive information in the
interview process. A total of twenty-four request letters were dispatched (to
cover all banks in the Nigerian banking industry), and eleven out of twenty-
four banks contacted agreed to have their senior employees speak to the
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researcher. Permission was also granted for telephone interviews, for
respondents who are not available to participate in face-to-face interviews or
to follow-up on emergent issues which necessitate further clarification.
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Appendix 4
Sample Transcript of interview with a senior bank manager from
Diamond Bank
Q1: What was the initial response of your bank, to Central Bank of Nigeria’s
consolidation drive?
At first there was some enlightenment for staff, and the issue of how to raise
the minimum requirements of the Central Bank was discussed. There were
various options, there was the option of raising additional funds from the
capital market and also the option of merging with other banks. Even though
some banks; for example Lead Bank Ltd lobbied against banking
consolidation, Diamond Bank was receptive to the CBN’s consolidation drive.
Q2: What options did you have as a bank to meet the new requirements?
As a bank we discussed the options of raising capital from the stock market
and the possibility of merging or acquiring another bank.
Q3: How did your bank meet the new requirements?
First, the bank issued an IPO (Initial Public Offer), in which staff members
were involved in enlightening the public of the benefits of buying the bank’s
shares. After its public offer and raising the required capital, Diamond Bank
acquired Lion Bank because we wanted to spread out to northern Nigeria. We
wanted a bank that had a lot of presence in the north and Lion Bank met this
requirement. This acquisition had a strategic advantage, because Diamond
Bank was seen as an eastern Nigerian bank before now and had to acquire a
northern based bank to help expand its banking services across Nigeria. The
issue was if we wanted to expand organically or acquire another bank, we
looked at the strategic advantages of an acquisition and decided it was right
for us.
Q4: What were the key steps used, and in what sequence were they
implemented.
After raising capital, we tried to identify target acquisitions and reviewed a
number of banks through due diligence processes. As earlier stated, we
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acquired Lion Bank and therefore tried to integrate their people, because
both banks had different cultures. This includes issues of job scale, reward,
management positions and values. I remember that lots of trainings were
organised to help with the process of integration, but there were major
issues of culture because Lion Bank was a northern based bank. There were
also layoffs and down grading for people who could not adapt. With respect
to systems, both banks adopted the software and processes used by
Diamond Bank.
Q5: From my understanding of implementing change, there could be
positive factor that drive the change process. What positive factors
influenced the change process for your bank?
Diamond Bank had and still has a very strong brand and capital base. Our
processes and values helped drive the change necessitated by consolidation.
In the case of our acquisition for example, most of our processes we
deployed and that helped make the integration of people and systems fast. I
think the change process was easier for us because we were bigger and
basically integrated people and systems from Lion Bank, thus there were few
issues of contention. This would have been more difficult if we were of equal
size as is the case in Unity Bank.
Q6: People naturally tend to resist changing old patterns. What sort of
challenges did you face while trying to implement these changes in your
bank?
Differences in culture were the main resistance to change. You know bringing
two banks together, you have to harmonise different work cultures. Lion
bank has a way that they normally do their processes, in fact they were seen
as a bit slow in their approach to the market. For instance their marketing is
not as aggressive, so the staff that were taken over had to be taught to
move (laughs). A lot has changed as a result of the consolidation. However, I
remember we were advised in a certain promotion exercise to promote any
former Lion Bank staff that appears on the list; as such an individual must
have put in so much effort. This is because most of them (former Lion Bank
staff) were not performing. Even up till now, I can tell you that its still a bit
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easy to identify former Lion bank staff, they are a bit reserved.
Q7: The concentration ratios of the Nigerian banking industry shows that,
top 10 banks have increased in size by assets, deposits and extended loans.
How has this changed your bank’s risk management and other operational
activities?
I must say Diamond bank realised the effects of CBN’s changes on its loan
size, capital base and assets quite early, and they sought for the required
skills and human capital to staff their risk management units and improve
the process. To achieve this they headhunted capable hands. Before now
Diamond Bank was being managed like a small bank, but with the changes in
size things had to change. If you are managing a small bank, the owners
practically knew every borrower and thus can assess them one-on-one or
visit them to assess them. With the expansion, the bank needed people who
understand risk management of various businesses. We employed
expatriates and consultants to help improve our processes, and deploy best
practice. Furthermore, we acquired various risk management tools to help in
the analysis of credit and its automation. We have also categorised our
customers into various risk buckets, which has helped us to manage them
better according to the risk rating of each customer. Departments have also
been established to oversee market risks and operational risks. As a bank we
have encouraged the use of trainings both external and internal to upscale
our people. In summary, risk management became very important to the
bank as a result of its increased assets, deposits and extended loans because
if you take money from people you need to pay interests, and to do that you
need to make good loans.
Q8: My preliminary research shows that the banking industry remained
competitive before and after consolidation. What is your observation in this
regard?
Yes, I spoke earlier on about headhunting, and as we tried to headhunt
skilled staff, other banks also tried to do the same thing. In the Nigerian
banking industry there is a scarcity of skilled staff, thus few skilled staff are
being headhunted by various banks. As a result, there is high competition for
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skilled staff and this also go a long way in providing customers with good
services. For example; a good relationship manager is able to move to a new
bank with a sizable customer base from his/her previous bank. Secondly,
banks are now able to do business they were unable to do before. If there
were two or three banks lending to Coca Cola Plc, now even more banks
could go for Coca Cola. There is also development of new areas like
mortgages, consumer finance, credit cards……..you see all these are areas
that banks are competing to get a niche.
Q9: Do you think this degree of competition will have a positive or negative
effect on availability of credit to the Nigerian economy.
The high level of competition in the Nigerian banking industry will have a
positive effect, because the consumer has a choice. The consumer is now
able to go either to bank A or bank B for products or services. Hitherto, a
particular product (i.e. mortgage) may only be offered by a Union Bank and if
a customer does not meet the bank’s requirements he/she will have no
access to the product. Now, if you go to Union Bank and they are slow or are
asking too many questions or have conditions you don’t want, you can go to
a Diamond Bank and get the same thing. So with the ability of Nigerian
banks to do similar transactions, big transactions, and different markets the
consumer will have a choice. This will also positively impact on interest rates,
as competition will cause a reduction in interest rates. In summary, I think
this level competition has a positive effect on the Nigerian economy.
Q10: What are the key factors that affect your propensity to lend?
There are regulatory constraints, by regulation a Nigerian bank is not
supposed to lend more than 80% of its deposits. It is also to maintain a cash
reserve ratio which has been reduced from 5% to 1%, because the
authorities want higher liquidity in the economy. So these are constrains that
can boost our ability to lend or reduce it. There are other things to consider
which are important internal determinants of our propensity to lend such as:
understanding the market, the profitability of the business, and the risk
implications. It is also important to access the bank’s capacity to handle a
particular segment for instance; not all banks do credit cards, while others
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have diversified into the insurance and mortgage segments. All these could
either increase or limit a banks propensity to lend. On the other hand, the
CBN tries to ensure that banks implement the Basel 2 framework to maintain
systemic stability.
Q11: My analysis shows a slight reduction in the spread between deposit
and lending rates in Nigeria. What specifically do you think has influenced
this?
The reduction in interest rates has been influenced by competition, and to
some extent regulation. Now the CBN states that banks should not charge
rates of more than 22% and a 2% management fee, thus making interest
rate charges 24% all inclusive. The CBN also states that deposits be taken at
15%, so they have given banks a very thin margin. Unlike before when
banks could take deposits at 3% and lend at 30% or 45% depending on the
risk they perceive on the transaction and customers ability to pay.
Q12: My findings confirm there has been increased credit to the private
sector after the consolidation. What specifically do you think has influenced
this?
I think this has been influenced by a number of factors such as; higher bank
capital, competition and the thinning margin at the corporate end. The
thinning margins at the corporate end now force banks to look for areas were
they can make more spread. Thus the banks have focused on the retail
segments that are less price sensitive. Another important factor is the huge
deposits of banks, remember that increased capital induced banks to expand
to areas that they had no presence before and has helped them to bank
smaller companies and individuals in those areas.
Q13: What has been the most prominent effects of restructuring on your
bank’s risk diversification and lending policies?
Consciously, we have an internal policy that no sector of the economy should
take more than 10% of our total risk assets. I may say that the larger capital
has helped banks including Diamond Bank, to provide banking services in
areas that were ignored before now…….because there is an enhancement of
our single obligor limit. So we can do big ticket long term projects in oil and
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telecoms, and offer products to the consumer segment for example
mortgages. Therefore our ability to focus resources in new areas has helped
our risk diversification and lending policies.
Q14: How would you characterise the key drivers of lending performance in
the newly consolidated banking sector?
I said earlier in this interview that we employed consultants and expatriates
to help us develop our lending policies, so that we can operate as a big bank.
Thus, most previously small banks have now developed proactive lending
policies to help them adapt to the new realities of being a big bank. We also
reviewed corporate governance issues, the kind of qualification of our board
members, the ratio of independent and non independent directors, and the
kind of imputes expected of them were all developed as a result of
consolidation. Also banks have developed polices to determine how to lend to
their subsidiaries. Generally, the new banking environment in Nigeria is
characterised by the need to effectively document bank lending polices so
that they become more institutionalised, robust and can run without
excessive executive oversight.
Q15: What do you think are the key challenges in credit performance of your
bank in the next 18months?
As a bank we are concerned with the CBN’s policy response to the recession.
The Nigerian economy is currently faced with issues of margin loans. I
understand that the CBN is insisting on the positioning of these loans, and
this will take sometime depending on the level of bank exposure to these
markets. There is also a slow down in the consumer sector because of the
recession. So in the next 18 months, I would expect banks to focus on
stabilising and recovering from the effects of these events. In our external
environment other finance firms for example; the micro finance firms still do
not have enough capacity to compete with banks.
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Appendix 5
Sample Coding Frame for Primary Data Collection in the Nigerian Banking
Industry
Change Management in the Nigerian Banking Industry
1: Bank Response to CBN’s Consolidation Drive
1.1 Receptive
1.2 Resistance
1.3 Other Issues
2: Options Adopted by Banks to meet new CBN Requirements
2.1 Public Offer/Recapitalisation
2.2 Private Placement
2.3 Merger
2.4 Acquisition
2.5 Go Solo
2.6 Partner with Strategic Investors
2.7 Group Injection of Funds
2.8 Other Issues
3: Key steps used by Banks to implement consolidation
3.1 Regulatory Requirements/Due Diligence
3.2 Training
3.3 Communicating to Employees/Customers/General Public
3.4 Structural Change
3.5 Change Champions
3.6 Action Research
3.7 Cultural Integration/Acculturation
3.8 Operational Integration/Technology Infrastructure
3.9 Strategic Objectives/Vision/Business Plan
3.10 Guiding Coalition/Integration Teams
3.11 Management Incentives/Staffing
3.12 Re-branding
3.13 Leadership Style
3.14 Other Issues
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Appendix 6
Acronyms used in Data from Nigerian Banks
GLA Gross Loan & Advances
PBD Provision for Bad Debts
BTD Bank Total Deposit
NBTD National Bank Total Deposit
GTA Gross Total Assets
RNL Ratio of National Loans
STD Share of Total Deposit
PBT Profit Before Tax
Data from Nigerian Banks for 2001
GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Access Bank 3488 693 4832 1265319 8001 0.20 0.004 116
All StatesTrust Bank 7592 934 27499 1265319 35540 0.12 0.022 1660
Afribank Int. Ltd 3466 423 3787 1265319 5682 0.12 0.003 191
Afribank Nig Plc 21122 6527 58287 1265319 71839 0.31 0.046 1090
Continental Trust Bank 6200 411.00 11176.00 1265319 16448.00 0.07 0.009 469.00
Co-operative Bank 6119 1122 12253 1265319 14991 0.18 0.010 303
Devcom Bank Ltd 2744 155 2962 1265319 5312 0.06 0.002 550
FBN (Merchant Bankers) 4362 830 8473 1265319 11455 0.19 0.007 409
First Bank of Nig Plc 57685 11574 148279 1265319 212901 0.20 0.117 6201
First Interstate Merch Bank 846 111 1877 1265319 3073 0.13 0.001 101
Fortune Int Bank Plc 7065 857 8908 1265319 11089 0.12 0.007 949
FSB Int Bank Plc 14196 1412 16472 1265319 30314 0.10 0.013 1358
Guaranty Trust Bank 12667 594 24139 1265319 40819 0.05 0.019 2050
Gulf Bank 5186 858 10781 1265319 13090 0.17 0.009 660
Hallmark Bank Plc 9380 1548 16597 1265319 231 0.17 0.013 1253
Inland Bank Ltd 6237 1008 8957 1265319 13834 0.16 0.007 283
INMB Bank 1382 77307 1738 1265319 2978 55.94 0.001 167
Int Trust Bank 2286 1048 4353 1265319 4957 0.46 0.003 52
Investment Banking & Trust Co 5287 237 3813 1265319 10448 0.04 0.003 1065
Lead Bank Ltd 5858 176 7409 1265319 11914 0.03 0.006 1008
Lion Bank Plc 2538 324 4740 1265319 7738 0.13 0.004 364
Magnum Trust Bank Plc 3112 249 8770 1265319 10420 0.08 0.007 362
Manny Bank 2486 334 2766 1265319 5539 0.13 0.002 361
MBC Int Bank Ltd 3194 564 5373 1265319 9926 0.18 0.004 201
Midas Bank Plc 1426 717 1293 1265319 2022 0.50 0.001 25
National Bank Ltd 2765 1764 1954 1265319 6164 0.64 0.002 53
New Africa Merchant Bank Plc 231 195 393 1265319 170 0.84 0.000 4
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GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
New Nigeria Bank Plc 836 8 2480 1265319 6488 0.01 0.002 -119
Omegabank Plc 4312 799 7688 1265319 11386 0.19 0.006 381
Pacific Bank Ltd 1767 173 1727 1265319 3702 0.10 0.001 243
Prudent Bank Plc 2068 119 2896 1265319 5099 0.06 0.002 203
Regent Bank Plc 518 5 673 1265319 2207 0.01 0.001 11
Trade Bank Ltd 4805 1414 9113 1265319 10792 0.29 0.007 210
Triumph Merchant Bank Plc 1898 318 2778 1265319 4891 0.17 0.002 200
Union Bank of Nig Plc 45835 8910 170977 1265319 214885 0.19 0.135 7058
Union Merchant Bank 1934 865 4613 1265319 6103 0.45 0.004 384
United Bank of Africa Plc 31041 7935 133135 1265319 183248 0.26 0.105 1585
Universal Trust Bank Plc 10813 1936 18967 1265319 29846 0.18 0.015 1373
Wema Bank Plc 14799 2588 29631 1265319 38813 0.17 0.023 800
ACB Int Bank 2387 2387 22 1265319 1954 1.00 0.000 720
Assurance Bank Ltd 3028 2796 2842 1265319 1517 0.92 0.002 -411
Broad Bank Nigeria Ltd 1035 568 3242 1265319 4106 0.55 0.003 -203
Diamond Bank Ltd 15798 421 32398 1265319 47372 0.03 0.026 2225
Eagle Bank Ltd 1191 1164 774 1265319 1508 0.98 0.001 -50
Eko Int Bank Plc 4348 1044 6842 1265319 10104 0.24 0.005 194
Equitorial Trust Bank 12039 781 19214 1265319 26171 0.06 0.015 2111
First City Monument Bank Ltd 6500 364 8128 1265319 17497 0.06 0.006 1030
Fidelity Bank Ltd 2882 552 9323 1265319 12715 0.19 0.007 442
First Atlantic Bank Ltd 5593 268 7857 1265319 10078 0.05 0.006 658
Global Bank Plc 4635 819 6578 1265319 8181 0.18 0.005 502
Int Merchant Bank 118 4905 1265319 8787 0.004 323
Intercity Bank Plc 6056 933 13127 1265319 17850 0.15 0.010 328
Marina Int Bank Ltd 2056 78 2167 1265319 3807 0.04 0.002 277
Nal Bank Plc 6742 824 7675 1265319 17480 0.12 0.006 461
NUB Bank Plc 1790 1790 37 1265319 1113 1.00 0.000 18
Platinum Bank Ltd 2813 28 6924 1265319 8453 0.01 0.005 137
Societe Generale Bank Ltd 5033 980 14470 1265319 16621 0.19 0.011 595
Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1670 107 1527 1265319 2677 0.06 0.001 73
Zenith Int Bank Ltd 13029 409 30688 1265319 60190 0.03 0.024 2802
Fountain Trust Bank 2163 480 4636 1265319 7652 0.22 0.004 685
Liberty Bank Plc 5788 1218 7345 1265319 9092 0.21 0.006 -697
Metropolitan Bank Ltd 3172 573 5569 1265319 7558 0.18 0.004 477
Societe Bancaire Ltd 2491 1216 1818 1265319 3163 0.49 0.001 -249
Standard Trust Bank 22894 1648 52158 1265319 60522 0.07 0.041 2133
Oceanic Bank Plc 7574 501 23388 1265319 32321 0.07 0.018 2474
African Express Bank 1472 144 2595 1265319 3680 0.10 0.002 295
African International Bank Ltd 11469 9281 20672 1265319 18749 0.81 0.016 -3453
Capital Bank Int Ltd 4303 740 6834 1265319 10712 0.17 0.005 293
Co-operative Dev. Bank 4538 1116 4912 1265319 6895 0.25 0.004 142
Ecobank Nig Ltd 6157 890 15910 1265319 23680 0.14 0.013 932
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GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Equity Bank of Nig Ltd 6904 1599 11784 1265319 15995 0.23 0.009 1025
Gateway Bank Plc 3992 685 6696 1265319 9411 0.17 0.005 611
Habib Nig Bank Ltd 8868 1604 20755 1265319 29262 0.18 0.016 1452
Intercontinental Bank Ltd 12080 1196 23509 1265319 35779 0.10 0.019 1523
Nigerian-American Bank Ltd 3157 95 2135 1265319 2135 0.03 0.002 286
NBM Bank Limited 2780 381 4498 1265319 4498 0.14 0.004 264
Nigeria Int Bank Ltd 18533 1803 23915 1265319 23915 0.10 0.019 4408
Stanbic Bank 2080 202 3268 1265319 3268 0.10 0.003 88
Standard Chartered Bank Ltd 585 6 813 1265319 813 0.01 0.001 -259
Trans Int Bank Plc 4183 553 8680 1265319 13135 0.13 0.007 508
Data from Nigerian Banks for 2002
GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Access Bank 4980 658 6475 1262556 11343 0.13 0.005 -18
Afribank Int. Ltd 2876 204 5078 1262556 7263 0.07 0.004 348
Afribank Nig Plc 31138 5405 56955 1262556 73088 0.17 0.045 2231
Bank of the North Ltd 43519 3337 46573 1262556 62595 0.08 0.037 743
Continental Trust Bank 14662 1552 11781 1262556 19439 0.11 0.009 -1106
Co-operative Bank 8982 1598 12713 1262556 17012 0.18 0.010 510
Devcom Bank Ltd 2701 150 2890 1262556 5255 0.06 0.002 163
FBN (Merchant Bankers) 6934 1507 9764 1262556 14289 0.22 0.008 550
First Bank of Nig Plc 91227 29309 168175 1262556 266356 0.32 0.133 5087
First Interstate Merch Bank 1434 206 2253 1262556 3645 0.14 0.002 259
Fortune Int Bank Plc 7698 1246 4317 1262556 9195 0.16 0.003 666
FSB Int Bank Plc 12715 2124 19059 1262556 31302 0.17 0.015 1114
Guaranty Trust Bank 18217 617 31373 1262556 59292 0.03 0.025 2657
Gulf Bank 7585 857 7305 1262556 13975 0.11 0.006 1007
Hallmark Bank Plc 12559 2273 20677 1262556 31662 0.18 0.016 1564
Inland Bank Ltd 8430 779 10099 1262556 16646 0.09 0.008 598
INMB Bank 1237 42 1794 1262556 3703 0.03 0.001 283
Int Trust Bank 3263 623 3849 1262556 4429 0.19 0.003 63
Investment Banking & Trust Co 10210 185 8910 1262556 20578 0.02 0.007 1503
Lead Bank Ltd 6250 376 6406 1262556 12511 0.06 0.005 833
Lion Bank Plc 3185 449 6169 1262556 10973 0.14 0.005 485
Magnum Trust Bank Plc 5715 274 10763 1262556 13414 0.05 0.009 501
Manny Bank 3250 657 4256 1262556 7447 0.20 0.003 446
MBC Int Bank Ltd 3370 961 4901 1262556 9227 0.29 0.004 389
Midas Bank Plc 2225 1032 2211 1262556 2363 0.46 0.002 -208
National Bank Ltd 4337 70 6830 1262556 11657 0.02 0.005 64
New Africa Merchant Bank Plc 447 447 526 1262556 952 1.00 0.000 -12
New Nigeria Bank Plc 3767 82 9563 1262556 12743 0.02 0.008 -324
Pacific Bank Ltd 1624 517 980 1262556 2282 0.32 0.001 -210
Prudent Bank Plc 5400 280 8779 1262556 12632 0.05 0.007 523
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GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Regent Bank Plc 955 10 184 1262556 3336 0.01 0.000 127
Trade Bank Ltd 5237 970 8922 1262556 11304 0.19 0.007 411
Triumph Merchant Bank Plc 1677 335 2531 1262556 5731 0.20 0.002 236
Union Bank of Nig Plc 61962 17568 204347 1262556 275194 0.28 0.162 7490
Union Merchant Bank 1574 159 159 1262556 7726 0.10 0.000 651
United Bank of Africa Plc 41150 4787 4787 1262556 198680 0.12 0.004 2238
Universal Trust Bank Plc 14190 2418 2418 1262556 32406 0.17 0.002 1523
Wema Bank Plc 17093 1291 1291 1262556 44101 0.08 0.001 2294
Broad Bank Nigeria Ltd 2119 615 3419 1262556 5495 0.29 0.003 25
Diamond Bank Ltd 16255 848 33556 1262556 53199 0.05 0.027 2142
Eagle Bank Ltd 1275 670 890 1262556 1598 0.53 0.001 64
Equitorial Trust Bank 12545 525 21361 1262556 29705 0.04 0.017 2462
First City Monument Bank Ltd 7484 1490 8564 1262556 14951 0.20 0.007 501
Fidelity Bank Ltd 5927 1006 12281 1262556 15637 0.17 0.010 634
First Atlantic Bank Ltd 4801 249 8677 1262556 13064 0.05 0.007 601
Guardian Express Bank Plc 748 17 2062 1262556 4137 0.02 0.002 210
Global Bank Plc 4146 356 8000 1262556 11446 0.09 0.006 752
Int Merchant Bank 2999 1260 3138 1262556 5049 0.42 0.002 -842
Intercity Bank Plc 6930 1912 13014 1262556 21209 0.28 0.010 417
Marina Int Bank Ltd 2443 87 2603 1262556 5073 0.04 0.002 353
Nal Bank Plc 12704 1249 14652 1262556 21468 0.10 0.012 71
NUB Bank Plc 397 12 3125 1262556 5020 0.03 0.002 -72
Platinum Bank Ltd 4496 91 9921 1262556 13305 0.02 0.008 151
Societe Generale Bank Ltd 7339 1077 12876 1262556 15429 0.15 0.010 217
Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1579 746 467 1262556 1562 0.47 0.000 -517
Zenith Int Bank Ltd 20665 439 50134 1262556 92563 0.02 0.040 3999
Fountain Trust Bank 2953 349 8468 1262556 10892 0.12 0.007 563
Liberty Bank Plc 6133 5027 3267 1262556 3666 0.82 0.003 -2937
Metropolitan Bank Ltd 4650 839 8293 1262556 10130 0.18 0.007 213
Reliance Bank Ltd 1697 21 3970 1262556 6073 0.01 0.003 127
Societe Bancaire Ltd 1718 1302 1756 1262556 2326 0.76 0.001 -142
Standard Trust Bank 23290 1458 58927 1262556 69946 0.06 0.047 2782
Oceanic Bank Plc 11272 673 40028 1262556 53294 0.06 0.032 3121
African Express Bank 2027 495 4476 1262556 6708 0.24 0.004 126
African International Bank Ltd 12498 10186 18554 1262556 14120 0.82 0.015 -1988
Capital Bank Int Ltd 6343 248 12262 1262556 15662 0.04 0.010 643
Co-operative Dev. Bank 4489 1442 5164 1262556 7660 0.32 0.004 336
Ecobank Nig Ltd 7169 1443 17602 1262556 24072 0.20 0.014 714
Equity Bank of Nig Ltd 6302 1289 11474 1262556 15042 0.20 0.009 235
Gateway Bank Plc 4959 719 7702 1262556 11923 0.14 0.006 702
Habib Nig Bank Ltd 12838 1536 22975 1262556 35437 0.12 0.018 993
Intercontinental Bank Ltd 14556 2049 35584 1262556 47797 0.14 0.028 2380
Nigerian-American Bank Ltd 2702 61 2245 1262556 5277 0.02 0.002 284
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NBM Bank Limited 4019 584 5571 1262556 10241 0.15 0.004 -696
Nigeria Int Bank Ltd 21656 2475 35555 1262556 72288 0.11 0.028 4896
Stanbic Bank 2178 221 2892 1262556 6798 0.10 0.002 123
Standard Chartered Bank Ltd 2490 24 11416 1262556 18428 0.01 0.009 768
Trans Int Bank Plc 6394 9786 9786 1262556 14483 1.53 0.008 497
Tropical Commercial Bank Plc 4448 3992 9786 1262556 5644 0.90 0.008 58
Data from Nigerian for 2003
GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Access Bank 7135 629 9309 1774011 22582 0.09 0.005 811
All StatesTrust Bank 8771 815 31521 1774011 37686 0.09 0.018 47
Afribank Int. Ltd 4298 895 5200 1774011 7952 0.21 0.003 185
Afribank Nig Plc 33845 8625 61195 1774011 83144 0.25 0.034 2471
Bank of the North Ltd 49122 36434 63085 1774011 40731 0.74 0.036
-
35120
Co-operative Bank 11291 1801 13133 1774011 19525 0.16 0.007 213
Devcom Bank Ltd 2092 238 4916 1774011 8148 0.11 0.003 238
FBN (Merchant Bankers) 6662 2370 10079 1774011 15553 0.36 0.006 339
First Bank of Nig Plc 92935 36899 193995 1774011 320578 0.40 0.109 13393
First Interstate Merch Bank 2403 707 3372 1774011 5598 0.29 0.002 -402
Fortune Int Bank Plc 8126 1531 7014 1774011 12709 0.19 0.004 718
FSB Int Bank Plc 13404 3509 23743 1774011 35783 0.26 0.013 -2671
Guaranty Trust Bank 31556 893 51068 1774011 83311 0.03 0.029 3802
Gulf Bank 9805 9451 8320 1774011 18857 0.96 0.005 958
Hallmark Bank Plc 20170 2616 31182 1774011 40275 0.13 0.018 1458
Inland Bank Ltd 12479 2488 15102 1774011 24580 0.20 0.009 478
INMB Bank 1476 154 1600 1774011 3512 0.10 0.001 184
Int Trust Bank 2723 1433 3290 1774011 3995 0.53 0.002 -336
Investment Banking & Trust Co 9604 225 8182 1774011 23947 0.02 0.005 1688
Lead Bank Ltd 7111 742 9984 1774011 15119 0.10 0.006 620
Lion Bank Plc 3830 737 7889 1774011 13765 0.19 0.004 690
Magnum Trust Bank Plc 7989 551 16513 1774011 19904 0.07 0.009 401
Manny Bank 4757 1192 5165 1774011 8840 0.25 0.003 198
MBC Int Bank Ltd 4331 175 11322 1774011 15581 0.04 0.006 421
Midas Bank Plc 2535 1305 2112 1774011 2575 0.51 0.001 -376
National Bank Ltd 4332 542 7702 1774011 12985 0.13 0.004 125
New Africa Merchant Bank Plc 502 366 751 1774011 1377 0.73 0.000 -21
New Nigeria Bank Plc 2414 261 8209 1774011 11779 0.11 0.005 189
Omegabank Plc 5399 807 11197 1774011 14775 0.15 0.006 105
Pacific Bank Ltd 1698 1130 1038 1774011 1954 0.67 0.001 -1013
Prudent Bank Plc 8909 450 16109 1774011 20934 0.05 0.009 854
Regent Bank Plc 1017 23 3190 1774011 5148 0.02 0.002 147
Trade Bank Ltd 7348 2592 11799 1774011 15278 0.35 0.007 433
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Triumph Merchant Bank Plc 7272 1321 8797 1774011 12489 0.18 0.005 -346
Union Bank of Nig Plc 61962 16399 224347 1774011 329583 0.26 0.126 10154
Union Merchant Bank 2800 339 6466 1774011 10254 0.12 0.004 860
United Bank of Africa Plc 50178 4102 142427 1774011 200995 0.08 0.080 4816
Universal Trust Bank Plc 14282 2703 26584 1774011 32135 0.19 0.015 496
Wema Bank Plc 23508 2768 43762 1774011 61323 0.12 0.025 2286
ACB Int Bank 759 64 2500 1774011 11313 0.08 0.001 553
Assurance Bank Ltd 5296 3745 8469 1774011 9541 0.71 0.005 -1415
Broad Bank Nigeria Ltd 4377 1031 5479 1774011 8266 0.24 0.003 165
Diamond Bank Ltd 15932 1420 42147 1774011 59287 0.09 0.024 309
Eagle Bank Ltd 739 203 3984 1774011 5291 0.27 0.002 105
Eko Int Bank Plc 6908 1937 10622 1774011 16422 0.28 0.006 861
Equitorial Trust Bank 17924 2619 25838 1774011 36207 0.15 0.015 2027
First City Monument Bank Ltd 6414 580 9216 1774011 15164 0.09 0.005 57
Fidelity Bank Ltd 7881 706 16888 1774011 22517 0.09 0.010 1085
First Atlantic Bank Ltd 8165 519 14355 1774011 20910 0.06 0.008 609
Guardian Express Bank Plc 3079 88 6459 1774011 10277 0.03 0.004 476
Global Bank Plc 5297 1217 12228 1774011 17316 0.23 0.007 613
Int Merchant Bank 3456 3612 3967 1774011 2079 1.05 0.002 -4662
Intercity Bank Plc 9259 3183 14909 1774011 24545 0.34 0.008 561
Marina Int Bank Ltd 2271 142 5497 1774011 8807 0.06 0.003 -522
Nal Bank Plc 11889 760 15376 1774011 24609 0.06 0.009 233
NUB Bank Plc 2011 45 5701 1774011 8057 0.02 0.003 152
Platinum Bank Ltd 8678 478 14988 1774011 20155 0.06 0.008 303
Zenith Int Bank Ltd 27895 605 61574 1774011 605 0.02 0.035 5440
Fountain Trust Bank 5347 756 11867 1774011 756 0.14 0.007 316
Liberty Bank Plc 6117 5957 2869 1774011 5957 0.97 0.002 -1294
Metropolitan Bank Ltd 7885 1592 12673 1774011 1592 0.20 0.007 242
Reliance Bank Ltd 2315 56 5330 1774011 56 0.02 0.003 227
Societe Bancaire Ltd 1234 1084 1672 1774011 1084 0.88 0.001 -9
Standard Trust Bank 22414 2340 74234 1774011 2340 0.10 0.042 3076
Oceanic Bank Plc 13600 725 49366 1774011 725 0.05 0.028 3287
African Express Bank 7910 7910 4798 1774011 2163 1.00 0.003 -7448
Capital Bank Int Ltd 7529 550 11928 1774011 17597 0.07 0.007 306
Co-operative Dev. Bank 4882 1649 4827 1774011 7879 0.34 0.003 334
Ecobank Nig Ltd 9715 1445 19979 1774011 27314 0.15 0.011 1111
Equity Bank of Nig Ltd 11356 1843 16545 1774011 23669 0.16 0.009 626
Gateway Bank Plc 6467 1188 8659 1774011 14140 0.18 0.005 755
Habib Nig Bank Ltd 14528 2267 24494 1774011 39758 0.16 0.014 1255
Intercontinental Bank Ltd 23187 1533 50245 1774011 71412 0.07 0.028 3414
Nigerian-American Bank Ltd 2994 86 2010 1774011 5532 0.03 0.001 293
NBM Bank Limited 4882 748 6630 1774011 10875 0.15 0.004 149
Nigeria Int Bank Ltd 26822 4922 37684 1774011 77636 0.18 0.021 4823
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Stanbic Bank 3190 197 3759 1774011 12166 0.06 0.002 240
Standard Chartered Bank Ltd 6658 71 14527 1774011 26254 0.01 0.008 1057
Trans Int Bank Plc 9065 1218 13364 1774011 19367 0.13 0.008 205
Tropical Commercial Bank Plc 4749 1582 5685 1774011 8515 0.33 0.003 127
Data from Nigerian for 2004
GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Access Bank 12341 879 22724 1854704 31342 0.07 0.012 952
All StatesTrust Bank 13654 977 31612 1854704 38768 0.07 0.017 -54
Afribank Int. Ltd 4059 1100 5293 1854704 7915 0.27 0.003 297
Afribank Nig Plc 26482 7404 57989 1854704 70578 0.28 0.031 1566
Bank of the North Ltd 53322 40353 28933 1854704 42252 0.76 0.016 164
Co-operative Bank 13508 2396 17585 1854704 23870 0.18 0.009 460
Devcom Bank Ltd 4033 423 6434 1854704 9602 0.10 0.003 256
FBN (Merchant Bankers) 7888 3641 13103 1854704 17312 0.46 0.007 -326
First Bank of Nig Plc 117123 39002 207181 1854704 312490 0.33 0.112 14106
First Interstate Merch Bank 3281 840 5121 1854704 6355 0.26 0.003 142
Fortune Int Bank Plc 11352 1629 7697 1854704 13669 0.14 0.004 208
FSB Int Bank Plc 12537 3444 28025 1854704 39817 0.27 0.015 254
Guaranty Trust Bank 45198 1522 74222 1854704 119698 0.03 0.040 5030
Gulf Bank 10913 1880 11235 1854704 21677 0.17 0.006 100
Hallmark Bank Plc 30966 7553 35096 1854704 47871 0.24 0.019 880
Inland Bank Ltd 14676 3538 16159 1854704 26404 0.24 0.009 527
INMB Bank 1870 234 1967 1854704 4098 0.13 0.001 171
Int Trust Bank 3483 2285 2965 1854704 2836 0.66 0.002 -324
Investment Banking & Trust Co 9618 138 10544 1854704 26872 0.01 0.006 1711
Lead Bank Ltd 8270 997 11722 1854704 19570 0.12 0.006 754
Lion Bank Plc 3921 836 8163 1854704 13463 0.21 0.004 419
Magnum Trust Bank Plc 9787 893 18906 1854704 23790 0.09 0.010 233
Manny Bank 7592 1904 7037 1854704 10943 0.25 0.004 237
MBC Int Bank Ltd 4543 280 9307 1854704 14446 0.06 0.005 624
Midas Bank Plc 3058 1901 2643 1854704 3046 0.62 0.001 -262
National Bank Ltd 5806 839 10655 1854704 16703 0.14 0.006 380
New Africa Merchant Bank Plc 521 375 444 1854704 1160 0.72 0.000 -67
New Nigeria Bank Plc 3900 456 13039 1854704 16047 0.12 0.007 350
Omegabank Plc 7284 1324 13966 1854704 17648 0.18 0.008 136
Pacific Bank Ltd 1279 500 1552 1854704 2432 0.39 0.001 536
Prudent Bank Plc 11314 1148 20913 1854704 25998 0.10 0.011 918
Regent Bank Plc 1868 43 3634 1854704 5405 0.02 0.002 -245
Trade Bank Ltd 7771 5326 12240 1854704 13262 0.69 0.007 -1601
Triumph Merchant Bank Plc 7272 1321 8797 1854704 12489 0.18 0.005 -346
Union Bank of Nig Plc 97643 19305 241585 1854704 367798 0.20 0.130 10210
Union Merchant Bank 3059 361 7288 1854704 11085 0.12 0.004 679
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United Bank of Africa Plc 58855 2719 151929 1854704 208806 0.05 0.082 5608
Universal Trust Bank Plc 14282 2703 26584 1854704 32136 0.19 0.014 496
Wema Bank Plc 41766 5159 55072 1854704 71424 0.12 0.030 1420
ACB Int Bank 945 62 4445 1854704 8631 0.07 0.002 29
Assurance Bank Ltd 1157 55 8134 1854704 9589 0.05 0.004 396
Broad Bank Nigeria Ltd 601 331 13434 1854704 17521 0.55 0.007 744
Diamond Bank Ltd 19500 1055 43391 1854704 69062 0.05 0.023 1162
Eagle Bank Ltd 1403 572 2140 1854704 2562 0.41 0.001 -470
Eko Int Bank Plc 8145 1953 12540 1854704 17184 0.24 0.007 559
Equitorial Trust Bank 21079 3573 33752 1854704 47406 0.17 0.018 2533
First City Monument Bank Ltd 8641 735 18019 1854704 23736 0.09 0.010 265
Fidelity Bank Ltd 11014 1278 19340 1854704 27552 0.12 0.010 1078
First Atlantic Bank Ltd 10320 707 23920 1854704 29917 0.07 0.013 821
Guardian Express Bank Plc 6493 316 14799 1854704 19460 0.05 0.008 583
Global Bank Plc 9469 1259 16216 1854704 20105 0.13 0.009 949
Int Merchant Bank 3953 2994 3120 1854704 4336 0.76 0.002 581
Intercity Bank Plc 1024 3789 18430 1854704 25702 3.70 0.010 554
Marina Int Bank Ltd 3586 230 5475 1854704 11865 0.06 0.003 494
Nal Bank Plc 12515 1546 17021 1854704 27222 0.12 0.009 1089
NUB Bank Plc 3076 228 8565 1854704 11560 0.07 0.005 441
Platinum Bank Ltd 9011 812 20015 1854704 25027 0.09 0.011 885
Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1020 58 73 1854704 4430 0.06 0.000 73
Zenith Int Bank Ltd 54420 1028 6405 1854704 193321 0.02 0.003 6405
Liberty Bank Plc 5899 5604 3266 1854704 3615 0.95 0.002 334
Reliance Bank Ltd 3260 91 7667 1854704 3260 0.03 0.004 322
Societe Bancaire Ltd 422 392 613 1854704 422 0.93 0.000 -42
Standard Trust Bank 35752 4837 103231 1854704 35752 0.14 0.056 4524
Oceanic Bank Plc 24827 576 68954 1854704 24827 0.02 0.037 3445
Capital Bank Int Ltd 7252 835 13054 1854704 17818 0.12 0.007 93
Co-operative Dev. Bank 5355 2695 4699 1854704 7161 0.50 0.003 -472
Ecobank Nig Ltd 13075 2012 28643 1854704 37642 0.15 0.015 1317
Habib Nig Bank Ltd 15056 2098 24034 1854704 37485 0.14 0.013 1283
NBM Bank Limited 6716 1274 9112 1854704 13855 0.19 0.005 -666
Nigeria Int Bank Ltd 21564 5623 42067 1854704 66247 0.26 0.023 5351
Stanbic Bank 3374 321 6815 1854704 12263 0.10 0.004 29
Standard Chartered Bank Ltd 9168 185 23526 1854704 34724 0.02 0.013 1565
Trans Int Bank Plc 9729 1419 14664 1854704 18799 0.15 0.008 593
Tropical Commercial Bank Plc 5797 1704 5764 1854704 8671 0.29 0.003 203
Data from Nigerian Banks for 2005
GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Access Bank 17942 1758 32608 2203915 66918 0.10 0.015 751
All StatesTrust Bank 23321 1789 41032 2203915 47429 0.08 0.019 361
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Afribank Int. Ltd 5773 1154 7678 2203915 10984 0.20 0.003 469
Afribank Nig Plc 30543 9192 61601 2203915 95754 0.30 0.028 530
Bank of the North Ltd 58006 44168 31760 2203915 44911 0.76 0.014 211
Co-operative Bank 14081 2569 16842 2203915 23690 0.18 0.008 237
Devcom Bank Ltd 3924 566 4692 2203915 8212 0.14 0.002 295
FBN (Merchant Bankers) 11647 4625 14547 2203915 20041 0.40 0.007 505
First Bank of Nig Plc 147511 32838 265378 2203915 377496 0.22 0.120 15145
First Interstate Merch Bank 3760 1032 6390 2203915 11267 0.27 0.003 -365
FSB Int Bank Plc 9588 3746 28405 2203915 41210 0.39 0.013 380
Guaranty Trust Bank 67179 2144 95564 2203915 167898 0.03 0.043 7004
Hallmark Bank Plc 44554 9066 65241 2203915 97336 0.20 0.030 1968
Int Trust Bank 3731 2850 4038 2203915 3905 0.76 0.002 -570
Investment Banking & Trust Co 13670 183 10886 2203915 34568 0.01 0.005 3013
Lead Bank Ltd 8273 1684 5540 2203915 13430 0.20 0.003 -578
Lion Bank Plc 6981 1437 9651 2203915 14824 0.21 0.004 99
Magnum Trust Bank Plc 10834 1124 17903 2203915 26994 0.10 0.008 663
MBC Int Bank Ltd 6206 341 12003 2203915 17748 0.05 0.005 371
New Africa Merchant Bank Plc 627 444 1358 2203915 2029 0.71 0.001 78
New Nigeria Bank Plc 5129 695 17032 2203915 21694 0.14 0.008 505
Omegabank Plc 7709 1842 13303 2203915 19097 0.24 0.006 734
Pacific Bank Ltd 1814 566 3085 2203915 4494 0.31 0.001 326
Prudent Bank Plc 13123 1000 22623 2203915 31991 0.08 0.010 743
Regent Bank Plc 2751 77 4668 2203915 6293 0.03 0.002 -75
Trade Bank Ltd 11235 917 14068 2203915 12785 0.08 0.006 -1109
Union Bank of Nig Plc 95356 16672 200511 2203915 398271 0.17 0.091 11953
Union Merchant Bank 4551 1441 5034 2203915 11359 0.32 0.002 -216
United Bank of Africa Plc 70086 2476 205110 2203915 248928 0.04 0.093 6239
Wema Bank Plc 54493 8310 61285 2203915 97909 0.15 0.028 1002
Diamond Bank Ltd 41805 1584 75166 2203915 125675 0.04 0.034 3522
Eagle Bank Ltd 1228 702 1177 2203915 1201 0.57 0.001 -345
Eko Int Bank Plc 8001 2159 14094 2203915 18856 0.27 0.006 620
Equitorial Trust Bank 23530 4705 34142 2203915 56034 0.20 0.015 2883
First City Monument Bank Ltd 12556 11120 26857 2203915 51318 0.89 0.012 1093
Fidelity Bank Ltd 15676 1784 20572 2203915 34953 0.11 0.009 1564
Guardian Express Bank Plc 6790 615 10053 2203915 14194 0.09 0.005 209
Int Merchant Bank 3938 3050 3259 2203915 6789 0.77 0.001 1211
Intercity Bank Plc 15340 4058 24743 2203915 33179 0.26 0.011 459
Marina Int Bank Ltd 3907 446 6982 2203915 11242 0.11 0.003 138
Nal Bank Plc 15306 1001 17747 2203915 44123 0.07 0.008 299
NUB Bank Plc 5156 446 13406 2203915 18751 0.09 0.006 625
Platinum Bank Ltd 19850 1237 21893 2203915 51671 0.06 0.010 1055
Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 2060 73 3860 2203915 6968 0.04 0.002 412
Zenith Int Bank Ltd 125531 3037 233413 2203915 329717 0.02 0.106 9165
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Fountain Trust Bank 8909 1439 9064 2203915 12461 0.16 0.004 -1015
Standard Trust Bank 39856 5126 104173 2203915 145940 0.13 0.047 2565
Oceanic Bank Plc 79762 22047 167401 2203915 217803 0.28 0.076 7265
Equity Bank of Nig Ltd 17105 2548 26063 2203915 36284 0.15 0.012 1100
Intercontinental Bank Ltd 55306 2707 110014 2203915 164348 0.05 0.050 6706
Nigeria Int Bank Ltd 30675 3087 44969 86979 0.10 4366
Ecobank Nig Ltd 22367 3236 32452 67653 0.14 2265
Data from Nigerian Banks for 2006
GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Access Bank 60941 6830 110879 3912542 174554 0.11 0.028 1119
Afribank Plc 48224 10940 94816 3912542 131270 0.23 0.024 3695
First Bank of Nig Plc 190004 14347 391169 3912542 538145 0.08 0.100 19831
Guaranty Trust Bank Plc 86958 3481 212834 3912542 305081 0.04 0.054 10025
IBTC Chartered Bank Plc 58132 8065 57073 3912542 110782 0.14 0.015 5418
Intercontinental Bank Plc 170035 11097 252281 3912542 360903 0.07 0.064 11030
Union Bank of Nig Plc 134864 18804 275457 3912542 517564 0.14 0.070 12350
Wema Bank Plc 75383 21681 85605 3912542 120109 0.29 0.022 7200
Bank PHB Plc 41841 4700 109870 3912542 156000 0.11 0.028 3484
Diamond Bank Plc 81306 3376 144570 3912542 223048 0.04 0.037 5292
Equitorial Trust Bank 37095 7516 72767 3912542 109740 0.20 0.019 2510
Fidelity Bank Plc 46398 7737 78648 3912542 119986 0.17 0.020 3587
First Inland Bank Plc 50663 23826 61380 3912542 106252 0.47 0.016 10308
First City Monument Bank Plc 26311 7240 70297 3912542 106611 0.02 0.018 3640
Unity Bank Plc 58666 21643 79683 3912542 131030 0.37 0.020 2370
Zenith Bank Plc 204057 4349 392864 3912542 608505 0.02 0.100 15154
Oceanic Bank Plc 105828 6912 310333 3912542 371587 0.07 0.079 11614
Skye Bank Plc 87379 15661 125472 3912542 174197 0.18 0.032 2091
Sterling Bank Plc 48207 9261 75026 3912542 111197 0.19 0.019 429
United Bank of Africa Plc 116963 9769 757407 3912542 851241 0.08 0.194 12514
Ecobank Nig Plc 54682 2384 84041 3912542 132091 0.04 0.021 5012
Nigeria Int Bank 38190 2700 61062 3912542 112272 0.07 0.016 10555
Stanbic Bank 13938 570 9008 3912542 65531 0.04 0.002 3622
Data from Nigerian Banks for 2007
GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Access Bank 118297 10546 205235 5647109 328615 0.09 0.036 8043
Afribank Plc 83760 12437 142277 5647109 182722 0.15 0.025 5081
Guaranty Trust Bank Plc 116682 2977 290792 5647109 478369 0.03 0.051 15350
IBTC Chartered Bank Plc 65107 8341 78316 5647109 146978 0.13 0.014 6185
Intercontinental Bank Plc 266665 13885 455701 5647109 638881 0.05 0.081 22316
Union Bank of Nig Plc 167819 18443 417406 5647109 619800 0.11 0.074 15320
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Wema Bank Plc 91490 22693 125476 5647109 165082 0.25 0.022 1879
Bank PHB Plc 106234 6076 307887 5647109 378949 0.06 0.055 10159
Diamond Bank Plc 102775 6390 211635 5647109 312250 0.06 0.037 8793
Equitorial Trust Bank 39890 7348 82577 5647109 130440 0.18 0.015 3878
Fidelity Bank Plc 76999 6762 176681 5647109 217144 0.09 0.031 4403
First Inland Bank Plc 50804 22331 130807 5647109 181308 0.44 0.023 3236
First City Monument Bank Plc 86824 3247 187991 5647109 262806 0.04 0.033 10675
Zenith Bank Plc 224347 6042 568012 5647109 883941 0.03 0.101 23289
Oceanic Bank Plc 349953 11614 690395 5647109 1030441 0.03 0.122 22341
Skye Bank Plc 115212 6762 269316 5647109 446114 0.06 0.048 7519
Sterling Bank Plc 54999 9041 106934 5647109 145975 0.16 0.019 605
United Bank of Africa Plc 334919 14690 897651 5647109 1102348 0.04 0.159 22827
Ecobank Nig Plc 121023 4842 222885 5647109 311396 0.04 0.039 10096
Nigeria Int Bank 44984 2598 79135 5647109 135879 0.06 0.014 8413
Data from Nigerian Banks for 2008
GLA PBD BTD NBTD GTA RNL STD PBT
Access Bank 255896 11300 351789 8610622 1043465 0.04 0.041 19042
Afribank Plc 131343 12027 278476 8610622 335695 0.09 0.032 12361
First Bank of Nig Plc 447061 9293 661624 8610622 1165461 0.02 0.077 38020
Guaranty Trust Bank Plc 297611 6081 357006 8610622 718000 0.02 0.041 27199
Intercontinental Bank Plc 429116 17674 1037420 8610622 1331404 0.04 0.120 9960
Union Bank of Nig Plc 272967 28122 649334 8610622 907074 0.10 0.075 29746
Bank PHB Plc 321443 8562 717929 8610622 1036586 0.03 0.083 25806
Diamond Bank Plc 240479 9034 403710 8610622 603327 0.04 0.047 15059
Fidelity Bank Plc 239676 8963 379729 8610622 533122 0.04 0.044 15796
First Inland Bank Plc 76444 16111 320012 8610622 444194 0.21 0.037 1109
First City Monument Bank Plc 193247 6682 251580 8610622 465211 0.03 0.029 18438
Skye Bank Plc 254162 9651 501596 8610622 784878 0.04 0.058 20425
Sterling Bank Plc 73342 7555 184730 8610622 236503 0.10 0.021 7790
United Bank for Africa Plc 435237 13489 1258035 8610622 1520093 0.03 0.146 45305
Zenith Bank Plc 427140 13409 1161476 8610622 1680302 0.03 0.135 48940
Standard Chartered Bank Ltd 62884 1368 96176 8610622 160279 0.02 0.011 11281
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